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Executive Summary 
Introduction 
Labour market intermediaries and the changing world of work 
The world of work is rapidly changing: technological progress has enabled new forms of work, which are 
characterised by high levels of flexibility, new opportunities for labour market participation through 
diverse forms of work and challenges linked to existing definitions of employment relationships. This study 
investigates the growth of the online talent platform economy, which is defined below, and the new forms 
of work it has spawned. It examines the size and structure of the online talent platform economy, with a 
focus on employment and its labour market effects. The study further analyses access to social protection 
and training for labour suppliers, and the applicable (regulatory) frameworks. These same issues are also 
considered for temporary work agencies and their workers, and a comparison is drawn between the two.  
Although the role of online talent platforms has been subject to a great deal of debate, in principle, such 
platforms function as labour market intermediaries that connect labour demand and supply in a triangular 
work relationship. Labour market intermediaries, such as temporary work agencies, have a long history in 
shaping the EU’s labour markets. By interposing themselves between workers and firms, intermediaries 
facilitate matching and reduce costs when competition in the labour market is imperfect and information 
is incomplete. Temporary work agencies, in particular, have been suggested as a model for online talent 
platforms, as both offer opportunities for flexible work and lower the barriers to enter the labour market. 
Yet, the differences between online talent platforms and temporary work agencies should be considered. 
In comparison with online talent platforms, temporary work agencies are heavily regulated, and there are 
also divergences in the content and organisation of work, among other dimensions. In general, temporary 
work agencies appear to offer different modes of work and their corresponding framework than offered 
by online talent platforms. In spite of these differences between temporary agency work and online talent 
platform work, there is overlap and there is a variety of platforms that, in some cases, offer comparable 
services as temporary work agencies. Moreover, hybrid forms that combine characteristics of online talent 
platforms and temporary work agencies have developed. As a result, the boundaries between the two 
models have become blurred.  
In the comparison of online talent platforms and temporary work agencies, there are two major obstacles 
to overcome: i) the lack of conceptual clarity on online talent platforms and work in the online talent 
platform economy, and ii) the lack of empirical evidence and data available for online talent platforms, 
and to a lesser extent, temporary work agencies. Despite advancements in the research, data remain 
scarce and the evidence on online talent platforms is rather patchy and mostly qualitative in nature. These 
deficiencies impede the analysis and makes it difficult to draw reliable conclusions.  
Definitions and conceptualisations 
Because there is no common definition or understanding of the platform economy, and the online talent 
platform economy more specifically, a conceptualisation is put forward in this study. For the purpose of 
this study, online talent platforms are defined as “digital work platforms that provide online peer-to-peer 
intermediation through which users can have temporary access to other users’ services and the payment 
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is made through the platform”. Individuals who offer labour on an online talent platform are referred to 
as online talent platform labour suppliers. 
In contrast, temporary work agencies and temporary agency work are defined in Directive 2008/104/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008. A temporary work agency is defined 
as “any natural or legal person who, in compliance with national law, concludes contracts of employment 
or employment relationships with temporary agency workers in order to assign them to user undertakings 
to work there temporarily under their supervision and direction”. A temporary agency worker is a “worker 
with a contract of employment or an employment relationship with a temporary work agency with a view 
to being assigned to a user undertaking to work temporarily under its supervision and direction”.  
Structure and size of online talent platform economy and temporary agency work sector 
Online talent platforms are a relatively new phenomenon in the EU. Initially, especially larger, American 
platforms dominated the market and the debate; later European platforms also gained ground. According 
to recent estimates, online talent platforms represent about 0.05% of total employment in the EU, 
although about 17% of Europeans are engaged in it as users or labour suppliers, according to the 2016 
Eurobarometer. Due to a lack of data, estimates on employment and revenues in the online talent 
platform economy tend to be imprecise and vary considerably. Despite its currently small size, the online 
talent platform economy is growing at a fast pace and has already had a disruptive impact in sectors where 
these platforms are most prevalent. Temporary agency work, in contrast, is well established. Temporary 
agency work corresponds to 2.5% of the EU labour force, representing a significant share of labour in a 
number of countries, but not in others. This type of work is closely linked to developments in the economic 
cycle. Prior to the economic crisis, temporary agency work was on the rise. During the crisis, there was a 
decline, and since then temporary agency work has seen some recovery.  
The online talent platform economy is characterised by a high level of heterogeneity, and it is becoming 
more heterogeneous as it continues to develop. There is less heterogeneity in temporary agency work. 
Most labour suppliers, who tend to be young men of an ethnic minority background living in urban areas, 
use this type of work to earn additional income and are active on multiple platforms. Temporary agency 
workers also tend to be young, labour market entrants or re-entrants. For both, the flexibility that online 
talent platform work and temporary agency work entail are important motivating factors. There is a range 
of online talent platforms and some operate based on similar business models and regulatory frameworks 
as temporary work agencies. Despite these similarities, the differences between online talent platform 
work and temporary agency work, for example in terms of a worker’s employment status, are likely to 
have an impact on the labour suppliers and clients that platforms and agencies attract. Far more people 
are making a living through temporary agency work than work in the online talent platform economy at 
this stage. 
Regulatory frameworks governing online talent platforms and temporary work agencies 
Regulation of the online talent platform economy has been the subject of much national and European 
debate, which has yet to be settled. For policy-makers, the challenge lies in attaining a balance between 
the benefits and risks created by the online talent platform economy for the different actors involved 
(from existing companies to new start-ups, but also workers and users participating in the online talent 
platform economy). In the absence of any specific framework governing (work in) the online talent 
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platform economy, the European Commission has clarified that the existing rules and regulation on 
taxation, competition and other domains apply. Because this framework may not be a good fit with the 
online talent platform economy, many grey areas remain. This has given rise to questions on what 
regulatory framework would then actually be applicable, and how its enforcement can be ensured. In this 
regard, the uncertainty on the status of labour suppliers is a major obstacle, as many regulations are 
directly or indirectly linked to status. As part of this debate, the option to introduce an EU-level regulatory 
framework has been discussed, but no consensus has been reached. Government responses at the 
national level are still in their early stages. On the online talent platforms’ side, there have been a few 
attempts of self-regulation, but these initiatives are also in their infancy. There is a growing number of 
court cases on the employment status of online talent platform labour suppliers, launched by workers, 
social partners and other stakeholders. 
For temporary work agencies, the situation is very different. Temporary agency work is governed by a 
specific regulatory framework, of which Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work is the most 
important component. In addition to this Directive, the regulatory framework is composed of Directive 
91/383/EC supplementing the measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of 
workers with a fixed-duration employment relationship or a temporary employment relationship, a 
number of ILO Conventions (of which especially ILO Convention 181 is relevant) and national regulations. 
The latter implies that there is some diversity in how temporary agency work is governed across national 
borders. Together, these EU and national regulations form a clear regulatory basis and guarantee that 
temporary agency workers have similar rights as employees with open-ended contracts.  
Access to social protection and the role of social partners for online talent platforms and 
temporary work agencies 
In the changing world of work, access to social protection has raised concerns among policy-makers, social 
partners and other stakeholders. In most EU countries, the existing social security schemes were designed 
with a very different employment model in mind than the new forms of work that are now emerging in 
the labour market. In these schemes, access to social protection is largely determined by one’s 
employment status, thereby creating issues in terms of statutory and effective access, and for those 
combining different statuses or transitioning between statuses. As a result, the existing social security 
schemes no longer seem fit for purpose. At the same time, access to social security has become a policy 
priority at the EU level, as laid out in the European Pillar of Social Rights.  
Access to social protection is linked to employment status, but the status of online talent platform labour 
suppliers is generally unclear. The status of online talent platform labour suppliers is heterogeneous and 
varies according to the business model of the platforms. As a result, labour suppliers may find themselves 
in a grey area in which it is also unclear for the authorities in charge of the social security scheme how 
these individuals should be treated. This uncertainty raises issues not only for the online talent platform 
economy, but also for other new forms of work. It also highlights the need for clarification on the status 
of online talent platform labour suppliers. In addition, as labour suppliers tend to be classified as self-
employed, more so than as employees, their access to social protection is likely to correspond with that 
of self-employed (which typically comes with less obligations as well as reduced rights). The option of 
introducing a third status has been discussed but has not yet been taken up in practice (with few 
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exceptions such as the UK). Governments, social partners and even some platforms have taken up this 
issue and policy responses are being developed. The measures that ultimately will be adopted, however, 
will depend on the national context and preferences. 
Access to social protection for temporary agency workers, in contrast, is similar to that of employees with 
open-ended contracts. Temporary agency workers have a clear employment status and can fall back on a 
regulatory framework that stipulates their obligations and rights in the domain of social security. For these 
workers, statutory access to social protection is typically not a concern. Yet, effective access is potentially 
problematic, i.e. temporary agency workers may face difficulties in meeting the conditions for access. This 
issue can be tackled by lowering eligibility thresholds, but this would have financial implications. 
Social partners are playing a major role in the online talent platform economy and the temporary agency 
work sector. In the online talent platform economy, social partners have called for a level playing field to 
address unfair competition in the market. Social partners have also voiced their concerns about working 
conditions in the online talent platform economy and have taken the first steps towards the organisation 
and representation of labour suppliers. The latter may be complicated by anti-cartel laws. With regard to 
temporary agency work, social partners are actively engaged in collective bargaining in several EU 
Member States. Sectoral social partners for temporary agency work have been fostering social innovation 
by developing solutions for transferable and portable rights. 
Skills development and access to training for labour suppliers in the online talent platform 
economy and temporary agency workers 
As technological progress and digitalisation are generating new jobs and new forms of work, the skills that 
are demanded in the labour market are also undergoing rapid transformation. These dynamics are further 
reinforced by the extension of working lives, globalisation and other socio-economic transformation. As a 
result, the skill needs are changing, skill gaps are widening and workers at all stages of their careers need 
to engage in training to ensure that their skills remain relevant. Considering that skills quickly become 
obsolete in today’s economy, continuous training (lifelong learning) is key for an individual’s 
employability. These issues have also been underscored in the 2017 declarations of the G20 and the L20 
(one of the six outreach groups within the G20, representing the interests of workers).  
Although it is clear that access to training matters for all workers, research shows that access to training 
is problematic for those engaged in non-traditional forms of work, such as online talent platform labour 
suppliers but also the self-employed. Access to training in the online talent platform economy appears to 
be minimal at best. Online talent platforms generally do not provide training opportunities to labour 
suppliers, and one can cite only a few platforms offer any training. In these cases, training tends to be 
organised in partnership with external training providers. The surveyed hybrid models, which combine 
characteristics of online talent platforms with those of temporary work agencies, appear to ensure access 
to training. Most online talent platforms, however, provide basic training covering safety regulations or 
the use of the platform. While these initiatives may boost a labour supplier’s employability on the 
platform, it is not clear what impact these would have on a larger scale. This lack of access to training in 
the online talent platform economy can be attributed to a number of factors, such as the immaturity of 
the platforms and their role as intermediaries, as well as the risk of a reclassification of labour suppliers 
into employees. 
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Access to training for temporary agency workers is on par with that for employees with permanent 
contracts. This is one of the domains in which social partners have played a fundamental role, for example 
by setting up bipartite training funds. The channels through which temporary agency workers receive 
training vary across the EU Member States; for example, training can be organised via the agency or under 
a broader framework. There are some cases in which access to training for temporary agency workers 
appears to be less comprehensive than for workers with other types of contracts.  
Labour market participation, labour market transitions and impact on undeclared and 
informal work of online talent platforms and temporary work agencies  
Among the potential benefits that are often attributed to online talent platforms and temporary work 
agencies is that these can encourage labour market participation and facilitate labour market transitions, 
by offering flexible options for work and lower barriers to entry. In that way, online talent platforms and 
temporary work agencies may provide opportunities for persons who face difficulties to find work in the 
regular labour market. Furthermore, temporary work agencies and online talent platforms can contribute 
to the reduction of undeclared work. These potential labour market effects are important in light of the 
United Nations’ sustainable development goals, notably the ambition to promote inclusive and 
sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all.  
Online talent platforms tend to formalise undeclared work and allow turning small jobs into a profession. 
While the potential labour market effects of online talent platforms are much discussed, there is only little 
evidence available to support or refute them. This is, in part, due to the overall lack of data on the online 
talent platform economy. In addition, and even more importantly, most online talent platforms are still 
limited in size and underdeveloped. It therefore seems to be too early to identify labour market impacts.  
Similarly, with regard to temporary agency work, there has been much debate on potential labour market 
effects, but also in this case, it has been difficult to derive conclusions as the evidence is fragmented and 
tends to focus on national cases. Temporary work agencies contribute to the formalisation of work. 
Temporary agency work lowers the barriers to access to the labour market for outsiders, facilitating 
transitions from unemployment into employment. For other transitions, the evidence is more mixed.  
Conclusions 
By comparing the online talent platform economy and the temporary agency work sector, this study aims 
to contribute to a rapidly growing literature on new forms of work and their impact on the labour market. 
It shows that online talent platforms and temporary work agencies do have features in common, but there 
are also significant differences between the two, which make it difficult to use temporary agency work as 
a model for the online talent platform economy; in many cases, it would not be a good fit. That being said, 
the call by policy-makers, social partners and other stakeholders for a level playing field should not be 
overlooked. Furthermore, the study also confirms that any comparison of the online talent platform 
economy and the temporary agency work sector is hampered by a lack of data. In order to address this 
issue, continued monitoring and much more transparency of online talent platforms will be needed, as 
well as further data collection and analysis of both the online talent platforms and the temporary work 
agencies. These efforts are important because more flexible forms of work are likely to become 
increasingly prevalent in the future. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The world of work has undergone tremendous changes in recent years. In the EU, technological, economic 
and societal developments have had a profound impact on production processes and the nature of work. 
In this context, the digitalisation of work and its implications for tasks, skills, organisation of work, business 
models, social dialogue and labour relations have been much discussed. Digitalisation gives rise to new 
jobs and skills and makes others become obsolete or significantly transformed – which explains why it is 
widely considered one of the main drivers of the ‘future of work’.  
Along with these developments, there has been a rise in new, non-standard employment forms, which go 
hand in hand with an increased flexibility, the wider application of advanced information and 
communication technologies, and changed relevance of specific occupations and sectors (Eurofound, 
2015). Some new forms of work are characterised by an increased fragmentation of work, blurred 
employment relationships and more diverse contract forms (Codagnone et al., 2016). As the number of 
transitions in the labour market goes up and more workers are combining several employment types, 
these new forms of work induce a shift from job security to employment security in the labour market. 
Although these new forms of work bring important benefits, for example the increased flexibility and 
more diverse work arrangements are welcomed by both employers and workers, they also present risks, 
for example regarding the classification of labour suppliers (De Groen et al., 2017). Furthermore, so far at 
least, their effects on employment and working conditions and the labour market more generally are 
poorly understood. This situation calls for further investigation (ILO, 2016). 
As part of this new world of work, online platforms have emerged on which labour or assets are supplied 
and demanded. The platform economy, which is also known as the ‘collaborative economy’, the ‘sharing 
economy’ or the ‘on-demand economy’, is, at its core, a collection of “business models where activities 
are facilitated by online platforms that create an open marketplace for the temporary use of goods or 
services often provided by private individuals” (European Commission, 2016). It is characterised by a wide 
diversity in platforms, in terms of size, sector, types of activities and other features. When the platform 
economy first gained ground in Europe, platforms of US origin were prominent. Since then, its complexity 
and heterogeneity have only increased.  
In this study, the focus is on online talent platforms, i.e. the online platforms that are work-based; where 
there is a clear work relationship.1 Online talent platforms have recently received much attention from 
academics, policy-makers, social partners, business owners and other stakeholders. This is motivated by 
the rapid growth of the platform economy in terms of value and participation, its potential benefits and 
its potential to disrupt, all of which have sparked debate in many EU Member States. While the online 
talent platform economy is still limited in size, despite the recent upsurge, platforms have already made 
their mark on the sectors in which they are concentrated (PWC, 2015).  
                                                          
1 Note, however, that this work relationship does not necessarily imply an employment relationship in the traditional 
sense, i.e. dependent employment. Online platforms that are mainly concerned with the sharing of assets are, 
therefore, excluded from the analysis. 
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When it comes to the online talent platforms, questions have been raised about the status of online talent 
platform labour suppliers and their access to social protection, in addition to concerns regarding working 
conditions, wages, and organisation and representation. The platforms themselves have also been under 
discussion, especially in relation to competition policy, taxation and the applicable laws and regulations. 
These dynamics have been widely discussed and their importance has been acknowledged, but they have 
not (yet) been the subject of serious, in-depth research. Furthermore, it is largely unclear at this early date 
what impact the online talent platform economy will have on the labour market, although preliminary 
literature has flagged the potential for both benefits and problems for labour suppliers.  
Nevertheless, the overall empirical evidence available to date is patchy. In part, this is due to the lack of a 
common definition or understanding of online talent platforms and platform work. This shortcoming is 
exacerbated by a lack of available data on the phenomenon, which complicates research into the platform 
economy and its socio-economic effects. In particular, comparative data are typically missing. While there 
have been a number of efforts to address this issue, the data available so far remain limited to surveys 
and case studies, and have often been unsystematic or narrow in scope.  
Against this background, the present study aims to analyse the online talent platform economy and then 
to present a comparison with temporary work agencies in terms of their characteristics, access to social 
protection and training, and the applicable (regulatory) framework. While the specific research questions 
are further elaborated in the various chapters, the goals of the study are i) to analyse the scope and nature 
of work in the online talent platform economy and ii) to identify opportunities and challenges facing 
labour suppliers and iii) examine potential labour market effects – in each case relating them to the 
experience of temporary work agencies. The study tackles these research questions from both a European 
and a national perspective.  
This report on online talent platforms, labour market intermediaries and the changing world of work was 
prepared by CEPS and IZA and was launched by the World Employment Confederation - Europe2 and UNI 
Europa. It forms part of the EU Sectoral Social Dialogue on temporary agency work and was financially 
supported by the European Commission.    
 
1.1 Definitions and conceptualisations 
As a starting point in our analysis of online talent platforms, temporary work agencies and the new world 
of work, we present the definitions and conceptualisations of online talent platforms and temporary work 
agencies used in this study.   
The conceptualisation of the online talent platform economy is a key challenge that needs to be tackled 
to fully grasp the phenomenon. When platforms first became the subject of public debate, concepts like 
‘sharing economy’, ‘collaborative economy’ or ‘gig economy’, inter alia were used as synonyms. This 
approach, however, overlooks some of the subtle yet important differences that exist between online 
                                                          
2 It should be noted that the World Employment Confederation was previously called Ciett, and, the World 
Employment Confederation – Europe was previously called Eurociett. In this report, publications from the World 
Employment Confederation and the World Employment Confederation - Europe that were prepared prior to the 
rebranding will, therefore, be referred to using their previous names, to provide readers with the correct reference.  
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platforms and obfuscates the debate (Maselli et al., 2016). At first, conceptualisations of the platform 
economy did not always account for the labour aspect. For example, the authors of one of the earliest 
conceptualisations of the platform economy (Frenken et al., 2015) use the concept ‘sharing economy’ and 
define it as a “phenomenon in which consumers grant other consumers temporary access to underutilised 
assets, possibly in exchange for money”. By relaxing this definition, other models can be attained (e.g. 
online platforms like Ebay, on which goods are exchanged permanently). Maselli et al. (2016) start from 
this conceptualisation to arrive at what they call the ‘on-demand economy’, which is composed of work-
based platforms. Later studies aimed to better delineate the types of work that are being performed on 
online platforms. Schmidt (2017), for example, distinguishes between ‘gig work’ (location-based) and 
‘cloud work’ (web-based). 
The European Commission introduced the term ‘collaborative economy’ in its 2016 communication to 
describe “business models where activities are facilitated by collaborative platforms that create an open 
marketplace for the temporary usage of goods or services often provided by private individuals” 
(European Commission, 2016). The collaborative economy engages three types of actors: i) service 
providers who share assets, resources, time and/or skills (private individuals offering services on an 
occasional basis or service providers acting in their professional capacity), ii) users of these and iii) 
intermediaries that connect — via an online platform — providers with users and that facilitate 
transactions between them (collaborative platforms). Although this definition is broad, it already 
highlights the triangular relationship between platform, client and provider, putting intermediation at the 
core of the debate. 
In this study, the focus is not on the platform economy as a whole, but rather on online talent platforms, 
which for the purpose of this study are defined as “digital work platforms that provide online peer-to-
peer intermediation through which users can get temporary access to other users’ services and the 
payment is made through the platform".3 The key point is that online talent platforms are used to provide 
access to flexible work opportunities, for specific tasks or assignments, and a set period of time (REC, 
2016). All payments to the labour suppliers are processed through the platforms. Such platforms are not 
to be confused with online job boards or professional social networking sites (REC, 2016). Those who offer 
their labour on an online talent platform are called online talent platform labour suppliers in this study. 
The definitions pertaining to temporary work agencies and temporary agency work are derived from 
Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary 
agency work. In line with the Directive, a temporary work agency is defined as “any natural or legal person 
who, in compliance with national law, concludes contracts of employment or employment relationships 
with temporary agency workers in order to assign them to user undertakings to work there temporarily 
under their supervision and direction”. A temporary agency worker is a “worker with a contract of 
employment or an employment relationship with a temporary work agency with a view to being assigned 
to a user undertaking to work temporarily under its supervision and direction”.  
 
                                                          
3 Note that this definition also includes work performed for businesses, in order to capture outsourcing of companies 
through online talent platforms – this could be relevant for the comparison with temporary agency work. Moreover, 
C2C models are also considered in the study (e.g. BlaBlaCar).  
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1.2 Comparing online talent platforms with temporary work agencies 
As the aim of this project is to compare online talent platforms with temporary work agencies in a range 
of domains, we will highlight differences and similarities between both. This exercise will help to clarify to 
what extent online talent platforms and temporary work agencies can be compared, and to what extent 
they represent different labour market segments. Although the role of the online talent platforms is not 
always clear, most online talent platforms maintain that they serve as intermediaries, matching labour 
demand and supply (or those offering a service and those in need of it). This argument has been refuted 
in a number of recent court cases (e.g. Uber in the UK), in which it was clarified that platforms can be 
employers even when their terms and conditions suggest otherwise. Moreover, some platforms identify 
themselves as tech start-ups or companies rather than a platform for labour market matching. That being 
said, the focus in this study is on online talent platforms and their position in the labour market. 
Labour market intermediaries have existed for many years and can be defined as “entities or institutions 
that interpose themselves between workers and firms to facilitate, inform, or regulate how workers are 
matched to firms, how work is accomplished, and how conflicts are resolved” (Autor, 2009, p.1). Economic 
theory suggests that labour market intermediaries can play a role when competition in the labour market 
is imperfect and information is incomplete. In practice, this is nearly always the case. For example, there 
are costs associated with the search for a job on a worker’s side, or the search for job applicants on the 
employer’s side. Temporary work agencies help firms to reduce the fixed costs of recruiting talent (Autor, 
2009). These fixed costs, which include identifying, hiring and screening workers, must be incurred before 
the task gets done. Firms might find these costs too high for jobs that are temporary in nature and 
therefore avoid making them at all. Temporary work agencies can help overcome this issue, by pre-
screening workers and arranging recruitment.4 In addition, temporary agency work provides firms with 
“numerical flexibility” which allows them to adapt their workforce quickly in times of rapid, but volatile 
growth or constriction and for regularly occurring, e.g. seasonal fluctuations. (Voss, 2013).  
Although research on online talent platforms has taken up a wide range of topics, the role of online talent 
platforms as labour market intermediaries has been quite underexplored. Similarly, in-depth comparisons 
with other types of labour market intermediaries have, to the best of our knowledge, not yet been done. 
For that reason, a comparison of online talent platforms and temporary work agencies can be helpful to 
better understand platform work and its implications for all involved stakeholders. In addition, a 
comparison can also provide insights into the functioning of the labour market, and the extent to which 
new actors (i.e. the platforms) are faced with the same rights and obligations as traditional actors (i.e. the 
temporary work agencies in this case) – i.e. to what extent is there a level playing field? Such an analysis 
further generates insights into some of the core questions in the debate: Are online talent platforms 
avoiding the employer status (in contrast to temporary work agencies, which do take up that role) to avert 
responsibilities and costs, at the expense of the labour suppliers. In general, the work relationships in 
some of the new forms of work have raised concerns about the classification of workers. These concerns 
have yet to be tackled. 
                                                          
4 For temporary agency workers, temporary work agencies also reduce costs, for example by pre-screening clients. 
This makes working through a temporary work agency an attractive option for those wanting a short-term position. 
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In a study performed for the European Parliament, Eichhorst et al. (2013) document a significant growth 
in the market of private employment agencies5 (which includes temporary work agencies). These authors 
explain that temporary work agencies offer important advantages to workers and employers, such as 
gaining work experience and benefitting from the stepping stone function of temporary agency work (for 
workers).6 Another example is the reduction of costs, as briefly mentioned above. IDEA Consult (2015) 
corroborates these potential benefits, further highlighting the strengths of the sector.  
There are important parallels between temporary agency work and online talent platform work, beyond 
the options for flexible work. Both have the potential to facilitate access to the labour market. As indicated 
above, the online talent platform economy is still rather small, but is characterised by fast growth and 
substantial heterogeneity; the temporary agency work sector had similar features not too long ago (e.g. 
temporary agency workers represent a relatively small share of the workforce in some countries, but a 
much larger share in others; the introduction of the Directive on temporary agency work in 2008 has led 
to some regulatory convergence in the sector). Nevertheless, the differences between both, for example 
in the employment status (temporary agency workers are employees and have the temporary work 
agency as employer; the status of online talent platform labour suppliers is to be clarified), the tasks 
performed, the client (firm vs. individual) and the level of integration into user firms, also have to be 
accounted for. Especially the modalities as to how work is organised are expected to differ. 
Notwithstanding these differences, Corpaal and Lehdonvirta (2017) report that large companies have also 
started using online talent platforms to source work from freelancers. Based on nine case studies, which 
include seven Fortune 500 companies and two multinational enterprises, Corpaal and Lehdonvirta (2017) 
point to three main motivations for these companies to engage online talent platform labour suppliers: i) 
gain access to a scalable source of labour, skills and expertise, ii) lower start-up and transaction costs in 
comparison to other sources of flexible labour and iii) reduce hiring barriers. Collaborating with online 
talent platforms also came with challenges, such as the need to adapt the platform to the firms’ existing 
infrastructure and policies, internal resistance and coordination costs. Building on this research, Corpaal 
(2017) points out six dimensions in which online talent platforms may have the advantage over temporary 
work agencies: cost, speed, flexibility, organisation, expertise and quality. These areas were identified on 
the basis of interviews with managers. Some managers, for example, pointed out that working with online 
talent platforms was easier from the organisational point of view, as their company used just one platform 
(versus several agencies to source the same labour) and had direct contact with the labour suppliers. This 
comparison, however, focuses only on the advantages for large potential client. It does not consider the 
perspective of other types of clients, nor of the worker, which is explored in more depth in this study. 
Similarly, the downsides of this type of work are also not mentioned. 
                                                          
5 In the study, private employment agencies are defined as “any enterprise or person, independent of the public 
authorities, which provides one or more of the following labour market functions: (a) services for matching offers of 
and applications for employment; (b) services for employing workers with a view to making them available to a third 
party (“user enterprise”); and/or (c) other services relating to job-seeking, such as the provision of information, that 
do not aim to match specific employment offers and applications. Agencies cannot charge workers for finding work.” 
6 The stepping-stone function refers to the capacity to facilitate different types of labour market transitions, for 
example from unemployment into employment, from employment into self-employment and others. For a more in-
depth discussion, please consult Chapter 6. 
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When comparing online talent platforms and temporary work agencies, it is important to note that hybrid 
models are starting to arise, with online talent platforms adopting the models and principles of temporary 
work agencies, and temporary work agencies launching platforms and apps to support their activities. The 
distinction between online talent platforms and temporary work agencies may become more blurred in 
the future. For example, platforms such as Book A Tiger and YOSS are vetting potential labour suppliers 
(e.g. Book A Tiger invites potential labour supplier for a job interview, and performs regular quality checks; 
note that its labour suppliers are employees and fully ensured, they also receive training). Platforms have 
also started to provide specific services to their clients. For example, Coople, which is a platform of Swiss 
origin that is specialised in retail, hospitality, events and promotion, logistics, business and administrative 
services and health care, offers consulting and payroll services.  
One additional observation is that online talent platforms have now entered into sectors and professions 
that involve flexible work but may not have been easily accessible before (at least not through direct 
contact between labour supplier and client). An example of this is care.com, on which vacancies for care 
professionals are listed (e.g. child care and senior care – in some cases, having a medical background is 
required). Care.com does not screen labour suppliers nor clients and seems to function as an online 
platform on which one can set up a profile and apply to or post vacancies. Another example is Helpper, a 
Belgian platform that connects the elderly, people with (chronic) illnesses or disabilities with a worker to 
support them in activities that are non-medical in nature (e.g. cleaning, cooking, doing groceries, etc.). In 
March 2018, Helpper received a grant of €1 million from Carevolution (a fund for innovation in care). The 
platform also established a collaboration with two major health insurance funds (Partena and OZ, the 
Independent Health Insurance Fund), which will direct their clients to Helpper. 
To return to the hybrid models, another interesting example is YOSS. YOSS is a new online platform 
created by the Adecco Group. YOSS aims to connect freelancers and large companies, recognising the 
challenges that both are facing. For freelancers, YOSS provides access to training, coaching and insurance, 
among other benefits. Whereas YOSS clearly is an online talent platform, the Adecco Group also has ADIA, 
which is a temporary work agency, and thus subject to the same regulatory framework as other temporary 
work agencies, but it fully operates online (through an app). ADIA was launched in the fall of 2016, YOSS 
was launched even more recently. Both examples highlight how temporary work agencies are adapting to 
technological change and new forms of work. 
Below, two examples are presented of platforms that intermediate work in the hospitality industry: Ploy 
(service launched by temporary work agency Randstad; its labour suppliers are hired as temporary agency 
workers) and Temper (online talent platform; labour suppliers are freelancers). Both offer similar services 
to the labour suppliers and clients using their tool (e.g. screening of applicants, ratings, payment system). 
While these two options exist side by side, it is clear that they may appeal to different audiences; e.g. 
those who choose to be self-employed versus those who prefer to work as temporary agency workers. 
These examples also illustrate the blurring boundaries between online talent platforms and other labour 
market intermediates.  
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Box 1. Temper 
Temper is an online platform that intermediates demand and supply, mostly for work in the hospitality 
industry (though other sectors are also represented on the platform). Temper is not a temporary work 
agency; and the platform’s terms and conditions clearly stipulate that it serves as an intermediary only. 
The platform does provide support to its clients and labour suppliers. For example, invoices are made 
up and shared by the platform. Temper also organises workshops for labour suppliers. 
 
How does Temper work? Clients (e.g. restaurants, bars, hotels, etc.) can register on the platform and 
post a request for work (i.e. a shift), to which labour suppliers can reply, after which the client selects 
a labour supplier (on the basis of information that is shared in their profiles, e.g. experience or rating). 
Although clients usually can set the remuneration for a shift, there are minimum rates for two 
professions: cooks and auxiliary cooks (€22 and €18 per hour, respectively, excluding the transaction 
fee). Clients wanting to hire a Temper labour supplier on a permanent basis are required to pay a fee 
to the platform. 
 
One of the features that makes Temper an interesting platform for further analysis is that it only works 
with freelancers, and that it allows people to try out an activity before turning it into their profession 
(which is one of the potential benefits that has been attributed to the online talent platform economy). 
More specifically, a labour supplier is allowed to work three times through the platform (TemperTrial), 
before s/he has to provide a VAT number and register with the Chamber of Commerce. After these 
three trials (also called shifts), one can no longer work through the platform without becoming self-
employed. These three trial shifts are exempted from taxes.  
 
In the Netherlands, where Temper is currently active, this model of working in the hospitality sector as 
a freelancer or self-employed seems to be very popular among young people, including students (Prick, 
2017). People working under this status appear to earn much more than their counterparts, which is 
due to a tax exemption (no income taxes have to be paid as long as annual earnings are below €24,000). 
In addition to this observation, the Temper model has been under scrutiny, and some have questioned 
whether Temper labour suppliers are indeed self-employed or whether this is a case of bogus self-
employment (as suggested by, among other, Stichting ZZP Nederland (i.e. the largest organisation for 
self-employed individuals without staff in the Netherlands), their argument being that Temper is trying 
to avoid the costs and responsibilities of an employer by forcing labour suppliers to assume the status 
of being self-employed). This debate, however, is far from settled. 
 
Source: Temper.works. 
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Box 2. Ploy 
Ploy is a service that is offered by Randstad, a temporary work agency that was created in the 1960s in 
the Netherlands and later expanded its activities to other European countries and beyond. With Ploy, 
Randstad aims to tap into the market involving hospitality businesses and professionals. Businesses can 
use the app to look for potential employees on a flexible, temporary basis. Especially in this sector, 
employers may struggle to fill vacancies on short notice, considering also the administrative and legal 
requirements in place.  
 
Ploy comes with an app for candidates (Ploy) and an app for businesses (Ploy Pro) to be installed on a 
smartphone or tablet. Upon registration, employers can provide information on the type of business, 
required worker profile, wages and other details. Candidates set up a profile with data on their age, 
experience, availability, and other characteristics and preferences. When looking for an employee, 
employers can send out a request for applications to all registered users or to candidates that have 
worked with their business before. Candidates can then reply to this request; after which a final 
selection is made by the employer. At the end of the shift, the employer enters the number of hours 
worked in the app; the payment for the service is then made through the app. This process is very 
transparent, which is important in a sector in which work may go undeclared. 
 
Work organised through the app is fully compliant with all legal and administrative requirements (e.g. 
candidates are employed as temporary worker via Randstad when working through the app and thus 
fully insured and covered by social security). Both employers and candidates are screened and receive 
a rating after the completion of the shift. Randstad is considering to expand the app to other sectors, 
such as retail, events and promotion, and logistics. 
 
Source: ploy.be 
 
More generally, the boundaries between online talent platforms and other digital platforms, such as job 
boards or professional social networking sites, are not always easy to denote. Traditionally job boards are 
set up as employment websites, on which employers can post vacancies for a position to be filled, to which 
job seekers can reply. Many job boards have now developed into platforms that go beyond the publication 
of vacancies (Beblavý et al., 2016). Instead, more and more job boards offer specific products or solutions 
for job applicants and companies, including pre-screening of job applicants and vacancy analytics, and 
some also target other stakeholders (e.g. work agencies, or education providers) and have their own 
research departments (e.g. Burning Glass). Some job boards have sections dedicated to platform work 
(e.g. jobmonkey has a ‘shared economy’ part where information on specific platforms is provided and ‘job 
offers’ for platform work are listed). Similarly, social networking sites, like Facebook and LinkedIn, have 
become more widely used for job search and recruitment. While some of these platforms have always 
had a focus on the labour market, other platforms had a different scope but are increasingly used also in 
this context.      
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1.3 Methodological challenges 
One of the main issues in the analysis of the online talent platform economy is that data are scarce. Even 
though the body of research on the online talent platform economy has grown substantially over the past 
few years, data availability remains an issue. As a result, many studies are rather descriptive in nature or 
focus on a specific platform or sector. Most studies have focused on the United States, although the 
evidence base for Europe is growing. Moreover, the most relevant data, such as information on labour 
suppliers who are active on the platform, are typically missing. Longitudinal data, covering a longer period 
of time, are also lacking. Besides these challenges, it is important to recall that platform work is a relatively 
new phenomenon, which implies that it is probably too soon to evaluate and arrive at conclusions on the 
impact of online talent platforms in the labour market. This concern is especially valid regarding the effects 
on labour market participation and transitions.  
Previous research has additionally shown that collecting data on online talent platforms and their labour 
suppliers is not an easy task. One reason is that online talent platforms are sometimes reluctant to share 
information, arguing that it might reveal the specificities of their business strategy. Another reason is the 
high volatility in the online talent platform economy, with platforms appearing and disappearing at a high 
pace. This complicates data collection and implies that collected data often provide only a snapshot of the 
online talent platform economy.   
In terms of methodology and data, this study will, therefore, strongly rely on existing literature (academic, 
policy and other publications) and data sources (surveys, case studies, online tools and databases).7 Each 
chapter is based on a literature review and desk research that focus on online talent platforms and 
temporary work agencies. The report is enriched with practical examples and small case studies, which 
are included to strengthen the analysis presented in the chapters. These examples are adapted to the 
question at hand, which means that for some a cross-country or cross-sectoral perspective is taken, while 
others focus on a specific national context, sector, profession or platform. Examples have been selected 
on the basis of data availability and with a view to covering different types of activities and practices. 
 
1.4 Structure of the report 
This study consists of seven chapters, each of which (other than the present introductory chapter) is 
dedicated to one of the topics outlined above. Chapter 2 covers the size and structure of the online talent 
platform economy and the temporary agency work sector. Chapter 1 describes the presence of a 
regulatory framework for online talent platforms and temporary work agencies. This chapter discusses a 
range of topics in the regulatory domain, including aspects related to taxation, competition, consumer 
protection and labour. In chapter 1, the access to social protection of those working through an online 
talent platform or temporary work agency are examined. The chapter builds on the previous chapter and 
reviews the roles of an individual’s labour market status, the employment relationship and social partners’ 
involvement, among other topics. Chapter 1 focuses on skill enhancement and access to training for 
                                                          
7 Examples are Eurobarometer 438 (2016) on the use of collaborative platforms, a survey on crowd work in the UK, 
Sweden, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands carried out by Huws et al. (2016), Eurofound work on new forms of 
employment (Eurofound, 2015) and ILO work on income insecurity of platform labour suppliers (Berg, 2016). Besides 
these sources, CEPS and IZA also build on their own substantial previous work on online talent platforms. 
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temporary agency workers and online talent platform labour suppliers. It investigates whether training 
opportunities are provided and what initiatives exist to facilitate access to such opportunities. Chapter 1 
considers the labour market effects of online talent platforms and temporary work agencies. In particular, 
the focus is on participation and transitions in the labour market, and informal and undeclared work. The 
final chapter 1 formulates conclusions and recommendations. Each of these chapters presents a 
comparison of the findings for temporary work agencies and online talent platforms. Further support for 
these results is provided in the form of case examples. This report also includes a glossary of key terms 
and concepts, to which readers can refer for clarification. 
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2. Size and structure of the online talent platform economy and the 
temporary agency work sector 
  
 
KEY MESSAGES 
 
 Estimating the size of both the online talent platform economy and the temporary agency work 
sector presents a number of methodological difficulties. 
 In the online talent platform economy, obtaining reliable estimates is further hampered by 
definitional issues. 
 Labour suppliers for online talent platforms currently represent roughly 0.05% of the European 
workforce, and around 17% of Europeans engage in the online talent platform economy as 
occasional consumers or labour suppliers. 
 Estimations for online talent platforms showed total gross revenues of approximately €4.5 
billion in 2016. 
 Roughly 2.5% of the labour force in Europe is in the temporary agency work sector, but this 
share varies greatly from country to country. 
 The online talent platform economy is growing much faster than the total labour force and is 
expected to continue to do so. 
 
 
2.1 Size of the online talent platform economy and the temporary work agencies sector 
In the absence of comprehensive official statistics, the size of the online talent platform economy and 
temporary work agencies is calculated on the basis of various sources of information. Besides the size of 
the platform economy and temporary work agencies in the EU28, the distribution across countries, 
sectors and types of work is also retrieved from various sources. 
2.1.1 Online talent platforms 
The creation of online talent platforms affects labour markets in many European countries. While initially, 
especially large well-known foreign platforms such as Uber originating from the US dominated also the 
EU market, recently smaller local online talent platforms have gained ground. Especially for local tasks 
and in countries where English is not an official language, these local online talent platforms can have a 
competitive advantage. 
Data on online talent platforms are still relatively scarce and opaque. The online talent platform economy 
is at best partially covered in the official economic and labour market statistics, but there are no specific 
indicators at this time that capture the platform economy. It is currently somewhat neglected in official 
statistics and subject to various measurement problems. One of the main issues is that there is no 
universally agreed definition for the platform economy.  
In order to determine the size of the platform economy in the absence of official statistics and a uniform 
definition, three methods are currently used: surveys, administrative data and big data. Economic activity 
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is traditionally measured with surveys among companies for value creation and among households for 
consumption. The platform economy diffuses this traditional division somewhat with households or 
unincorporated individuals also creating value. Not all of these activities might be adequately captured in 
the official statistics. Online talent platform activities might be under-reported since at least part of the 
revenues are not considered. In particular unincorporated individuals and corporates with income below 
the value-added tax threshold and without employees on their payroll are not captured (as illustrated, for 
example, in the UK8). 
2017 was the first year that Eurostat included questions on the usage on online platforms in its 
questionnaire on internet access, in order to get a better understanding of the market size of the services 
provided by individuals. These questions, however, only covered the consumer-to-consumer platforms in 
the transport and accommodation sectors. Moreover, such surveys tend not to be very accurate when 
the services are used frequently or are sensitive such as undeclared activities (ONS, 2017).9 
The platform economy is likely to be under-reported in the current labour market statistics, precisely for 
this reason. In labour force surveys, for example, respondents are asked to indicate all their jobs and how 
much time they spend on these, but not about the nature of these jobs. Moreover, although the platform 
economy workers earn money with their activities, they are not always considered as an additional job, 
which is likely to contribute to under-reporting (Wile, 2015; Bean, 2016; Coyle, 2016). Part of the work 
might not be reported, since it has not been declared to the tax authorities. It is currently not known what 
share of the earnings gained from working on online platforms is reported (Kässi and Lehdonvirta, 2016). 
Another way to assess the size of the platform economy is using administrative data. These data, which 
were not always intended to be used for statistical purposes, are also problematic. The platforms generally 
are hesitant to share data with statistical offices and governments (Black, 1998). In fact, not all participants 
in the platform economy are required to publish their financial statements. Moreover, there is no specific 
category in the standard industrial classification for only the online platforms, which makes it more 
difficult to identify the relevant companies.10 In addition, the reported data might not always be 
comparable. The reported turnover and number of employees, for example, may just be the fee received 
                                                          
8 Moreover, the business expenses and investments in tangible goods might be under-reported. Indeed, the 
expenses of unincorporated individuals in particular are not categorised as business expenses but rather as 
consumption. The costs for cars that are used for transportation services such as Uber are a good example of 
business expenses/investments that are likely to be categorised as consumption. 
9 The investments in intangible assets such as human capital, research and development are likely to be under 
reported as well, although traditionally most of the costs related to intangible assets have been considered as 
expenses instead of investments. This is gradually changing. In the revisions of the European statistics standards 
(ESA, 2010), research and development (R&D) costs have been categorised as investments, reducing the value 
added. These costs cover primarily the scientific (knowledge) part in sectors such as engineering and information 
technology, while non-scientific (creative activities) in sectors such as art and retail are largely ignored. This is 
relevant to part of the activities in the platform economy, but also the wider economy in which human capital plays 
an increasingly important role (Bean, 2016). New technologies allow predominantly routine tasks to be automated 
with the remaining non-routine tasks requiring primarily creative and entrepreneurial skills (De Groen et al., 2017). 
The OECD has already recommended broadening the definition of R&D to better capture the creative activities. 
10 Based on a small sample of 50 platforms, the UK statistics bureau found that they were categorised in various 
categories, including ‘business services and finance’, ‘Transport, storage and communication’, ‘Distribution hotels 
and restaurants’ and ‘Government and other services’ (ONS, 2016). 
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by the platform and the number of employees working for the platform. Moreover, the figures of the 
platform might also cover activities that are unrelated to the platforms. This could lead to both under- 
and overstatement of the activities in the platform economy (ONS, 2016). 
The increasing amount of data from social media, online media and various devices, however, create an 
additional potential source of big data. Most national statistics offices are currently just beginning to 
explore the possibility of using these new sources, various researchers are already using web scraping and 
application programming interfaces (APIs) to obtain data on online platforms. With web scraping, 
unstructured data are extracted from the source code of the platforms, while with APIs the data that are 
provided for web applications by third parties can be obtained. Both methods have the disadvantage that 
they only include the data that the platforms are willing to provide or display, which vary from one 
platform to another (ONS, 2016). Moreover, the online talent platform economy is quite volatile, with 
platforms emerging and disappearing at a fast pace.  
In the absence of a single reliable source to estimate the size of the platform economy, a combination of 
methods is used to estimate and validate the size of the online talent platform economy in the EU. In 
previous studies, all three methods mentioned above have been used to estimate the size of the platform 
economy or similar phenomena. Huws and Joyce (2016), for example, used online surveys to determine 
activity in the online economy. However, online surveys that compensate participants tend to overstate 
the online activity, since the workers that are more involved in online activities are also likely to be more 
engaged in online intermediated work (De Groen et al., 2017). Other work, like Lehdonvirta and Ernkvist 
(2011), Kuek et al. (2015), and De Groen and Maselli (2016), used interviews and data from the platforms 
to estimate the size and growth rates. Farrel and Gregg (2016) used financial transaction data from a large 
US bank to estimate the activity in the platform economy. PWC (2016) used a variety of sources, including 
statistical databases, financial statements, other secondary sources, and expert views. Staffing Industry 
Analyst (2017) simply used financial statements. Kässi and Lehdonvirta (2016) used APIs of the largest 
online platforms intermediating digital services in the UK.  
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Box 3. Online Labour Index 
The Online Labour Index (OLI) developed by the Oxford Internet Institute (OII) presents an interesting 
example of an economic indicator that can be used to capture the size of the platform economy (work-
based platforms only and platforms for local services are excluded from the analysis). More specifically, 
the OLI keeps track of the tasks posted on the largest English-language online platforms, as well as the 
status of these tasks (open, in progress, closed). By analysing information on the number of tasks, and 
their status, the development of the online platform economy can be assessed. In addition, data on the 
occupation classification and employer country are gathered through web crawling. Recent results 
published on the iLabour project website provide support for the rapid growth of the platform economy 
in 2016-17. This growth is mostly driven by a rising demand for software development and technology 
work, and in creative and multimedia work. Especially professional services, while being only a small 
segment of the work intermediated online, also saw a significant increase. Whereas the US remains 
dominant as employer country, the platform economy is growing in Europe (mostly in the UK and in 
Germany – recall that only online labour is taken into consideration). OLI data can also be used to study 
mismatches between demand and supply of work in the online talent platform economy.  
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on Kässi and Lehdonvirta (2016). 
 
 
Summarising these estimations, the platform economy is found to play an important role only in certain 
sub-segments (Baker, 2015). Overall, the platform economy is still of relatively minor importance, but 
growing rapidly. The estimations of PWC (2016) suggest that the platform economy generated gross 
revenues of approximately €32 billion in 2015 (around 0.2% of EU GDP). This was already substantially 
larger than in previous years. The total revenues of the platform economy grew 58% in 2014 and 79% in 
2015. This figure, however, captured five sectors including accommodations and financial services, in 
which the labour component is relatively limited. These two categories do not reflect well what is 
happening with online talent platforms. On the other hand, labour-intensive on-demand activities, 
including transportation (€2.4 billion), household (€6.75 billion) and professional services (€850 million), 
generated in total approximately €10 billion or 0.1% of EU GDP.  
Turning to the number of people active in the platform economy, there is a clear distinction to be made 
between the surveys that have been conducted online and via phone, as the latter show substantially 
lower participation rates. Huws and Joyce (2016), for example, commissioned an online survey among 
more than 8,500 adults in four European countries (Austria, Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom).11 According to the survey results, which were conducted in early 2016, between 11% and 23% 
of the populations in the four countries provide crowd work via online platforms (e.g. Upwork). In 
addition, there was a large group of people that would like to provide crowd work, which would have 
reflected around a 50% increase in participation for Austria and the Netherlands and double for Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. 
                                                          
11 In Austria in total 2,300 adults (age 18-64) completed in April 2016 the survey. The survey in the Netherlands was 
completed in April 2016 by 2,125 persons (age 16-70). In Sweden 2,146 people (age 16-65) completed the survey in 
the period February-March 2016. In the UK the survey was already completed in January 2016 by 2,238 people (age 
16-75). 
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The results of online surveys are likely to be overstated. The main reason for this seems to be that the 
people who fill out these online surveys against a payment are more used to doing online micro tasks for 
payments, which has some similarities with most of the work via online talent platforms. In Huws and 
Joyce (2016), this more intense online activity is also reflected by the fact that between one-half and two-
thirds of the participants are selling their own belongings on platforms such as Amazon and Ebay. 
Although the definitions and timing of the surveys often differ, there are some surveys that can serve as 
comparison.  
Phone interviews based on random selections are more likely to provide more reliable figures. For the 
Eurobarometer on the collaborative economy, such phone interviews were conducted for all EU Member 
States in early 2016. The definition used for the survey is broader than Huws and Joyce (2016), since it 
also included platforms intermediating assets and services with limited or no labour component. The 
Eurobarometer results, nevertheless, suggest that fewer EU citizens are active in the platform economy. 
According to the Eurobarometer survey, around 17% of the EU citizens have used platforms. There are, 
however, large discrepancies across countries. In some countries such as France (36%) and Ireland (35%), 
a large share of the population has been active on platforms, while in other countries such as Cyprus (2%), 
Malta (4%) and Czech Republic (7%), much fewer people are active. Looking at the share of people that 
provided goods and services, roughly about one-third of the people who indicated to have visited the 
platform also provided services through it. Indeed, around 5% of the EU population would have provided 
services in the collaborative economy. The French (16%) population has been the most active in providing 
services, followed by Latvia (11%) and Croatia (10%) at some distance. In turn, in Malta (0.6%), Cyprus 
(0.6%) and Hungary (1.1%) only a very small share of the population is active in the platform economy. 
Figure 1. Share of population (%) providing goods and services at platform 
 
Note: The figure above shows the share of the population that has provided goods and/or services via 
collaborative platforms.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurobarometer (2016). 
 
The activity determined based on online and offline surveys is both substantially higher than what could 
be expected based on the figures provided by the largest platforms. Harris and Krueger (2015) estimated 
the number of active participants in the collaborative economy in the US at 900,000 or 0.6% of employees. 
Using a similar methodology, De Groen and Maselli (2016) estimated that the equivalent for the EU at the 
end of 2015 would roughly be 100,000 or 0.05% of employees. The difference between the figures of the 
16%
11%10%
7%
6% 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1%
FR LV HR SE SI RO DE BG ES PL DK IT LU LT AT CZ FI NL IE GR SK PT EE BE UK HU CY MT
16 | ONLINE TALENT PLATFORMS, LABOUR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES AND THE CHANGING WORLD OF WORK 
 
 
 
  With financial support  
from the European Union 
Eurobarometer and the extrapolation based on the platforms is likely to be at least partially caused due 
to differences in definitions of the platform economy and workers. First, the extrapolation of Harris and 
Krueger was purely based on active workers (provided services in the last month), which is much stricter 
than the Eurobarometer indicator, which did not have a time constraint. Second, Harris and Krueger 
(2015) focus only on the platforms with a labour component, whereas the Eurobarometer included all 
platforms. This is likely to have a material impact, since these platforms are more developed as the 
estimations from PWC (2016) showed. Third, the estimations of Harris and Krueger (2015) and De Groen 
and Maselli (2016) were made for periods pre-dating those of the surveys, which is likely to lead to lower 
results given the high growth rates of the online platforms. The latter is an important motivation to 
regularly update estimations of the size of the online platform economy. 
To estimate the size of the online talent platform economy in this study, a bottom-up approach is used. 
Hence, the size of the online talent platform economy is estimated aggregating the size of all the online 
platforms with some activity that meets the definition provided in the introduction. The gross list of 
platforms is based on the dataset with European Platforms of JRC (2017)12. This dataset includes also some 
information on the characteristics and size of the platforms. The approach is in line with the approach of 
PWC (2016). 
The size of the platform economy is estimated based on the total annual gross revenues for the EU. Gross 
revenues include both the compensation for the execution of the task, activity or job as well as the fee 
charged for the services provided by the online platform. The JRC (2017) dataset contains information 
about the gross revenues for some platforms from primary and secondary sources. The revenues are often 
for the entire platform, which can contain tasks that are executed outside the EU. For interpolation and 
extrapolation, the database has been extended with data on unique monthly visitors and origin across 
countries from Amazon’s Alexa in August 2017, which serves as a proxy of the activity on a platform.   
The gross revenues of the online talent platforms are not always available at EU level. For that reason, we 
use interpolation to scale the revenues provided at mostly global level back to EU level. This is done on 
the basis of the share of unique visitors. When the revenues are provided for the global activities, they 
are multiplied with the share of unique visitors in the EU. Indeed, this assumes that the platform generates 
the same gross revenues per unique visitor across the globe.  
The online talent platform economy is quite heterogeneous. Differences between platforms, such as in 
average transaction amount, are likely to lead to variations in average revenues per unique visitor. In the 
extrapolation exercise, this heterogeneity issue is addressed by identifying platforms for which revenue 
data are available that share some similarities with the platforms for which no revenue data are available. 
Similar platforms are identified using clustering methodology.  
There are various clustering techniques that could be used to categorise online platforms. In this analysis, 
hierarchal clustering is chosen because it provides the best clustering in the sense of the inertia gain. This 
technique measures the differences between data points on the basis of the five variables. At the start of 
                                                          
12 The authors gratefully acknowledge the JRC for giving authorisation to use the database. This database was 
created as part of a recently completed research project entitled “Review of collaborative economy labour platforms 
in the EU”, which was launched and funded by the JRC. The database is presented and described in a report 
“Overview of European Platforms: Scope and Business Models” (see Fabo et al., 2017). 
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the exercise, each data point is a cluster. Then, the closest data points are agglomerated, which creates 
clusters with several platforms. The aim of the hierarchal clustering is to minimise the total within-cluster 
heterogeneity and maximise the heterogeneity between clusters, which is measured by inertia gain. 
Figure 2. Inter-cluster inertia gain  Figure 3. Hierarchical clustering 
   
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.    Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
The optimal number of clusters in hierarchal clustering is given by the inter-cluster inertia gain. When 
there is a clear-cut break in the inter-cluster inertia gain, adding a cluster may give more information, but 
would prevent clear separation between clusters. In this analysis, the optimal number of clusters is six. 
However, using six clusters means some clusters are extremely small and have too little data on revenues 
and service providers, which make it impossible to make an accurate estimation. Therefore, the second 
most important break in the inertia gain is used to determine the ideal number of clusters. This occurs in 
the transition from three to four clusters (see Figure 2). In the end, the 173 crowd employment platforms 
are divided in three groups (see Figure 3). 
To arrive at the gross revenues for individual platforms for which these data are missing, an extrapolation 
is done with the number of unique visitors at hand. Many platforms are quite small, which is reflected in 
the absence of data on unique visitors in the Alexa database. Thus, only part of the platforms in each 
cluster was used to estimate trend lines, which express the relation between gross revenues and unique 
visitors for the platforms in each of the clusters. The least-squares method is used to estimate the 
coefficients of the function. To find the best fit (highest r-squared), several functions are estimated, 
including linear, exponential and logarithmic. In general, one would expect a non-linear relation, because 
the more activity on the platform the more likely that demand and supply will meet and lead to 
transactions (see e.g. De Groen et al., 2016). 
The number of unique visitors can only explain part of the gross turnover. The explanatory power of these 
trend lines expressed in share of variance explained is fair (R² ranging between 0.27 and 0.45). The 
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strongest predictor is for cluster 1, which is probably due to less variation in types of tasks and services 
within the cluster. 
Figure 4. Gross revenues trend lines 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
The estimators for the trend lines are used to estimate the gross revenues of the individual platforms in 
each of the clusters. The estimated results are compared to the gross revenues reported in the JRC 
database. The information on gross revenues for various geographical areas and unique visitors was 
available for about a third of the platforms in each of the clusters. The estimation of the total revenues 
for all crowd work platforms is based on a combination of the estimations and the data in the JRC-dataset. 
If revenue data were available in the JRC database, these data are used; if not, then the estimates are 
used instead. 
For some platforms, there are large differences between the estimation results and the gross revenues in 
the JRC-database. This could be explained by the imprecision in the estimation, but also the JRC database. 
Hence, the five variables that define the clusters are determining only part of the revenues per unique 
visitor and most of the information in the database is obtained from online sources such as the platform 
websites of which the quality is uncertain. The data is often not subject to external audits and compliant 
with international accounting standards and platforms might be inclined to present higher revenues to 
signal that the platform is successful. 
Table 1. Estimation of the gross revenues 
Cluster Total gross revenue (€) % of EU GDP 
Cluster 1 € 1.65 billion  0.011% 
Cluster 2 € 2.56 billion 0.017% 
Cluster 3 € 0.27 billion 0.002% 
Total € 4.48 billion 0.030% 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Overall, the platforms had an estimated total gross revenues of about €4.5 billion for 2016 (see Table 1). 
This is quite near the PWC study (2016), which estimated the revenue of five sectors of the collaborative 
economy at €3.6 billion for 2015 in Europe. It could be interpreted as significant growth in this portion of 
the economy, which would align with expectations. 
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The estimated number of active workers13 is calculated as the sum of employees of the platform and the 
service providers performing tasks via the platforms. The number of service providers is sometimes 
reported in the JRC database, while for all platforms the number of employees is known. However, the 
number of employees is provided in scales, for example 1 to 10 or 11 to 50. Summing up all the lower 
values and upper values, the platforms should have between 11,000 and 45,480 workers. Taking the most 
conservative estimate as a starting point, the number of employees working for platforms (not as service 
providers) in Europe is likely to be around 11,000. 
Figure 5. Service providers trend lines 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
Turning to the estimation of the service providers who provide tasks via the platforms, the estimation 
approach is highly similar to the estimation of the gross revenues. As before, the estimators of the trend 
lines are used to determine the number of service providers of the platforms for which the information is 
available in each cluster. The data on number of service providers and unique visitors were available for 
roughly a third of the platforms in each of the clusters. For each cluster, the trend lines are estimated for 
the platforms whose number of service providers as well as number of unique visitors are known. The 
explanatory power of these trend lines is similar as for the gross revenues (R² ranging between 0.32 and 
0.51). The estimates are added to the number of service providers indicated in the JRC dataset to obtain 
the total for each respective cluster (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Estimation of the number and share of active workers 
Cluster Total active workers (million) % of EU labour force 
Cluster 1 3.4  1.58% 
Cluster 2 2.5  1.15% 
Cluster 3 6.9  3.15% 
Total 12.8  5.88% 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
                                                          
13 For the JRC database, the term “service providers” was used to distinguish between two types of platform users – 
customers (who need not necessarily pay for services, only receive them) and service providers, who perform work 
intermediated through the platform (Fabo et al., 2017). 
20 | ONLINE TALENT PLATFORMS, LABOUR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES AND THE CHANGING WORLD OF WORK 
 
 
 
  With financial support  
from the European Union 
Overall, the surveyed platforms had 12.8 million active workers in the EU for 2016, which is equivalent to 
5.9% of the total employment (ages 15-64).14 This is similar to Eurobarometer (2016), which estimated 
the number people who regularly provide services on the collaborative economy at roughly 5% of the EU 
population. Still, as Eurobarometer considered a much wider variety of platforms than the present study 
(e.g. accommodation and finance, and e-commerce websites) and looked at whether people have ever 
worked via platforms, the present study’s estimation would actually be considerably larger. 
Compared to De Groen and Maselli (2016), which estimated 100,000 service providers worked in the EU 
in 2015, this result is much higher. Part of the difference is likely owing to self-reporting on service 
providers, for which platforms have an incentive to inflate the actual numbers. Some numbers are highly 
suspect. For example, one platform reported nearly 3 million service providers, which is incredible given 
that the site had fewer than 1 million unique visitors for the surveyed month. This platform alone 
accounted for some 40% of the service providers in cluster 3. Another consideration is that some active 
workers may be counted multiple times. Some overlap is inevitable, in that it is likely that providers offer 
services on multiple platforms. Future efforts can further refine the methodology and data quality.  
Despite the small size of the online talent platform economy, one should not overlook its rapid growth or 
disruptive effects in those sectors where platforms are the most prevalent. Furthermore, work on online 
talent platforms, together with other new forms of work, is on the rise and it may especially attract young 
people and others who are facing difficulties in the labour market. Especially in southern Europe, where 
unemployment rates remain high, new types of work may be an attractive option. These issues are further 
explored in the next section. 
Demographics and profile of online talent platform labour suppliers 
In order to shed more light on the demographics and profile of online talent platform labour suppliers, a 
number of online surveys have been conducted (De Groen et al., 2017). Focusing on the US, a 2015 survey 
conducted jointly by Burson-Marsteller, the Aspen Institute and TIME of 3,000 Americans reported that 
22% of the surveyed individuals has worked through an online talent platform. The most common profile 
of an online talent platform labour supplier – a young man of minority background living in an urban area 
– tends to be overrepresented (Burson-Marsteller, Aspen Institute and TIME, 2015).  
For Europe, Huws and Joyce (2016) confirm that especially young men of ages 18-24 are overrepresented. 
A Danish survey of about 18,000 people conducted in 2017 found that about 1% of the surveyed persons 
earned money through an online platform within the last year, of whom the majority earned less than 
                                                          
14 Note that this exercise is based on a head-count. No data on full-time equivalents or working hours are available. 
It is clear, however, that online talent platform labour suppliers are typically combining their activities with other 
forms of work (multiple job handling). Moreover, working times for online talent platform activities do not account 
for the hours that workers spend looking for or bidding for work. Using Amazon Mechanical Turk as a test case, Hara 
et al. (2018) examine the median hourly wage of 2,676 labour suppliers on the platform. They find that the hourly 
wage calculations are heavily influenced by how unpaid work is accounted for, i.e. how is time spent waiting or 
bidding for tasks, working on tasks that are not won, not submitted or rejected, etc. accounted for? The authors 
report that the vast majority of labour suppliers (around 96%) on average earns less than the federal minimum wage 
of $4 per hour. Data further show that on average labour suppliers lost $30 on time for returned tasks (which they 
started working on but did not complete), while unpaid time between tasks amounts to something between $8 and 
$30, depending on the worker. 
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€3,300 before taxes (Ilsøe and Madsen, 2017). This confirms that most labour suppliers view the online 
talent platform economy as an opportunity to supplement income from other sources. Very few labour 
suppliers depend on online talent platforms for their main source of income. The survey also revealed an 
overrepresentation of the unemployed and new labour market entrants among labour suppliers, most 
notably young, low-skilled, low-paid, immigrant and temporary workers. Ilsøe and Madsen (2017) argue 
that the online talent platform economy might serve as a stepping stone into employment for these 
groups of people.  
When it comes to the reasons why individuals participate in the online talent platform economy, several 
motivations have been suggested, ranging from access to flexible work, to opportunities to try a new 
activity, or options to build up a portfolio or clientele prior to establishing themselves as self-employed 
(De Groen et al., 2017). More details are provided throughout this report. 
2.1.2 Temporary work agencies 
IDEA Consult (2015) presents an overview the temporary work agencies sector and its size and structure 
in particular. The report finds that temporary agency work (TAW) represented about 2.5% of total 
employment in the EU15 in 2012, which is relatively limited in comparison to other employment forms. 
The share of temporary agency work in total employment grew by 1 percentage point over the period 
1998-2012. The Labour Force Survey (Eurostat. 2018) presents similar numbers for 2016 (EU-28): 2 % for 
males and 1.3% for females. The study of IDEA Consult (2015) further indicates that the Great Recession 
had an important impact on the sector, in that the amount of temporary agency work dropped more 
quickly than other types of labour. An additional point is the substantial heterogeneity, regarding 
penetration rates, in temporary work agencies across the EU Member States. Based on this analysis, IDEA 
Consult (2015) finds that temporary work agencies play an important and growing role in the labour 
market. 
Accurately measuring the size and composition of the temporary agency work sector depends on the 
presence of basic, comparable and reliable data across the European Union. The availability of such data 
remains limited (Michon, 2006; Eichhorst et al., 2013). For example, as of 2013, no data on temporary 
agency workers were available for Bulgaria or Cyprus, and Estonia and Lithuania’s data were unreliable 
(Ibid.). Even as of 2017, this problem still persists and has since been pointed out by various studies. 
Voss et al. (2013, p.44) wrote: “(…) we would like to stress (…) the limitations of any comparative review 
and interpretation of quantitative data. The situation results from the fact that the underlying national 
statistics differ quite significantly from the sources used (e.g. statistical office, LFS data, estimations of 
national temporary agency work employers’ organisations, data provided by bilateral observatories.” 
More recently, a publication of Eurofound (2016, p.7) stressed a similar point: “Due to the specific nature 
of temporary agency work (the triangular contractual relationship with the agency as well as the user 
company) and, related to this, different national concepts of counting agency workers (…) it is extremely 
difficult to gather employment data on agency work on a comparative basis. As the method of gathering 
data on temporary agency employment differs between countries, any comparative review faces several 
uncertainties, for example, on the absolute number of employees or with view on structural 
characteristics.”  
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Directive 2008/104/EC has clarified the temporary agency work sector at the EU level, and additional data 
sources have become available such as those from Ciett. Still, other data-related issues remain. Additional 
difficulties in measuring the size of the temporary agency work sector include the rapid turnover of 
temporary work agencies and the seasonality of much of the relevant work, among other issues (Voss et 
al., 2013). Nevertheless, the available data are sufficient to draw certain conclusions. The most important 
measures for the size of the temporary agency work sector are the absolute size and the relative size. 
Absolute size is largely a function of broader economic forces, and relative size is generally seen as the 
more illustrative measure. Relative size is determined by one primary indicator, namely the ‘penetration 
rate’ of TAW in the labour market. The penetration rate is defined as the share of the daily average 
number of temporary agency workers (full-time equivalents) in the total employment. A few caveats must 
be noted. First, the size of total employment is not expressed in full-time equivalents. Second, the 
overwhelming majority of EU 27 countries, with very few exceptions (amongst them Belgium and Poland), 
authorise the use of open-ended contracts in agency work (Ibid.). Therefore, temporary agency workers 
would include both those “temporarily” hired by a temporary work agency and those working for a 
temporary work agency under a “permanent” or open contract.  
Table 3 displays the percentage of temporary agency work across the EU. There is no or unreliable data 
for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia and Malta. 
Table 3. Percentage of temporary employment agency workers (ages 15 to 64) 
Region/Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
EU27 1.7 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 
Austria 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 
Belgium 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.1 
Croatia 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.2 
Czech Republic 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.9 1.3 
Denmark 1.4 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.7 0.8 
Finland 1.3 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.8 
France 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.7 
Germany 1.9 1.7 2.2 2.4 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.1 
Greece 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 
Hungary 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.4 
Ireland 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3 
Italy 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 
Latvia 4.4 1.8 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.7 
Lithuania 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.7 1.8 
Luxembourg 0.5 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.5 2.1 1.8 
Netherlands 3.4 2.7 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.6 4.1 
Norway 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Poland 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 
Portugal 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.1 
Romania 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 
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Slovakia 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.5 2.6 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.3 
Slovenia 5.8 5.5 6.0 5.3 5.2 4.7 4.7 5.3 5.2 
Spain 4.1 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.7 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.0 
Sweden 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 
United Kingdom 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Note: Data for Slovenia also include students, which is not the case for the other countries. 80% of all temporary 
agency workers are students, which explains the high share reported for Slovenia. No data are available for Bulgaria 
and Estonia. 
Source: Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa_qoe_4a6r2&lang=en) 
Based on the above data, a few observations can be made. First, Slovenia has by far the highest share of 
temporary agency work in the EU, the reason being that Student Agency Work is considered a special 
variety of temporary agency work in that country, with students accounting for 80% of all agency workers 
(Osvald, 2017). Temporary agency work is also particularly prevalent in the Netherlands. With 23.3% of 
temporary agency workers under 25 years of age and 54.5% of temporary agency workers below the age 
of 35 (Statistics Netherlands), Dutch temporary work agencies might act as a facilitator for the labour 
market entry of young people. Furthermore, research suggests that temporary agency workers in the 
Netherlands receive substantially more training than fixed-term workers (Boston Consulting Group and 
Ciett, 2011), which could make agency work more attractive than fixed-term contracts elsewhere. France, 
Germany and Belgium represent countries with a moderate share of temporary agency workers. Greece, 
Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Italy have low penetration rates. The UK is special case as no robust statistics 
are available for the size of the temporary agency work sector (estimates range from 300,000 to 1.2 
million).15 Still, Hudson-Sharp and Runge (2017) report that in the UK temporary agency work is a much 
more prominent employment form than in most European countries. Table 3 also documents a decline in 
temporary agency work in the crisis period, providing support for the connection between TAW and 
economic conditions. These initial observations are further supplemented by data from the OECD (2014), 
which is presented in Table 4, and allows us to distinguish between open-ended and fixed-term positions. 
                                                          
15 Estimates on the number of temporary agency workers in the UK vary substantially across different sources (i.e. 
academic sources tend to indicate numbers around the lower end of the range, while data from recruitment agencies 
and employment confederation data provide estimates around the higher end of the range). There are no official 
figures of the number of agency workers (Judge and Tomlinson, 2016). The numbers reported in the table are derived 
from Eurostat, and based on data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS, conducted by the national statistical office and 
centrally processed by Eurostat). LFS data appear to underestimate the number of temporary agency workers in the 
UK (inaccuracies in LFS data may be due to the self-reported format of the LFS (respondents may incorrectly classify 
themselves as temporary agency workers) or the small proportion of workers engaged in temporary agency work in 
several countries (making it harder for a household survey like the LFS to find them)). There are several potential 
explanations for the discrepancies in the estimated number of temporary agency workers: fluctuations resulting 
from higher turnover rates (compared to workers with open-ended contracts), varying levels in the demand for work 
(e.g. students seeking work in the summer) (Biggs, 2006). Other surveys are based on snapshots of the number of 
temporary agency workers on assignments in a given time period (BIS, 2010). Finally, Druker and Stanworth (2001) 
further indicated that temporary agency workers may reside on the books of multiple agencies, and may be placed 
into work by multiple agencies.       
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Table 4. Permanent and fixed-term contracts, of which with a temporary work agency (percentage of all 
employees, average 2011-2012) 
  
PERMANENT FIXED-TERM 
TWA 
  All permanent 
contracts 
Not with 
a TWA 
With a 
TWA 
All fixed-term 
contracts 
Not with 
a TWA 
With a 
TWA 
Austria 90.6 88.6 2.0 9.4 9.2 0.3 2.2 
Belgium 91.5 91.5 0.0 8.5 6.7 1.8 1.8 
Czech Republic 91.9 90.7 1.2 8.1 7.9 0.2 1.4 
Denmark 91.3 90.5 0.8 8.7 8.4 0.3 1.1 
Estonia 96.0 95.8 0.2 4.0 3.9 0.1 0.2 
Finland 84.4 83.9 0.5 15.6 14.9 0.7 1.1 
France 84.9 84.9 0.0 15.1 12.8 2.3 2.3 
Germany 85.6 83.9 1.8 14.4 13.1 1.2 2.8 
Greece 89.2 89.0 0.3 10.8 10.7 0.1 0.4 
Hungary 90.8 90.2 0.7 9.2 8.8 0.4 1.0 
Ireland 89.8 89.3 0.6 10.2 9.8 0.4 0.9 
Italy 86.4 86.4 0.1 13.6 13 0.6 0.6 
Latvia 94.3 93.0 1.3 5.7 4.9 0.8 2.1 
Lithuania 97.3 96.7 0.6 2.7 2.6 0.1 0.7 
Luxembourg 92.7 91.8 0.9 7.4 6.7 0.6 1.5 
Netherlands 81.2 80.8 0.5 18.8 16.3 2.5 2.9 
Norway 91.8 91.7 0.1 8.2 8.1 0.1 0.2 
Poland 73.3 73.3 0.0 26.7 26.2 0.5 0.5 
Portugal 78.6 78.0 0.6 21.5 20.1 1.4 1.9 
Slovak Republic 93.4 91.9 1.5 6.6 6.1 0.5 2.1 
Slovenia 82.5 81.9 0.7 17.5 12.8 4.6 5.3 
Spain 75.5 74.0 1.5 24.5 23.4 1.2 2.7 
Sweden 83.8 83.1 0.7 16.2 15.6 0.5 1.3 
United Kingdom 93.9   6.1    
Source: OECD (2014) 
The OECD data demonstrate marked heterogeneity in the temporary agency work sector beyond the 
penetration indicator; for example the distinction between open-ended and fixed term contracts for 
temporary agency workers shown in Table 4. Open-ended contracts for temporary agency workers are 
forbidden in Belgium and Poland, and authorised in France only since 2013. In Germany, Sweden, Austria 
and several other countries, the majority of temporary agency workers were hired under open-ended 
contracts, while in other countries like Spain, Estonia, Croatia and the UK, open-ended contracts are rare 
(Countouris et al., 2016). In the Netherlands, there exists a three-phased contractual system: only after 
completing phase A (78 weeks worked for the same agency), workers move to phase B, in which they are 
paid between assignments and when ill. Phase B might last up to four years and only after entering Phase 
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C are workers entitled to a permanent contract (Collective Labour Agreement for Temporary Agency 
Workers, 2012-2018; 2017). 
Analysis from IDEA Consult based on Eurostat (LFS Data) and Ciett data demonstrates two other notable 
elements of the size of the temporary agency work sector. First, in absolute terms, all forms of work 
(temporary agency work, self-employment, open-ended contracts, and temporary employment including 
temporary agency work) grow together. This indicates that no form of work grows strongly at the expense 
of another, at least for the EU15 and the timespan considered between 1998 and 2012. In relative terms, 
however, the same data show that temporary work of all kinds and open-ended contracts are inversely 
correlated. This is sensible, of course, when considering the proportions of different types of work. 
Nevertheless, analyses suggest that the data do not show a structural correlation between growth in one 
type of flexible labour and growth, or decline in any other form of flexible labour (IDEA Consult, 2015).  
One additional point on the size of the temporary agency work sector is notable. The total share of 
temporary employment is positively correlated with the extent of employment protection for open-ended 
contracts against dismissals. This seems to reflect employer preferences for flexible labour, especially 
when the perceived costs and risks of standard employment are relatively high.  
Growth 
The growth of the temporary agency work sector is quite high, significantly higher than total employment 
growth in absolute terms. Temporary agency work increased by 10.9% in 2007 according to the European 
Labour Force Survey (LFS). Eurociett reported 13.1% growth for the same year. After the worst of the 
Great Recession, the temporary work agency resumed growing at a high rate, by 8.6% in 2010 and 8.0% 
in 2011. 2015 showed 9.6% growth in temporary agency work compared to 2012 (WEC, 2015). These 
conclusions ought to be viewed cautiously, however, given the difficulties in the classification of firms 
(Eichhorst et al., 2013).  
IDEA Consult’s (2015) recent analysis of the size and growth of the temporary agency work sector finds 
evidence that growth in the temporary agency work sector is closely linked to GDP levels. While this is 
fairly intuitive, it is interesting to note that growth in temporary agency work is more sensitive to GDP 
than other types of work. That is to say, when GDP rises, all types of employment will grow in absolute 
terms – but temporary agency work tends to grow more. Consequently, a higher than average decline 
occurs in times of economic downturn. It is important to note, however, that the tendency for strong 
growth in temporary agency work and non-standard forms of employment was clearer in the period 
before the Great Recession (IDEA Consult, 2015).  
 
Demographics and profile of temporary agency workers 
The gender ratio of temporary agency workers varies greatly from country to country. In most of the 
Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) a gender bias, in terms of the distribution 
according to gender, towards women can be observed, while in Austria, Germany, France and Belgium 
one can find a gender bias towards men. Between July 2016 and June 2017, 70% of temporary agency 
workers in Germany were male (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2018). In the UK, the percentage of male 
agency workers decreased from 60% in 2011 to 53% in 2016 (Judge and Tomlinson, 2016). A balanced 
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ratio of around 50% can be found in Italy, Poland, Romania, the Netherlands and Hungary (Voss et al., 
2013). At the European level, 58% of agency workers are male (CIETT, 2016), compared to 56% at a global 
level (WEC, 2017). 
Workers in the temporary agency workforce tend to be younger than those in the total active working 
population. In 2015, the age group under 31 years old accounted for about 59% of the total temporary 
agency workforce in Europe, as depicted in the figure below (WEC, 2017). The number of younger workers 
is especially high in the Netherlands, with 23.3% of temporary agency workers under 25 and 54.5% under 
35 (Statistics Netherlands). On the other hand, a much higher disparity in regards to the proportion of 
workers above 54 can be noted. While, for instance, only 13% of German (BA, 2018) and 10.4% of Dutch 
(CBS, 2016) temporary agency workers are over 54, the UK’s share of older workers is more than 30% 
(Judge and Tomlinson, 2016). 
Figure 6. Age of temporary agency workers in Europe in 2015 
 
Source: WEC (2017). 
 
IDEA Consult (2015) and other comparative sources support the notion that a large share of temporary 
agency workers either has a low or medium initial education level, although 26.7 % has completed higher 
education (IDEA Consult, 2015). Notwithstanding a lack of comparative data, information garnered from 
national temporary agency work organisations shows that in most European countries the largest group 
of temporary agency workers is the one that has completed secondary education. In Germany, for 
example, 27% of agency workers have no formal vocational qualifications, 16% have had an academic 
education and 64% completed a vocational training (BA, 2018). Exceptions are countries with a high share 
of low-level education of temporary agency workers, such as Czech Republic (70%), Spain (56%) and 
Hungary (44%). Conversely, countries with a high share of educated temporary agency workers are 
Bulgaria and Sweden (both 40%), Belgium (31%) and the UK (30%) (Voss et al., 2013). 
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A generality which can be observed in the TAW sector is that on average and according to Ciett data, over 
three-quarters of temporary agency workers in Europe are employed in the services sector and in 
manufacturing. Yet there exist significant variations between European countries. These can broadly be 
divided into two categories, regarding the role of services and manufacturing. Firstly, there are the more 
industrially-advanced countries where TAW in manufacturing has a comparatively high share in total 
temporary agency employment. Secondly, a smaller group of EU countries (UK, Spain and the Netherlands 
among others) are characterised by a share of services in the temporary agency workforce of more than 
50% of the total.  
2.1.3 Summary and comparison of size 
In 2015, the temporary agency work sector represented a penetration rate of 1.9% of total employment 
in Europe (WEC, 2015). Eurostat estimates that 1.7% of employees work for temporary work agencies 
(Eurostat, 2017). The penetration of temporary agency work is quite varied across Europe, with 
substantial fluctuations from one country to another.  
By contrast, measuring the online talent platform economy poses its own set of difficulties. No uniform 
definition exists for the online talent platform, which hinders data collection from administrative data, big 
data or other methods. Nevertheless, a few attempts have put the size of the online talent platform 
economy at roughly 0.05% of the European labour force as of 2015. The phenomenon, however, is very 
likely to be underreported. The percentage of individuals who engage in the online talent platform 
economy as consumers or part-time labour suppliers is much higher, roughly 16%, but significantly higher 
in some countries and assuming a very wide definition of online platforms. Both in the United States and 
Europe, roughly 2/3 of labour suppliers in the online talent platform economy are estimated to be Uber 
drivers. This corresponds with the early market entry of the personal transportation model to Europe, as 
well as the adaptability of the model and high level of demand for alternatives to existing modes of 
transportation. The growth of the platform economy is expected to be very high. Estimates put the rate 
at 79% revenue growth for Europe in 2016. 
Both the online talent platform economy and temporary agency work sector are growing, but the platform 
economy is almost certain to grow more quickly. It represents an adaptable and fast-evolving model, and 
new forms of online talent platforms are being created constantly. Like other internet-based technologies, 
online talent platforms are sure to evolve and grow quickly in coming years.  
 
2.2 Structure of the online talent platform economy and the temporary work agencies 
sector 
2.2.1 Online talent platforms 
This section provides a typology for the online talent platform economy. There is a large set of potential 
distinguishing categorisation elements that can be divided in three broad dimensions related to online 
platforms, work offered and the personal situation of the worker, respectively (see Eurofound, 2018 - 
forthcoming). Table 5 provides a comprehensive list of categories across the three dimensions. 
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The first group of categorisation elements is related to online talent platforms. The characteristics of these 
platforms play an important role in determining the organisation of crowd work. These characteristics 
include elements such as market position, owner, dynamism, size, sector, etc.  
A second group of categorisation elements involves those linked to work offered on online talent 
platforms. These categories capture different aspects of crowd work such as scale, complexity, required 
skills, working place and time, autonomy, etc. 
The third set of categorisation elements include characteristics of the crowd workers performing the tasks. 
There is considerable heterogeneity among crowd workers, which can be captured in categories such as 
age, gender, living area, education, labour market status, pluralism, etc.  
Table 5. Categorisation elements pertaining to online platforms, work offered and personal situation 
Online platforms Options 
Market position Monopoly, oligopoly, competition 
Dynamism Stable/static, dynamically changing 
Ownership Commercial, cooperative 
Size Number of clients, workers, tasks or activities (relative to other 
platforms) 
Sector, occupations NACE, ISCO 
Accessibility Generally open, Restricted (eligibility criteria) 
Transparency of client and 
worker 
Anonymous, Disclosed 
Services offered Matching vs. management of tasks, Guidance/recommendations for 
clients and workers, Pre-screening of ads/offers, Training for workers 
Conduct Existence and characteristics of terms and conditions, Adherence to 
specific codes of conduct, Data protection mechanisms, 
Control/surveillance mechanisms 
Fees to platform Registration (client, worker, task), Successful matching, Successful 
task completion 
Initiator Client, Worker 
Matching process Competition/Contest, Procurement/Specification/Offer 
Selection process Client, Platform, Crowd worker, Third party/Panel 
Work offered Options 
Scale of tasks Micro, Larger (projects) 
Complexity of tasks Routine tasks (simple, non-innovative), Complex tasks (moderate), 
Creative tasks (sophisticated, innovative, cognitive) 
Required skills (level) Low, Medium, High 
Format of service provision Virtual, Physical 
Type of activities Specialist (i.e. focused on one type of tasks, e.g. delivery), Generalist 
Working time Worker is free to choose when and how long to work, Restrictions 
imposed by clients/platform 
Autonomy in task 
Completion 
Hierarchy-like (low autonomy), Market-like (high autonomy) 
Award of competition One winner, Several winners, All participants 
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Price setting Full discretion of the client/worker, Minimum prices set by the 
platform, Standard prices set by the platform (financial, token) 
Realisation of payments Directly between client and worker, Through the platform (deposit) 
Clients Private individual, Private organisation, Public organisation 
Access to social protection Full access, Partial access, No access 
Access to representation Full access, Partial access, No access 
Personal situation Options 
Age Young [18-29], Middle [30-49], Old [50-65] 
Gender Male, Female 
Living area Urban, Rural 
Educational attainment ISCED 
Family background Single (no children), Partner (no children), Single (children), Partner 
(children) 
Labour market status Employee (full-time/part-time/other), Self-employed (full-
time/part-time/other), Unemployed, Other 
Pluralism Active on one platform or multiple platforms 
Main source of income Regular employment activities, Crowd employment, Other 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Eurofound (2018 – forthcoming). 
As explained in the previous section, in this analysis the crowd platforms and the work they generate have 
been mapped based on clustering analysis. The clusters are based on five categorisation elements 
retrieved from the literature16 and availability in the JRC database. The first variable is set of skills required 
of the crowd worker for the intermediated work through the platform, which is closely linked to the 
remuneration level. The second variable is the format of service provision or location. Whether the service 
is conducted virtually or physically is also found to be an important factor for the hourly remuneration. 
The third and fourth variables are the market sector and the types of services offered by the platform, 
respectively, which are related to the intensity and duration of tasks. The fifth variable indicates whether 
or not the platform intermediates a task via an app. This is a technical variable to account for the fact that 
the number of website visitors might be only capturing part of the activity on a platform at the moment 
that most of the intermediation is performed through a mobile application. Many platforms use apps 
alongside websites, the visitors of which are not captured in the number of unique visitors. 
The clustering run on these five clusters led to three distinct clusters. Taking a closer look at a plot of the 
clusters in the figures above, there is a clear divide between the three clusters (see Table 6). The variable 
coding for the format of service provision (location) is highly discriminating: 98% of virtual platforms are 
located in cluster 3, whereas of the bulk of platforms in the other two clusters intermediate physical work. 
Another variable that helps to differentiate the clusters is the required skills. All platforms in cluster 1 are 
involved in low-skilled work, all platforms in cluster 3 intermediate high-skilled work, and the platforms 
in cluster 2 intermediate a mix of low- and medium-skilled tasks. The main difference between clusters 1 
and 2 are the sector and services. The platforms in cluster 1 intermediate transportation services and in 
those in cluster 2 intermediate various other tasks covering all cleaning, laundry services, food and eating, 
home maintenance and care services. 
                                                          
16 See e.g. Codagnone et al. (2016) and De Groen et al. (2016; 2017). 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics for online platform clusters 
Cluster Examples Required 
skills 
Format 
of 
service 
provision 
Sector Services offered App 
Cluster 1 
Low-skilled 
physical 
platforms 
focusing on 
transportation 
(44 obs.) 
Uber, 
Taxify 
Low 
(100%) 
Physical 
(100%) 
Transportation 
services 
(100%) 
Transport of people 
(55%), transport of goods 
(32%), delivery of goods 
(14%)17 
App 
(50%), 
No 
app 
(50%) 
Cluster 2 
Low-to-medium 
skilled physical 
platforms 
focusing on 
domestic and 
local services 
(80 obs.) 
Listminut, 
Taskrunner 
Low-to-
medium 
(43%) 
Physical 
(99%) 
Local services 
(74%), local 
tasks (13%), 
local and 
professional 
services (10%) 
Various local services 
(24%), cleaning (14%), 
laundry services (10%), 
home maintenance (9%), 
food and eating (9%) 
App 
(23%), 
No 
app 
(77%) 
Cluster 3 
High-skilled 
virtual platforms  
(49 obs.) 
GoPillar, 
Freelancer 
High 
(67%), 
medium-
to-high 
(25%) 
Virtual 
(98%) 
Professional 
services 
(100%) 
Various professional 
services (33%), design 
and creativity (25%), IT 
services (18%), consulting 
services (10%), academic 
texts writing (8%) 
App 
(10%), 
No 
app 
(90%) 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.  
2.2.2 Temporary work agencies 
As can be expected, there is a diversity of structures across the EU Member States for the temporary 
agency work sector. As noted in Directive 2008/104/EC (para. 10), “there are considerable differences in 
the use of temporary agency work and in the legal situation, status and working conditions of temporary 
agency workers within the European Union”. 
This reflects various histories and approaches to the temporary agency work sector across the EU. In fact, 
Directive 2008/104/EC required around ten years of consultations, negotiations and debate to be 
finalised. National governments were required to implement the Directive by the end of 2011. This 
Directive serves as the cornerstone for a shared understanding of the temporary agency work sector in 
Europe, with respect to definitions, rights and structure (Voss et al., 2013).  
Temporary agency work is triangular, which is to say that temporary work agencies, user firms, and 
temporary agency workers are all connected in the system. This basic structure is indicated by Figure 7 
below. 
                                                          
17 Transportation of goods is business-to-business (B2B), while delivery of goods is business-to-consumer (B2C) or 
consumer-to-consumer (C2C). 
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Figure 7. Stylised structure of temporary agency work sector 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration, based on Storrie (2006). 
While there is some diversity in the legal arrangements governing the different parts of this triangular 
relationship, the basic functions of the temporary work agency, worker and user firm are more or less the 
same across Europe. Again, this common European understanding of the temporary agency work sector 
is provided by the EU Directive on temporary agency work (Directive 2008/104/EC), which further defines 
each portion of the temporary agency work sector. 
Temporary work agency (denoted in Figure 7 as ‘Agency’): is defined as any natural or legal person who, 
in compliance with national law, concludes contracts of employment or employment relationships with 
temporary agency workers in order to assign them to user undertakings to work there temporarily under 
their supervision and direction (Article 3.1B). 
Temporary agency worker (denoted in Figure 7 as ‘Worker’): is defined as a worker with a contract of 
employment or an employment relationship with a temporary work agency with a view to being assigned 
to a user undertaking to work temporarily under its supervision and direction (Article 3.1C) 
User undertaking (denoted in Figure 7 as ‘User Firm’): is defined as any natural or legal person for whom 
and under the supervision and direction of whom a temporary agency worker works temporarily (Article 
3.1D). 
Assignment: is defined as the period during which the temporary agency worker is placed at the user 
undertaking to work temporarily under its supervision and direction (Article 3.1E). 
Lastly, as indicated in Figure 7, the relationship between temporary work agencies and temporary agency 
workers is governed by the relevant employment contract. At the same time, the relationship between 
temporary work agencies and user firms is governed by relevant commercial contracts. As noted before, 
employment contracts themselves can vary, being either temporary or fixed in duration, or open ended 
in other circumstances, depending on the national legal context, and other relevant considerations. Fixed 
contracts can be repeated a certain amount of times or indefinitely, depending on the national legal 
context. This rather general overview of the structure of the temporary agency work sector is refined in 
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Chapter 3, with discussions and examples of specific regulatory contexts that affect structure and 
function. 
2.2.3 Summary and comparison of structure 
The structure of the online talent platform economy and temporary agency work sector have one obvious 
similarity, namely the intermediary function. At first glance, the way in which online talent platforms 
intermediate transactions between labour suppliers and consumers is similar to the way in which 
temporary work agencies intermediate between user firms and temporary agency workers. However, the 
similarities in structure do not extend much further. 
Online talent platforms represent a great variety of models, some of which rely on labour to be completed 
in person, and some of which is completed entirely remotely via the internet. Activities can be complex, 
such as full projects that need completion, or small, for example click work. Labour suppliers working an 
on online talent platform tend to be regarded as self-employed, although this is not necessarily the case. 
The online talent platform typically charges a fee for connecting the labour supplier to the consumer. 
Temporary work agencies generally have an employment contract with temporary agency workers to 
connect those to user firms for in-person labour at a particular location. There is some variation in this 
arrangement, but in general it holds true across Europe. Accordingly, the employment contract and 
commercial contract are important considerations for temporary work agencies, but usually only the 
commercial contract is of concern for online talent platforms.  
Nevertheless, it is difficult to make generalisations that hold true across all EU Member States and sectoral 
contexts. Even looking to the same online talent platform, different structural arrangements exist in 
different EU Member States. A great variety of structures of online talent platforms already exist, and new 
ones are likely to emerge – making this already heterogeneous sector even more diverse. While the basic 
structure underlying the temporary agency work sector in Europe is defined under Directive 2008/104/EC, 
no such overarching framework exists for the online talent platform economy.  
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3. (Regulatory) framework governing online talent platforms and 
temporary work agencies 
 
 
KEY MESSAGES 
 
 The regulatory framework of the temporary agency work sector is primarily determined by 
Directive 2008/104/EC at the European level, and further governed by national regulations. 
 Overall, the regulatory framework for the temporary work agency is very clear, especially 
compared to the current state of affairs in the platform economy. 
 There is no clear and specific European legal framework governing the online talent platform 
economy. Nor are there comprehensive regulatory frameworks operating at the national level. 
 The existing regulations apply at different governance levels to companies, intermediaries, 
consumers and potential third parties, depending on the sector of activity. However, a range 
of grey areas remains, especially regarding the application of laws pertaining to consumer 
protection, health and safety, and labour. 
 A series of possible solutions have been put forward in the literature, but no concrete policy 
example has successfully provided a clear-cut and balanced solution for dealing in practice with 
the online talent platform economy so far, at least in Europe.  
 
 
3.1 The (regulatory) framework governing online talent platforms and labour in the 
online talent platform economy 
The proliferation of online talent platforms present various challenges to the traditional world of work. 
While offering job seekers practical solutions to earn money, it also raises several legal and ethical 
questions on the way they interact with individuals and operate in their ecosystem. Their actual impact 
on online and offline markets and the eventual consequences for employment is generating more and 
more interest from researchers and policy-makers in search of policy solutions.  
Despite their advantages to workers in terms of flexible work with few entry barriers, the emerging talent 
platforms and their labour suppliers currently lack clarity regarding legal protections and obligations. They 
present policy-makers with a range of regulatory issues that remain for the most part unresolved. In order 
to reduce the uncertainties that harm platform-owners, workers and companies, policy-makers need to 
provide clear-cut answers to such questions as: To what extent is the platform regarded as an 
intermediary or an employer? What is the status of the labour supplier and under what conditions is 
income taxable or exempt? To what extent is the pursued activity perceived as professional (i.e. not 
occasional), and what regulatory regime should apply? What are the administrative requirements to abide 
by the rules? Is public intervention needed, or can self-regulation provide guarantees for all parties 
without stifling innovation?  
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To meet these new challenges, policy responses to date have appeared in rather disparate and 
experimental ways (De Groen et al., 2017; Lenaerts et al., 2017). Various regulatory experiments across 
Europe were envisaged to cope with the negative effects on existing companies and market structures, 
but no coordinated action has been taken at the EU level (Henley, 2017). New sector-specific rules have 
been enacted in a few cases,18 but this makes it difficult to draw a comprehensive approach to the 
problem. More importantly, the risk is to fragment the European market for online talent platforms.  
Equally important, the issues posed by online platforms shed light on the lack of adaptive regulatory policy 
in a context of fast-paced technological transformation. While amplifying recurrent questions pertaining 
to the impact of technology on employment and labour relations, it also raises a set of relatively new 
regulatory issues. These relate to: i) taxation and administrative clearance; ii) consumer protection and 
liabilities; iii) issues of competition, data governance and privacy; and iv) other aspects relating to labour 
conditions and regulations, such as employment status, which discussed later in this study. While 
technological change might well be at the source of the frictions affecting labour markets, digital 
technology might also be leveraged to bring innovative solutions to long-standing problems, e.g. the fight 
against fiscal fraud and undeclared work. 
Despite the absence of a specific framework governing online talent platforms, the existing rules apply de 
facto on consumers, firms, intermediaries and potential third parties. In its official communication on “A 
European agenda for the Collaborative Economy”, the European Commission (2016) stressed that existing 
EU laws already apply to the activities pursued through ‘collaborative economy’ platforms, such as market 
access requirements, consumer protection, sector-specific regulation or taxation. The Communication 
encouraged EU Member States not to take unjustified and disproportionate measures that could hinder 
market access, but there remain many grey areas and uncertainty in many cases. The activities and rise of 
some online talent platforms have triggered disruptions and widespread protests that have resulted in 
court cases. Governments have started to respond to these challenges, but this has mostly been in a 
reactive and case-by-case manner (De Groen et al., 2017; Lenaerts et al., 2017). More understanding of 
the key provisions that regulate the functioning and operations of these platforms is therefore needed. 
As for the work conducted on the online talent platforms themselves, there is no specific framework 
governing this activity, which implies, again, that the existing laws and regulations apply when it comes to 
working conditions, health and safety at work,19 as well as other related issues. An additional level of 
complexity arises from the multiple approaches that have been adopted in the attempt to clearly define 
the status of the labour suppliers in the online talent platform economy, and from the patchwork of 
national rules in place applying to employees and the self-employed across Europe. Since the status of 
labour suppliers is not always clear, the uncertainty regarding the level of social protection and other 
benefits might prevent people from participating in the talent platform economy, and thereby impinging 
its development.  
In the remainder of this section, the regulatory challenges linked to the online talent platform economy 
are highlighted. As many of these challenges are directly or indirectly connected with the status of labour 
suppliers working in the online talent platform economy, labour aspects are dealt with first. Given the 
                                                          
18 For example, in the transport or accommodation sectors, in response to the emergence of Uber and Airbnb. 
19 See e.g. EU-OSHA (2017). 
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uncertainty about the regulatory framework, it is important to bear in mind the following points: a specific 
framework governing the online talent platform economy generally does not exist (although some 
countries have adopted measures); the existing regulations and rules should therefore apply, but because 
the online talent platform economy is not a good fit with the existing framework, this raises questions 
concerning which regulations apply and how they can be enforced. 
3.1.1 Labour aspects 
While acknowledging the benefits arising from the online talent platform economy, researchers have also 
called for caution by pointing out the risk of “casualisation of work” that could be detrimental to the 
labour suppliers and an “informalisation of the formal economy” (Meil and Kirov, 2017). At the same time, 
traditional employment forms in the offline world, such as those based on open-ended employment 
contracts, are changing towards a wider variety of working arrangements and contractual forms (Spasova 
et al., 2017). These new forms of employment contracts have sparked public debate on what employment 
standards can ensure sufficient job quality, fair remuneration and social protection. Where some see a 
chance for enhanced flexibility and inclusion in the labour markets, others see these new forms of work 
as a potential way to foster precarious working conditions by limiting access to workers’ rights and 
circumventing labour laws.  
As things stand now, there is no specific regulatory framework governing the work that is intermediated 
through online talent platforms. Many issues regarding the classification of labour suppliers as well as the 
labour conditions and workers’ fundamental rights have fuelled the debate on the need (or lack thereof) 
for clarification of legally acceptable business practices. Issues such as remuneration, working conditions 
and time restrictions, the right to free association, the bargaining power vis-à-vis the platform and clients, 
as well as the level of social protection and access to benefits – such as minimum wages, sick pay, holidays 
and the protection against arbitrary dismissal – have been widely discussed in the literature (Aloisi, 2015; 
De Stefano, 2015; Cherry, 2016; Meil and Kirov, 2017).  
As illustrated by the growing number of ongoing court cases in which judges are asked to arbitrate the 
legal employment status of labour suppliers, some authors have suggested different approaches to solve 
these issues. One such approach consists of refining and adapting the concepts of ‘employee’ and 
‘employer’ to incorporate the talent platform economy into regular employment standards. A second 
approach would be to introduce, or extend, an intermediate classification of labour suppliers that would 
stand in between a regular employee and a self-employed person (Prassl and Risak, 2017). Such a ‘third 
status’ already exists in a number of countries, e.g. the UK (contractual workers), which could be applied 
to online talent platform labour suppliers as well. A third option would be to build on existing examples 
of regulatory frameworks governing labour market intermediaries, such as temporary work agencies. This 
latter option entails a brand new statutory regulation that authors have coined as a ‘Crowdwork Act’ 
(Ibid.). A fourth option would be to provide all workers, in all forms of work, with the same social and 
fundamental rights, as advocated by UNI and referred to in the L20 and the European Pillar of Social Rights. 
Under this scenario, the incentive to circumvent responsibilities and costs by replacing employees by self-
employed labour suppliers would be reduced. This scenario is closely linked to the idea of portable social 
security benefits, which is further explored in Chapter 1. 
36 | ONLINE TALENT PLATFORMS, LABOUR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES AND THE CHANGING WORLD OF WORK 
 
 
 
  With financial support  
from the European Union 
 
The idea of creating a new type (or an extension of) of employment status for labour suppliers in the 
online talent platform economy has not gained much traction among national governments across 
Europe. Recent research, however, has uncovered policy developments in Belgium and France, in which 
politicians have started to discuss related initiatives. As Lenaerts et al. (2017) report, the Belgian Minister 
for Employment, Economy, Consumer Affairs and Foreign Trade, announced a possible introduction of a 
so-called ‘autonomous employee’ status where the degree of autonomy would define the degree of 
protection.  
In France, the labour inspectorate (Inspection Générale des Affaires Sociales or IGAS) has examined this 
idea, finally concluding that the existing models should preferably apply to the online talent platform 
economy to avoid further erosion of employment standards (Lenaerts et al., 2017). Nevertheless, in 2008 
Article L123-1 of the business code created a status of auto-entrepreneur, under which labour suppliers 
for online talent platforms can register. This status is open to individuals whose annual revenue drawn 
from a particular activity is below a low ceiling – €33,200 per year for services in 2017, and €81,500 for 
goods in 2017. For auto-entrepreneurs, social security payments are determined by Articles L133-6-8 of 
the social security code and paid quarterly. The mandated social security payments of 13.4% for goods 
Box 4. QAPA as a recruitment platform 
The French platform Qualiﬁcation Automatisée Pro-Active (Proactive automated qualification or 
QAPA) was created to connect recruiters and job seekers. In essence, it operates as a paid job-posting 
board. QAPA utilises an algorithm to evaluate CVs submitted by candidates and to recommend 
candidates to recruiters.  
QAPA is a free service for job seekers, but it also offers the ‘QAPA Pass’ for €9.90-19.90 monthly. This 
subscription provides substantially higher visibility for job seekers, advertised as providing a ten times 
higher likelihood of being contacted by a recruiter. Meanwhile, a recruiter can submit job offers for 
free, but most purchase ‘job offer credits’ to see the full details of matched candidates. By using QAPA, 
both job seekers and recruiters must agree to the platform’s terms and conditions. 
QAPA stipulates in the terms and conditions that the employment contracts offered must follow a 
number of requirements, including compliance with the French Labour Code and laws against 
discrimination. The employment contract is also allowed to include a trial period, as covered by Article 
1221-19 of the Labour Code. Possible contracts include the Contract Duration Indeterminée (CDI, 
open-ended contract), Contract Duration Determinée (CDD, fixed-term contract), contrat d’intérim 
(interim contract) and contrat de professionalisation (part-time work-study contract). 
QAPA claims to screen individuals and recruiters for quality control. For example, if job seekers report 
that a recruiter is engaging in fraudulent behaviour, QAPA launches an investigation, which can result 
in banning the recruiting firm from using its services and reporting the firm to the authorities. Likewise, 
a job seeker who fails to follow-up with recruiters as agreed, e.g. not showing up for an interview, may 
have their account suspended.  
Source: QAPA (n.d.). 
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and 23.1% for services are substantially lower than those applicable to other self-employed, and even 
more advantageous compared to salaried activities. Meanwhile, auto-entrepreneurs can access the same 
social security rights as other self-employed. This excludes unemployment insurance, although a new 
universal scheme is anticipated to be implemented (Belouezzane and Bissuel, 2017). A publication by 
Huteau and Bonnand (2016, p. 16) notes that “this status has the advantage of reduced formalities for 
business creation and simplified calculation and payment of charges and social contributions”. 
To take another example, the particularity in the German case is that this intermediate category is covered 
by legislation on collective agreements. Working as an independent worker for a single client over a long 
period of time is generally considered as bogus self-employment in France and Belgium, as far as the 
judges can reveal an actual relationship of subordination between the two parties. But this is not the case 
all over Europe. In Austria and Germany, individuals who are not engaged in a traditional employment 
relationship but are delivering services to the account of someone else are considered employee-like 
(Arbeitnehmerähnlich), mostly due to their economic dependence thereof. These individuals are subject 
to some labour laws, e.g. employee liability and anti-discriminatory provisions (Prassl and Risak, 2017). 
They are not, however, subject to statutes related to employment security and working time 
(Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, 2017). The Italian system recognises some sorts of 
intermediate categories referred to as “para-subordinate relationships” that are covered by certain 
statutory protections (De Stefano, 2016; Ibid.).   
Harris and Krueger (2015) have advocated formally defining an ‘independent worker’ status and 
embedding the labour suppliers in the talent platform economy (and more largely to the ‘gig economy’). 
This move would entitle them to a certain degree of legal protection and give them rights to collective 
bargaining and minimum social security. However, this solution seems not to provide effective guarantees 
to labour suppliers, especially regarding the application of minimum wages and working time protections.  
The challenge of defining which statutory provisions should apply to workers active in the gig economy 
echoes and revives the questions raised by the so-called zero-hour contracts in the UK. Also known as 
casual contracts, these types of employment status are allowed in cases of ‘piece work’ or ‘on-call’ work, 
as applied in a few sectors such as hotels and restaurants, as well as health and education. This means 
that employers issue a call to work when they need, but cannot expect workers to be always available if 
they have already accepted work from another employer. The legislation in the UK specifies that 
employers are responsible for health and safety during the on-call hours and must nonetheless provide 
annual leave and remuneration matching the national minimum wage in the same way as regular workers. 
These contracts have been subject to closer regulation as critics have been describing it as a tool to 
reprimand workers, therefore decrying an unbalanced bargaining power that can be particularly 
detrimental to labour suppliers.  
Finally, a third option to be envisaged would be to draft a piece of special legislation. Inspired by the TWA 
Directive, Prassl and Risak (2017) have analysed the case for a Crowdwork Act. They, however, provide a 
mixed assessment of this policy option, on the grounds that it would fail to provide a solid and 
comprehensive framework for such a diverse business model landscape. By defining the general bottom-
line principles, however, this new legislation might provide a minimum level of protection to labour 
suppliers while enabling further development of new voluntarily and flexible forms of work. As they argue, 
this option could nonetheless limit the current ‘value extraction’, while providing minimum guarantees 
38 | ONLINE TALENT PLATFORMS, LABOUR MARKET INTERMEDIARIES AND THE CHANGING WORLD OF WORK 
 
 
 
  With financial support  
from the European Union 
for labour suppliers and levelling the playing field with traditional sectors, as based on a principle of equal 
treatment between labour suppliers in the talent platform economy and the existing corporate workforce. 
A more in-depth analysis of the current practices developed by the online talent platforms is needed, and 
a number of points remain unclear. For example, it is not clear when the designation of self-employment 
is rightfully applied within the online talent platform economy, and more broadly, when self-employment 
is an appropriate designation. Social partners, e.g. IG Metall, have expressed the importance of accurately 
designating workers as self-employed and avoiding situations of bogus self-employment (IG Metall, 2017). 
The classification of online talent platform labour supplier (and the uncertainty associated with it) not 
only has a large impact on the applicable regulatory framework, but also on many other dimensions in the 
domain of labour and beyond. Examples include access to social protection and training; these will be 
explored in more detail in the following chapters. 
The problem is all the more complicated given that so many platforms operate across borders, and indeed 
a single platform may operate differently in different jurisdictions. Given that different EU Member States 
have different legal frameworks for the employment relationship, self-employment, rights enforcement, 
etc., it is difficult to find satisfying answers about the online talent platform economy at the EU level. 
Indeed, transnational platform operations raise difficult questions about conflicting laws, and the EU-
OSHA (2017) posits that transnational policy responses may be necessary in addition to national ones. As 
the European Commission has stated, existing regulations apply to work intermediated by online talent 
platforms (European Commission, 2016), but it is not always clear which regulations apply or how.  
3.1.2 Taxation, information exchange and administrative proceedings  
The main aspect to consider regarding taxation in the online talent platform economy begins with an 
analysis of current rules and obligations applying to individuals active on these platforms and to the 
platforms themselves. Therefore, we investigate three main aspects to draw a clear snapshot of the 
current situation regarding taxation: direct taxes, i.e. income taxes, corporate tax; indirect taxes, such as 
sales and use taxes as well as VAT regimes; and information reporting, pertaining to the relations between 
organisations, individuals and the tax authorities.  
Usually the streams of revenue and transactions determine whether income and/or transaction taxes 
apply, along with any necessary reporting and registration requirements. This requires a direct 
collaboration between platforms and tax authorities, as well as between individuals active on the 
platforms. The existing legal uncertainty regarding professional and non-professional users’ rights and 
duties may well constitute a major impediment to a greater participation in intermediated crowd work. 
For the time being, however, some participants in the online talent platform economy are taking 
advantage of this lack of clear rules and obligations. This might lead users to neglect compliance with 
safety rules or to deliberately not pay their due taxes. Recommendations were actually formulated in this 
regard, including ways to motivate platforms to implement mechanisms “ensuring that users are given 
clear, impartial information on what regulations they need to comply with, and what taxes they need to 
pay” (Wosskow, 2014).20 While established industries call for elaborating a proper legal framework, 
                                                          
20 Although these recommendations have been quoted in a number of papers, it is unclear whether they have been 
taken up. 
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participants in these activities call for more information-sharing and raising awareness of the current 
applicable rules. 
Most activities intermediated through the talent platforms are not captured by official labour statistics 
and thereby escape any public records (Coyle, 2016). Since online talent platforms are generally not 
responsible for directly paying for the work mediated by a platform (Kilhoffer et al., 2017), their primary 
function is to facilitate the transaction between the client and the labour suppliers while levying a fee for 
using the platform and/or its services. Platforms can charge a fee to the clients, the labour suppliers or 
both. In most countries, platforms are not required to pay personal income tax nor social security 
contributions, and there are currently no common rules regarding administrative proceedings and 
obligations vis-à-vis tax authorities across Europe. There are some notable exceptions, however. In 
Estonia, for example, ride-sharing platforms like Uber directly transfer data about their labour suppliers 
to the tax authorities, so that revenues earned though platform work come pre-filled in the tax declaration 
form (European Commission, 2016). 
As De Groen and Maselli (2016) have demonstrated, the administrative requirements and obligations in 
terms of information reporting, as well as the amount of tax and social security contributions, vary 
substantively depending on the individual situation and the country of residence. In turn, there is no 
guarantee that labour suppliers, whether employee or self-employed, declare their income to the tax 
authorities as they are legally obliged to do. For example, it was reported by TNS Sofres in France that 
only 15% of those working in the platform economy declared their earnings (De Groen and Maselli, 2016). 
As a result, there is a growing fear that online crowdsourcing will result in a reduction of government tax 
revenues and lead to supporting undeclared work and concealed employment (as well as concealed 
unemployment), while fostering subpar labour conditions to the detriment of the labour suppliers 
(Kilhoffer et al., 2017). 
Interestingly, De Groen and Maselli (2016) found that labour suppliers were more inclined to declare their 
earnings in countries where specific schemes were implemented to motivate them to do so. This is the 
case for instance regarding household services in some EU countries, where special vouchers make it 
financially more appealing to comply with tax obligations. For example, in Belgium, there is a subsidised 
voucher system, the so-called titres-services benefiting both parties involved. Under this system, the 
labour supplier is partially covered under the social security system (DGCIS, 2011).  
Any earnings made from the talent platforms are generally subject to direct and indirect taxes, and must 
therefore be declared. In some countries, tax incentives have been implemented to encourage labour 
suppliers to report their income. From March 2017 in Belgium, a new tax regime provides an opportunity 
for online talent platforms to apply for accreditation. Via an ‘approved’ platform, this accreditation gives 
individuals who offer their services in the context of the collaborative economy the right to benefit from 
a favourable tax regime. From now on, services provided occasionally by non-professionals (i.e. individuals 
who do not perform these activities on a professional basis, as their occupation) for remuneration are 
subject to a 10% tax, as opposed to the 33% tax applied previously. These revenues have to be reported 
as ‘miscellaneous income’. The new regime also establishes the formal responsibility of platforms to 
deduct tax from the labour suppliers’ income, while the labour supplier receives a net amount. Within this 
new fiscal regime, the Belgian federal government introduced an indexed threshold of €5,100 under which 
labour income is exempted from income tax with no VAT or social contributions charged. Above this 
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threshold, the labour supplier must be registered as self-employed. However, the scope of this new 
regime is not entirely clear as some platforms, like Uber, argued that they would not be subject to the 
new tax reporting obligations, as the drivers are allegedly considered self-employed.21 Overall, there is 
still much discussion about the system and its proposed reforms, which have been criticised by many 
(Kilhoffer and Lenaerts, 2017). 
In some cases, online talent platforms may offer an opportunity to increase tax compliance by creating 
traceable transactions. For instance, Kearney et al. (2013) argue that tax compliance is higher in countries 
with a higher penetration of electronic payments. A more enforced tracking of digital transactions might 
help increase tax revenues, in particular with regard to micro-tasking and punctual work, but a fair balance 
should be struck in order to avoid discouraging participation in the online talent platform economy. For 
example, tax systems such as those proposed in Estonia and Belgium, which allow individuals willing to 
supplement their income by legally performing punctual tasks, should encourage participation in the new 
online talent platform economy.  
3.1.3 Consumer protection, liabilities and insurance 
The primary function of an online platform is to enable innovative service delivery models, in particular 
through automated supply- and demand-matching features. Under European law, the internet-based 
platforms are considered as technical intermediaries ensuring a ‘hosting’ function in the meaning of the 
EU electronic commerce Directive (ECD). This status sets clear limits on liability for digital platforms that 
cannot be held responsible for illegal material uploaded to their websites or applications, nor presumably, 
for the behaviour of the individuals active on the platform. Instead, the general principle is that digital 
platforms are responsible only for bringing down illegal material when informed of its presence. Other 
pieces of regulation come into play regarding the regulatory framework governing online platforms, such 
as privacy and security obligations. 
The emergence of peer-to-peer transactions generally poses a challenge to sector-specific regulations. As 
Barbezieux and Herody (2017) posit, general matters of security and other ‘public order’ objectives may, 
in some instances, justify restrictions on the principle of free enterprise (or freedom to undertake). 
However, the issue is that, most of the time, the formal guarantees provided under consumer law only 
apply in the context of transactions performed with professionals (to be understood as self-employed or 
businesses in this case). In most EU countries, these guarantees are even reinforced in the case of distance 
sales, by specifying certain rules pertaining to commercial rights and obligations, e.g. contractual and non-
contractual liabilities governing peer-to-peer relations. These include, for instance, the ‘double-click’ rule 
applied before proceeding to distance payments - an opt-in obligation - or the prohibition of ‘pre-checked 
boxes’ for the expression of consent before payments, or among others, displaying clear information on 
the terms of the exchange.  
Strict health and safety regulations are imposed on professionals active in regular business-to-consumer 
settings or business-to-business settings. Additional guarantees regarding qualifications and professional 
                                                          
21 The Belgian government is currently proposing to change the rules concerning work in the online talent platform 
economy, and the new proposal would allow more earnings (up to €6,000 per year) and the tax rate would be 
brought down to zero. Under this proposal, some types of platform work would be classified in the framework of 
‘occasional work’. Nevertheless, this matter is still under discussion. 
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certification are mandatory to exercise specific activities, e.g. licenses and certificates are compulsory to 
offer and benefit from certain products and services. Some policy-makers have been pointing out the fact 
that consumers should be clearly aware that these guarantees do not apply in a peer-to-peer setting 
(Barbezieux and Herody, 2016), since the roles of consumers and professionals are not always well defined 
in the talent platform economy. Likewise, it is not always clear whether platform users are subject to 
personal and professional insurance schemes. In France, a recent bill provided clarification on the 
platforms’ obligations to provide loyal, clear and transparent information on the quality of the advertiser 
and on the rights and obligations (civil and fiscal) applying to both parties. In other countries as well, policy 
proposals were envisaged to nudge platforms to provide a proper dispute-resolution mechanism and a 
right of redress. Wosskow (2014) proposed, for instance, bestowing a ‘kite mark’ or a label on platforms 
that have adopted good practices and standards approved by the British Standards Institution.  
While talent platforms provide a venue for enhancing inclusion and participation in the labour markets, 
there is very little clarity on how credentials and competences are determined, measured or displayed to 
both parties. This tends to blur the concept of ‘professionalisation’ and may pose serious challenges in 
the case of heavily regulated sectors and occupations, as mentioned above. In fact, most of the online 
talent platform economy relies on ratings and reputation systems. These are helpful for assessing the 
platform itself as a competitor in a given marketplace (Dervojeda et al., 2013) and for providing 
information on the users and labour suppliers. This is also a valuable form of recognition regarding users’ 
competences and commitment when delivering a service, and thus is a way to attract listings of more 
qualified and rewarding tasks or jobs for individuals active on the talent platforms. Basically, the 
reputation system rests on the principle of trust, which must be equally distributed in the three-party 
relationship involving service demanders, providers and the intermediary platform itself.  
On the positive side, rating systems enhance transparency for users vis-à-vis the platform and the labour 
supplier, thereby improving consumer choice and welfare. On the negative side, there is very little 
guarantee that rates and reviews are authentic and reliable, while reputation is non-transferable among 
platforms.22 There is no common and interoperable basis for assessing the peer-to-peer ratings. This 
mixed attitude towards review rankings and rating systems is well reflected in the Special Eurobarometer 
survey, which indicates that 49% of the respondents who have used internet-based platforms consider 
peer-reviews as reliable, while 41% would not rely on it (TNS opinion and social, 2016). Other surveys 
suggest that peer-to-peer recommendations influence users’ behaviour, as revealed in a survey 
conducted by PWC (2015), in which 69% of polled participants responded that they would not trust a 
platform until it had been recommended by someone they trust.  
Moreover, rating systems can be abused by competitors or even by the platform itself, as there is no 
guarantee of authenticity. They can also suffer from low response rates (Codagnone et al., 2016) and from 
cognitive biases when participants are reluctant to give negative rates for fear of negative returns (see 
Edelman and Geradin, 2015; Kilhoffer et al., 2017), or provide a discriminatory or biased evaluation. Unfair 
judgment may cause substantial damage to all parties, for instance leading to direct exclusion from the 
                                                          
22 In an interview with a platform owner conducted in the framework of this project, the question was posed as to 
whether platforms are open to transferrable ratings. The platform owner responded that the platforms are looking 
into the possibility, but that this is not yet the case as far as they are aware. See Schmidt (2017) for further discussion 
on ratings transferability.   
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platforms. As a result, a new kind of asymmetry of information arises with regard to platforms’ ratings 
systems and information-referencing mechanisms (e.g. content, profiles, offers, prices, etc.). Especially 
for Uber and Airbnb, there are a number of studies that link ratings to discrimination. Edelman and Luca 
(2014), for example, demonstrate using data on Airbnb hosts in New York that non-black hosts charge 
12% more for an equivalent rental property than black hosts, and that black hosts receive a larger penalty 
for having a poor location rating than non-black hosts. Similarly, Cui et al. (2016) report that guests at 
Airbnb with African-American-sounding names were less likely to be accepted that those with Caucasian-
sounding names. However, a positive review on these guests’ pages redressed this discrimination, 
bringing their acceptance rate up to the same level as those of guests with Caucasian-sounding names. 
The online talent platform ecosystem is fast evolving. Some platforms are developing self-regulatory 
solutions, while new services emerge to help users optimise their participation in the online talent 
platform economy. For example, Famust specialises in the management of internet reputation and offers 
its users the possibility to combine and display all their ratings and peer-reviews they have received on 
collaborative websites, merged into a single profile (Barbezieux and Herody, 2016). The organisation Fair 
Crowd Work, hosted by the German trade union (IG Metall), enables service providers to compare and 
benchmark all the characteristics of the intermediated jobs or tasks (remuneration, quality of work, 
functionalities, etc.) among the various platforms. 
Additional issues regarding the definition of liabilities in the tripartite relationship include, for instance, 
the professional liability insurance that is required in some specific areas or for certain kinds of 
professional practices. Also referred to as “professional indemnity insurance”, these schemes are usually 
designed to protect professional service providers from bearing the full responsibility and costs of 
defending against a potential negligence claim. More evidence should be collected on the actual practices 
found in the online talent platform economy (Aloisi, 2015).  
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Finally, the implications of online talent platforms and their role in enforcing intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) must also be investigated (Meil and Kirov, 2017), in particular when the work intermediated is of a 
creative and artistic nature. Evidence should be drawn on the current business practices, such as whether 
online talent platforms provide information to both parties regarding IPR management, including 
sufficient certainty regarding copyright and neighbouring rights; and on what the terms of agreement are, 
especially in cases where a work is dismissed without payment. We further explore questions of 
competition, data governance and privacy in the following section. 
 
Box 5. Upwork as an intermediary 
Upwork was formed in 2013 as a result of the merger of Elance and oDesk, and now claims to be the 
largest English-speaking freelance marketplace. It provides services including job boards, payment 
guarantees and staffing for clients. 
Upwork is particularly interesting for a few reasons. For example, it enacted a global minimum wage 
in what Finck (2017) refers to as a positive example of self-regulation. Finck (2017) argues that the 
regulations enacted through Upwork (and other online talent platforms) are superior to other 
regulations in the sense that they are run through computer scripts, and are thus self-executing. While 
$3/hour is a very low wage for the developed world, it represents at least a ‘floor’ in a race to the 
bottom, in which individuals from developed and developing countries may be competing with one 
another for the same contracts. In practice, a survey of dozens of verified Upwork workers reported 
hourly wages ranging from €3.94 to €26.32, with a mean of €12.81 and median of €12.91. 
Additionally, Upwork offers staffing agency services, but these are limited to the US. In this 
arrangement, Upwork acts as the employer of record for W-2 workers (employees, not independent 
contractors). Upwork charges additional rates for this service, which benefits businesses who would 
otherwise be required to be the employer of record themselves. Upwork also advertises this service 
as a more cost effective than that offered by ‘traditional staffing agencies’, as shown in the table 
below. 
 
Source: Fair Crowd Work (2017), Upwork (n.d.). 
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3.1.4 Competition, data governance and privacy issues 
Data have become an increasingly important asset for business. As a result, there is growing attention 
from competition authorities and regulators on the issues of big data and its interaction with competition 
law. Basically, platforms that unfairly restrict rivals’ access to datasets, including consumer data, risk 
breaching competition law and could be subject to substantial financial penalties (Gata, 2015). More than 
the ability to collect numerous data troves, operators’ competitive advantage lies in their ability to 
combine, analyse and exploit large datasets, notably by developing data analysis techniques and 
algorithms. Some practitioners in competition law are also questioning the nature of the intermediating 
function performed by algorithms in processing and organising information, representing the market 
through application programme interfaces (APIs), matching both parties and setting prices. They notably 
question the implications of developing ubiquitous algorithms and their impact on competition in light of 
TFEU Article 101 (Ibid.). 
A recent study has shed light on how most of the online platforms rely on advertising and data use and 
re-use, in combination with other monetisation models (VVA et al., 2017). Concerns have been expressed 
regarding these business practices and their implications in terms of privacy, e.g. intrusive marketing 
techniques, along with collecting and exploiting users’ personal data. As reported in a Eurobarometer 
survey (2016), 72% of “internet and online platform users” agreed that they were generally concerned 
about the data collected about them on the internet. Policy-makers have already called for better law 
enforcement in the protection of personal data, in particular with regard to consumer data and tracking 
practices (Danti, 2016). They encourage platforms to supply transparent information to users about the 
collected personal data, and the way in which it is processed.  
Another growing concern is how the accumulation of data by a handful of players could distort 
competition in a given market, which implies that the refusal to give competitors access to data sets could 
be deemed anti-competitive behaviour. Koopman et al. (2015) argue, however, that contract law can 
address part of these concerns about data collection and usage. In its official Communication, the 
European Commission has also stated that the use of existing general contract law and competition law 
instruments would provide an adequate response to avoid lock-in effects and anti-competitive behaviour 
in the market (European Commission, 2017c). 
Overall, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), entering into force in May 2018, aims to reinforce 
the European legal framework for the protection of personal data. This revised legal framework will 
provide the data subjects with new data portability rights and guarantees regarding the usage of their 
personal information, such as additional notification requirements and systematic requests for formal 
consent. In this regard, questions have also been raised concerning the relationship between labour 
suppliers and the online talent platform: Do platforms inform labour suppliers how their data are used? 
Do these labour suppliers own their data? One of the conclusions of the L20 (Labour 20) meeting in July 
2017, was that agreements are needed to strengthen the protection and ownership of employee data to 
prevent disproportional surveillance and monitoring. In the context of online talent platforms, these 
pointers are relevant. Several social partners, including UNI, have also put forward principles for workers’ 
data privacy and protection. 
Nevertheless, policy analysts have warned against the potential unintended consequences of imposing 
excessively strict regulation, which might prevent companies from developing innovative solutions or 
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applying best practices (Koopman et al., 2015). Instead, they argue that the enforcement of existing laws 
on competition and data protection would suffice for policing online platforms and helping to develop 
good practices in the platform economy.  
Mitigating the risk of data breach and cyberattack is also a key factor driving the digital economy as a 
whole. Data protection and information system security are two subjects gaining tremendous importance 
for platform owners in the context of implementing the Directive on security of network and information 
systems (NIS Directive). The legislation will impose obligations on key digital services providers (such as 
those running search engines, cloud computing services and online marketplaces) to comply with new 
formal security and notification requirements. In turn, reinforcing regulations for trust and privacy in the 
online environment are expected to positively impact the ‘crowdworking platforms’ by providing legal 
certainty to platform developers and safeguards to users (Meil and Kirov, 2017).  
 
3.2 The (regulatory) framework governing temporary work agencies and temporary 
agency work 
In contrast with online talent platforms, there is a clear, specific regulatory framework for temporary work 
agencies, primarily from Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work. This directive was required to 
have been implemented at the Member State level by the end of 2011. Directive 2008/104/EC establishes 
the principle of equal treatment of agency workers with employees in user undertakings and it creates a 
framework for the use of temporary agency work. The Directive calls for appropriate regulation and for 
removing unjustified restrictions. 
Besides Directive 2008/104/EC, there is Directive 91/383/EC supplementing the measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of workers with a fixed- duration employment relationship 
or a temporary employment relationship, which governs health and safety. Directive 91/383/EC ensures 
that temporary agency workers have the same level of health and safety protection as other employees. 
It also requires adequate instructions and training before temporary agency workers begin their 
assignment and clarifies other responsibilities between temporary employment agencies and user firms. 
Certain ILO conventions also apply to temporary work agencies, of which ILO Convention 181 is the main 
one addressing and regulating private employment agencies and temporary agency work. ILO Convention 
181 – Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 – sets in place a number of rules for private 
employment agencies, such as respecting workers’ data privacy and prohibiting charging fees to workers. 
Additional stipulations in ILO Convention 181 include signatories taking necessary measures, in 
accordance with national law and practice, such that the workers employed by private employment 
agencies can enjoy freedom of association, collective bargaining, minimum wages and access to training 
and a variety of other benefits.23 ILO Convention 96 – Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention 
(Revised) – stipulates that temporary work agencies are not allowed to charge fees to workers. 
                                                          
23 See especially Articles 11 and 12. The ILO uses the term “private employment agency”, which is understood to be 
the same as the term “temporary work agency” in this paper. For further discussion, see “Workers enjoy more 
protection in countries that have ratified ILO Convention No. 181 on private employment agencies” from WEC (n.d.). 
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The role of social partners in ensuring that these directives are implemented is also acknowledged. Next 
to EU level regulations, Member States also have national legislation, regulations and frameworks that 
apply specifically to temporary work agencies, and which apply more broadly to the labour market. The 
involvement of social partners is expressly covered in Directive 2008/104/EC and ILO Convention 181. 
Michon (2006) identified three broad regulatory structures for the temporary agency work sector in 
Europe. These are as follows: 
1. Countries in which temporary agency work is not strictly distinguished from other forms of work 
and is therefore subject to broader labour law and legal frameworks. Ex: UK, Ireland and Finland. 
2. Countries in which temporary work agencies are regulated by their own specific legal framework, 
but temporary agency workers are not treated as a special category of workers. Ex: Germany, the 
Netherlands and Spain. 
Box 6. ILO Conventions on private employment agencies 
ILO Convention 181, or the Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997, entered into force on 10 
May 2000. At the time of writing, the Convention has been ratified by 32 nations, including a number 
of European states. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and the UK are among the major 
European economies that have not ratified the agreement; nor has Croatia, Greece, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Romania or Slovenia. Spain, Finland and the Netherlands were among the first 
countries to ratify it (1999) whereas France only did so in 2015. ILO Convention 181 represents the 
organisation’s shift to a more accommodating stance towards the temporary agency work sector. This 
convention has been ratified by 32 member nations. 
Alternatively, there exists ILO Convention 96, or the Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention 
(Revised), 1949, which abolishes “fee-charging employment agencies conducted with a view to profit” 
and also lists certain regulations for other agencies. The list of European ratifying states has shifted 
somewhat in recent decades; for example, Sweden and Germany had previously signed ILO 
Convention No. 96, but denounced it in 1992 as a part of liberalising reforms of the same period. More 
recently, France allowed the automatic denunciation in 2016. ILO Convention 96 has been ratified by 
42 countries. 
While not demonstrating causality, a WEC assessment (WEC-Global, n.d.) argued that countries that 
ratified ILO Convention 181 fared better than countries that ratified Convention 96 in a number of 
ways, such as better wages for agency workers and better control of the temporary agency work 
sector’s development.   
Additionally, the ILO has released recommendations on the use of ILO Convention 181, as well as ILO 
Convention 188 (Private Employment Agencies Recommendation, 1997). These recommendations 
hold ILO Conventions 181 and 188 as important instruments to assist lawmakers in drafting national 
legislation to protect workers.  
Sources: WEC-Global (n.d.), ILO (1997; 2016). 
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3. Countries in which temporary work agencies and temporary agency workers are both covered 
under a unique and specific legal framework. Ex: Belgium, France and Italy. 
Of these three structures, the second was the most common in Europe, but they are all are now seen as 
too simple to adequately describe the increasing heterogeneity of national systems of regulation (Voss et 
al., 2013). No recent literature survey on the temporary agency work sector has attempted to create a 
simplified typology, instead describing the diversity of systems across EU Member States. 
The first European licensing system for temporary work agencies appeared in the Netherlands in 1965, 
followed soon thereafter by Denmark (1968), Germany (1972), France (1972) and the UK (1973).24 
Belgium, Sweden, Spain, Portugal and others followed in the 1980s and 1990s. Examples of countries that 
introduced specific legislation on temporary agency work since 2000 include Finland, Greece, Poland and 
Slovakia. This progression of legal structures for temporary work agencies appears in Figure 8 below. 
Figure 8. Timeline of legal status of temporary agency work 
 
Source: Voss et al. (2013). 
In spite of various national regulatory frameworks applying to the temporary agency work sector, some 
general observations can be made. In most countries, a specific licensing and registration system for 
temporary agency work is in place, establishing a set of standards for operation (e.g. for the business 
premises, infrastructure and financial requirements). Eight EU Member States, however, do not utilise 
licensing schemes: Estonia, Lithuania, Denmark, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK and Finland. 
This is not to say, however, that temporary work agencies in all of these countries are entirely without 
licensing requirements. For example, the UK temporary agency work sector maintains licensing 
requirements (‘Gangmaster Licensing’) in the agriculture, horticulture, forestry, food processing and 
packaging, and shellfish industries. In the Netherlands, a financial warranty scheme is in place, and the 
temporary agency work sector operates on a self-regulatory framework of norms and minimum standards 
set by the Dutch Federation for temporary agency work (ABU), to which ABU certified agencies have to 
comply. In Sweden, the Swedish Staff Agencies (SSA) set up an authorisation scheme that is compulsory 
for SSA membership. A voluntary authorisation certificate has also been established in Finland for 
                                                          
24 Licensing is only one of the approaches used to regulate temporary agency work, as will be further clarified below. 
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members of the Finnish Private Employment Agencies Association (Henkilöstöpalveluyritysten Liitto, HPL). 
Denmark requires special certificates for truck drivers and chauffeurs (Voss et al., 2013; Ciett, 2014).  
In most European countries, temporary agency work is subject to two sets of regulations: those that apply 
to labour generally, and those that uniquely apply to temporary agency work. Among the latter, common 
regulations include requirements governing the contractual arrangements between temporary work 
agencies and temporary agency workers, circumstances in which temporary agency work may be 
employed (e.g. not to replace striking workers), limits on the sector and occupations that can use 
temporary agency work, duration and number of assignments, etc.    
A variety of unique regulatory arrangements are also noteworthy. Consider the two examples of the UK 
and Ireland. In the UK, there exist no clear requirements for temporary agency workers to be employed 
by the temporary work agency or the user firm. For this reason, temporary agency workers in the UK can 
be contracted by more than one agency simultaneously or be self-employed. Also, temporary agency 
workers in the UK tend to operate under a contract for services rather than an employment contract. In 
Ireland, under the 1993 Act on Unfair Dismissals, temporary agency workers are considered to be 
employees of the user firm (Irish Statute Book, 1993).  
With respect to the sheer diversity of European regulatory frameworks, it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to elaborate further. A number of pieces have already attempted to rather exhaustively describe 
the various regulatory frameworks for temporary work agencies across Europe, and these include 
Eichhorst et al. (2013) and IDEA Consult (2015). Nevertheless, Table 7 presents a simplified summary of 
certain key restrictions in the use of temporary agency work.25 
Table 7. Restrictions on the use of temporary agency work 
Type of regulation With restrictions No restrictions 
Restricting the use of temporary 
agency work in strike situations 
By law: 
FR, IT, ES, the NL, AT, SI, RO, PL, BE, PT, SK, 
CZ 
By general collective agreements:  
LU, DK, SE, FI 
No restrictions, if specific requirements are 
fulfilled:  
HU, DE, UK (although the hirer has no 
influence over the supply of temporary 
agency workers) 
BG, CY, EE, IE, LV, 
and MT 
Restrictions in other specific 
situations/reasons justifying 
assignments 
IT, BE, FR, LU, ES, PT, RO, SI, EL, PL BG, CY, DK, EE, FI, 
DEa, HU, IE, LV, LT, 
MT, NL, SK, UK 
Restrictions on the maximum 
length of assignments and/or 
number of extensions 
BG, BE, CZ, DE, FR, EL, IT (max. of 6 
extensions), LU, PL, PT, RO, SI, ES 
AT, CY, DK, EE, FI, 
HU, IE, LV, LT, MT, 
NL, SK, SE, UK 
                                                          
25 Note that the World Employment Confederation’s Code of Conduct includes as a principle “Respect for Workers’ 
Rights”, which implies the commitment that private employment agencies will not in any way deny the right of 
freedom of association and collective bargaining of their employees. 
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Sector specific restrictions Construction: 
DEb, PT 
Public administration: 
AT (Civil Service), BE, EL, HU, ES 
Other sectors: 
AT (public hospitals/nursing 
institutionsc), BE (removal firms and 
furniture warehouses, inland waterways), PL 
(dangerous jobs, security guards);), FL 
(security guards, some restrictions for 
doctors and teachers), GR (dangerous work), 
NL (restrictions for bus drivers and for 
transportation of goods)d 
The remaining 
Member States 
a In Germany, works councils of the user enterprise have broad rights to be informed about the use of temporary 
agency work. In certain circumstances, such as an agency’s failure to abide by the law, works councils can object to 
the use of temporary agency work. In the metalworking sector, the collective agreement has established further 
rights of the works councils in the context of temporary agency work. 
b The temporary agency work law in principle prohibits the use of temporary agency work to cover blue-collar work 
in the construction industry except under the conditions of a collective labour agreement. 
c In these sectors a maximum of 15% of the total workforce in the relevant department can be temporary agency 
workers. 
d The minimum age for TAW bus drivers is 21 years, whereas otherwise it is 18 years. 
Source: Voss et al. (2013, p. 36); Ciett (2014).  
 
3.3 Summary and comparison of regulatory frameworks  
The regulatory framework is quite clear for temporary work agencies, which have operated in Europe for 
decades under national schemes, and since 2011 under a shared EU scheme provided by Directive 
2008/104/EC. In addition to the EU level Directive, Member States have benefited from long experience 
in regulating the temporary agency work sector. While Directive 2008/104/EC provides an EU level 
baseline for temporary agency work, no comparable legislation exists at the EU level for the online talent 
platform economy. This has led to a good deal of confusion, and largely left EU Member States to resolve 
regulatory issues pertaining to online talent platforms. At the European level, the approach has been to 
wait rather than to introduce a comprehensive regulation scheme, so as to avoid stifling innovation in an 
emerging sector of the economy. 
In “A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy”, the European Commission (2016) stressed that 
existing EU laws apply to the activities pursued through online talent platforms, such as market access 
requirements, consumer protection, sector specific regulation and taxation. But this has not resolved 
certain basic questions, such as what would constitute a litmus test for an online talent platform labour 
supplier to be considered an employee. Also, given that the European Commission has thus far only 
offered a tentative definition of ‘collaborative economy’ platform, efforts to date have not done much to 
clarify the confusion of what exactly constitutes a relevant platform. Because online talent platforms 
represent a new and rapidly evolving phenomenon, it is likely to take more time before a clear regulatory 
framework is in place at the European level.  
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4. Access to social protection for online talent platform labour suppliers 
and temporary agency workers 
 
 
KEY MESSAGES 
 
 Social security systems are generally not adapted to the new world of work, and the uncertain 
status of online talent platform labour suppliers further complicates this issue. 
 Because labour suppliers for online talent platforms are commonly considered self-employed, 
their access to social protection depends on the status of self-employed in a given context and 
varies from one country to another, as it is dependent on national legislation for self-
employed.  
 In a few cases, governments have taken direct action to ensure online talent platform labour 
suppliers can access social protection. Some platforms have also taken up the issue. 
 Some social partners have been increasingly active in advocating social protection for labour 
suppliers of online talent platforms. 
 Social protection (statutory access) for temporary agency workers is generally comparable to 
that for employees on an indefinite contract.  
 Social partners are quite active in advocating on behalf of temporary agency workers in the 
EU, although the efficacy and engagement varies a good deal across the Member States.  
 
 
Access to social protection is one of the policy priorities of European policy-makers. Social protection and 
inclusion is one of the three main categories delineated in the European Pillar of Social Rights, which was 
adopted in late 2017 but is not legally binding.26 One of the 20 principles of the Social Pillar, as it is also 
known, stipulates that “regardless of the type and duration of their employment relationship, workers, 
and, under comparable conditions, the self-employed, have the right to adequate social protection”. In 
practice, however, the application of this principle may not be so straightforward. Access to social 
protection is generally tied to employment status, which in the case of the online talent platforms is not 
yet clarified and should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. This results in a number of complexities, 
which are further explored in this chapter. Moreover, access to social protection has traditionally ranked 
high on the agenda of the social partners. Considering the importance of social dialogue for the European 
social model, and the role of social partners as the main actors in social dialogue, further attention will be 
paid to how social partners engage with online talent platforms. For both topics, a comparison is drawn 
with the experience of temporary work agencies. 
 
                                                          
26 The European Pillar of Social Rights is currently a political declaration, which, until it is enforced, not legally binding. 
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4.1 Access to social protection 
The first section of this chapter investigates whether labour suppliers working in the online talent platform 
economy have access to social protection. It further considers what practices exist and aims to identify 
interesting examples. This exercise is repeated for temporary work agencies and the results are compared. 
4.1.1 Online talent platforms 
The topic of access to social protection for labour suppliers working in the online talent platform economy 
has already sparked heated debates in some EU Member States, therefore meriting more in-depth 
discussion. As indicated above, the issue of adequate social protection is an important focus of the 
European Pillar of Social Rights, including the right to transfer social protection during professional 
transitions (European Commission, 2017b). When it comes to the online talent platform economy, 
however, many have raised concerns about the access of labour suppliers to social protection: Are the 
labour suppliers covered by social protection, in what areas and to what extent? Additionally, this raises 
questions on the obligations of labour suppliers in terms of paying contributions into the social security 
system.  
Most EU Member States have well-developed social security schemes that cover unemployment, sickness, 
injury, maternity leave, parental leave, old age pensions, invalidity and survivorship (Eurofound, 2011).27 
While some of these benefits are universal in nature, others depend on an individual’s employment status 
(European Commission, 2017a). Traditionally, social security schemes have been designed with a “stable, 
open-ended and direct employment relationship between a dependent full-time employee and a unitary 
employer” in mind as the baseline model (Schoukens and Barrio, 2017). This model, however, no longer 
fits the reality of the world of work today. New, non-traditional employment forms, including work on an 
online talent platform, challenge this model. In fact, employment relationships that have existed for 
decades, such as temporary agency work, self-employment and even part-time work, are also often 
difficult to fit into the social security schemes. Countries have come up with different solutions in an 
attempt to address these issues. As the number of non-traditional workers is growing, this challenge will 
only become more pressing in the future (Schoukens and Barrio, 2017). Adaptations of the existing 
schemes are needed to accommodate these dynamics. 
For workers in non-traditional employment forms, access to social protection comes with different types 
of issues (ILO, 2016). A first issue is whether these workers are entitled to social protection on a theoretical 
level (eligibility/statutory access). A second issue relates to non-traditional workers’ ability to meet these 
eligibility criteria in practice, their effective access to benefits. Making this distinction is important because 
even though workers may not be excluded from social protection, eligibility conditions can be such that 
they are very difficult or even impossible to meet. As Schoukens and Barrio (2017) explain, social 
protection systems often build on the following principles: i) define work, ii) detect employer and iii) 
establish lack of labour or income. All three principles are challenged in the online talent platform 
economy: the first because of micro tasks, commodification and unpaid work, the second because of 
multiple employers and classification issues, and the third because of low income, limited working hours, 
                                                          
27 Note that more schemes are possible. European Commission (2017a) lists 12: healthcare, sickness benefits, 
maternity/paternity benefits, old-age pensions, survivors’ pensions, unemployment benefits, social assistance, long-
term care benefits, invalidity, occupational injury benefits and family benefits. 
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and difficulty of tracking working time. The latter may also imply that even when one is eligible for 
benefits, the level of benefits received is inadequate (European Parliament, 2017d). Another difficulty is 
that non-traditional workers may combine different positions (e.g. combine several part-time jobs or work 
for multiple employers) or different types of work (e.g. employee and self-employed). These workers may 
also go through more frequent labour market transitions and are faced with income fluctuations.  
For labour suppliers working in the online talent platform economy, several of these issues come into play 
at the same time (ILO, 2016). Moreover, the uncertainty about their status further complicates this issue, 
and may cause labour suppliers to ‘fall through the cracks’. Considering that online talent platforms may 
attract the most vulnerable in the labour market, this calls for caution. A briefing note from the European 
Parliament (2017d) states that up to 70% of labour suppliers declared to have no access to pregnancy, 
childcare and housing benefits, and that this issue was especially pertinent for those who earned most of 
their income in the online talent platform economy. Only about one-third of labour suppliers pay in into 
a pension scheme (European Parliament, 2017d). Furthermore, it seems that the more dependent labour 
suppliers become on online talent platforms, the less likely they are to have access to social protection. 
The tension between online talent platforms and social security systems is further explored in the boxes 
below. 
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Box 8. Social protection for online talent platform workers: The case of GoMore 
A second example drawn from Denmark involves the GoMore platform, which enables individuals to 
rent out a car. While this platform does not meet the criteria of an online talent platform, it is still 
interesting for its relevance to social protection. In 2016, an unemployed man was refused 
unemployment benefits because he had rented out his car through GoMore. His unemployment 
insurance fund, 3F-A-kasse, argued that he was not available for the Danish labour market as a result 
of his activity with the platform. The Danish Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment (Styrelsen for 
Arbejdsmarked og Rekruttering) intervened and decided that the use of GoMore did not affect one’s 
eligibility on the Danish labour market, and therefore does not affect eligibility for unemployment 
Box 7. Social protection for online talent platform workers: The case of Happy Helper 
In Denmark, the default status for labour suppliers of online talent platforms is self-employed. This has 
created a tension between online platform work and access to social protection. The case of Denmark 
demonstrates that the relationship between a platform and labour supplier can have unexpected 
effects on social protection of various types. Two recent disputes are illustrative in this regard.  
First, an exchange student who worked as a labour supplier for an online talent platform called Happy 
Helper (which provides cleaning services), requested an education grant from the Danish Agency for 
Institutions and Educational Grants (Styrelsen for Institutioner og Uddannelsesstøtte, or SU). In order 
to be eligible for a grant, students must provide evidence that they work 10 to 12 hours per week 
either as an employee or self-employed. SU declined the student’s request, arguing that the student 
was neither an employee nor self-employed, and therefore not eligible for grants.  
The SU’s criterion for proof of being an employee is “[a]n employment contract and pay slips from your 
employer in Denmark [that] will serve as documentary evidence that you are a worker and perform 
effective and genuine activities for a minimum of 10-12 hours per week” (authors’ own emphasis). 
With regard to self-employment, the individual must “(…) as a minimum be registered with the Central 
Business Register (CVR) and be financially active. In our assessment, we presuppose that you on your 
own account run a business of financial nature and with the purpose of achieving financial profit. 
Furthermore, it is a prerequisite that your business is conducted on fairly regular basis and through a 
not entirely short period of time. Finally, it is a prerequisite that the business is not of very secondary 
size”. Even assuming proper registry with the CVR, it is not clear whether labour via online talent 
platforms normally meet the criteria for self-employment.  
Similar problems have arisen with others attempting to receive social protection in Denmark. In order 
to receive cash assistance (kontanthjælp), one must prove they are available to the labour market by 
working at least 225 hours within a year. This is intended to motivate recipients to maintain a 
connection to the labour market, and failure to meet this requirement results in a reduction of 
benefits. Nevertheless, labour through the platform Happy Helper (and other online talent platforms 
utilising comparable models) does not unequivocally count towards requirements for state assistance. 
Note: The analysis in this box is based on an unpublished manuscript consulted in the preparation of the report 
by Lenaerts et al. (2017). Quotations from www.su.dk/english/su-as-a-foreign-citizen/equal-status-according-to-
eu-law/you-work-in-denmark/you-are-a-worker-or-a-self-employed-person-under-eu-law/. 
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benefits. Renting of assets through online platforms was thus clarified to be a form of capital income 
without constituting labour.   
 
After the GoMore case, unemployment insurance funds began distributing guidelines for the 
unemployed to rent property via platforms. For example, those renting out cars or apartments were 
advised not to hand over keys or other materials between the hours of 08:00 and 17:00. In these times, 
an unemployed individual is obliged to be available for the labour market to qualify for benefits. 
 
Note: The analysis in this box is based on an unpublished manuscript consulted in the preparation of the report 
by Lenaerts et al. (2017).  
 
Because labour suppliers in the online talent platform economy tend to be classified as self-employed 
rather than employees, an elaboration on access to social protection for self-employed is provided below 
(European Parliament, 2017d). This discussion can also be informative because the issues related to social 
protection of online talent platform labour suppliers are clearly connected to broader issues, for example 
outsourcing and bogus self-employment (Goudin, 2016). Governments have, therefore, also used the 
platform economy as a lever to adopt measures with a wider scope (Lenaerts et al., 2017). 
When reflecting on access to social protection for the self-employed, however, it is important to recall 
that the definition of self-employed is far from standardised across Europe (European Parliament, 2017a). 
Moreover, the status of self-employed and what protections this implies varies a great deal throughout 
Europe.28 Pedersini and Coletto (2010) further argue that social protection for the self-employed is an 
area of ongoing change where the level of protection depends on the level of the welfare regime for a 
respective country.  
The European Parliament (2017a) identifies four clusters of nations respecting how much access to social 
protection the self-employed enjoy. These are presented in Table 8. As Table 8 shows, across Europe the 
self-employed can enjoy anywhere from minimal to comprehensive social protection. The norm, however, 
is for the self-employed to lack access to benefits, especially in comparison with employees (OECD, 2015). 
Moreover, self-employed are typically only covered for some risks. Also the organisation of the system 
differs across the countries. For example, in some countries there is a separate scheme for self-employed, 
whereas in other countries it is part of the general social security system. Participation in the scheme can 
be obligatory or voluntary. This makes for a complicated set-up in most countries. 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 An exhaustive treatment of the various conceptions of self-employment and how the self-employed access social 
protection and engage in industrial relations is beyond the scope of this paper; please refer to Eurofound (2010) for 
more details. This and a number of other relevant and informative papers on social protection for the self-employed 
can be found at https://epthinktank.eu/2013/07/10/social-protection-for-self-employed-workers/. 
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Table 8. Access to social protection for self-employed 
 Category Detail Countries 
Cluster 1 Full-to-high 
access 
Covered by all insurance based schemes 
identified by EP 
HR, HU, IS, LU, RS, 
SI 
Cluster 2 High-to-medium 
access 
Not required to be covered under one or more 
insurance based scheme, while salaried 
employees must be insured under all of them; 
however, the self-employed in these countries 
have the possibility to voluntarily opt into the 
scheme(s) concerned 
AT, CZ, DK, ES, FI, 
PL, RO, SE 
Cluster 3 Low-to-no access Cannot opt into one or more insurance-based 
schemes, while salaried employees are 
mandatorily covered by the scheme(s) 
concerned 
BE, CH, CY, EL, FR, 
IT, LI, LT, LV, MK, 
MT, NO, SK, TR 
Cluster 4 Patchwork of 
medium-and-low 
access 
Combination of features of clusters 2 and 3. The 
self-employed are not required to be insured 
under one or more insurance-based schemes 
while employees are mandatorily insured. But 
the self-employed have the possibility to opt 
into some schemes, while being excluded from 
others 
BG, DE, EE, IE, NL, 
PT, UK 
Source: European Parliament (2017a). 
 
Efforts to provide adequate social protection to the self-employed, as well as non-traditional workers 
more generally, precede the online talent platform economy. OECD (2018) presents an overview of a 
number of potential solutions. A first option is an individualisation of social protection (individual activity 
account). Under this option, rights are attached to an individual, not to a job or status. This would involve 
creating a record that holds information on a person’s entitlement in one account; in that way making 
rights portable. The option would make earnings fluctuations and combining income from multiple 
sources less problematic, and also give individuals more freedom to use their rights. Such a system, 
however, would go against the principles of risk-sharing and redistribution that are common in Europe’s 
social security schemes. Another option is to make social protection universal. This would involve the 
uncoupling of social security from the employment relationship. This is likely to result in large earnings 
fluctuations, but would address other issues including coverage gaps. This option is closely linked to the 
proposal for a universal basic income. This idea has been around for quite some time, and at the moment 
it is being piloted in a number of countries (e.g. Finland). There are several options for how such a scheme 
could be introduced and financed, each of which come with its own set of advantages and risks. A 
discussion of these, however, is beyond the scope of this report. 
Besides these options, governments are discussing whether to extend eligibility to categories of workers 
who were previously excluded, or to adjust the parameters of the social security scheme to facilitate 
access (e.g. making it easier to meet the eligibility conditions) (ILO, 2016: OECD 2018). 
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The debate on access to social protection for labour suppliers working in the online talent platform 
economy is far from being settled. To date, few specialised schemes seek to address the particular needs 
of labour suppliers in the online talent platform economy. Nevertheless, governments have started to 
explore and adopt measures, and also platforms are increasingly concerned with the matter. In France, 
the Law on Digital Platforms (2016) requires online talent platforms to cover insurance contributions for 
occupational accidents for self-employed workers – when the workers voluntarily take out such insurance 
– or to take out an insurance contract, except in the event of a collective bargaining agreement. In 
Germany, the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs published a document called “Arbeiten 4.0” 
[Work 4.0] (2017). The document calls for a range of measures on social protection for self-employed and 
other labour suppliers, above all urging the need for a new social protection framework that fits the 
changing needs of the labour market. “Arbeiten 4.0” further emphasises the value in social dialogue for 
finding solutions in this regard. 
Online talent platforms have also taken up this issue. Online talent platforms and related services like Ploy 
and Book A Tiger are offering flexible work options through which labour suppliers are fully insured and 
covered by social security. A German platform called content.de collects and contributes the 5.2% of 
earnings to the KSK (Künstlersozialkasse) on behalf of its labour suppliers (German double contribution 
system) (Sigge, 2014). This arrangement works as content.de largely intermediates creative writing tasks, 
and the KSK was designed to support self-employed writers, publishers and artists. Another example is 
YOSS, a newly launched platform that offer the option to buy-in on insurance (also legal and accounting 
advice). All talent platforms mentioned in these examples use this feature to attract both labour suppliers 
and clients, and it thus is likely that more platforms will follow these examples in the future. At the same 
time, other online talent platforms have chosen the opposite route, working with self-employed only (e.g. 
Temper).  
Overall, it is clear that a lot of work is still ahead, regardless of what solutions are chosen. Because of the 
complexity of national social security schemes and the accompanying legislation, adapting them to the 
new world of work will be highly challenging. The Belgian case is illustrative in this regard: the current 
labour law already makes it difficult to establish one’s employment status (i.e. it is difficult to prove that 
someone is an employee in situations where there might be doubt on this), and its application to online 
talent platform labour suppliers is even trickier. Furthermore, how the social security system would be 
adapted would depend on the national context and preferences. What is clear, however, is that labour 
suppliers in the online talent platform economy would benefit from receiving more information on their 
rights and obligations. In this context, the importance of social dialogue and collective bargaining has also 
been underlined (ILO, 2016). 
4.1.2 Temporary work agencies 
Social security is a bundle of rights and policies aimed at sustaining a high standard of living and protection 
against both outside and inside shocks and risks to individuals and to society as a whole, ensuring access 
to essential services, providing opportunity to escape poverty, stabilising income and so forth (IDEA 
Consult, 2015).   
Temporary agency work is granted comparable access to unemployment benefits in the vast majority of 
the EU Member States, yet it is also true that across states workers have to meet thresholds to qualify for 
social benefits, such as a minimum number of working days in the past 24 months in order to be granted 
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unemployment benefits (IDEA Consult, 2015). This means temporary agency workers are potentially at a 
disadvantage here, in particular in cases where employment spells are short or interrupted. Due to the 
nature of temporary agency work, which is a flexible form of short-term employment, some temporary 
agency workers may not reach the necessary number of working days to qualify for social benefits (IDEA 
Consult, 2015). Following the idea that the job search is frictional and costly (e.g. time consuming, 
mismatch), temporary agency workers are more likely to face periods of unemployment, which potentially 
makes them more vulnerable to certain risks (European Commission, 2017c).  
The same is true for sick benefits and access to healthcare. Generally speaking, temporary agency workers 
are granted nearly identical access to these benefits. Temporary agency workers, usually being less 
experienced in their working environment, incur a higher risk to suffer from injuries at work, which creates 
a need for full access to health care and sick benefits (Countouris et al., 2016; European Commission, 
2017c). However, while injuries related to performing work are covered clearly under the Directive, 
accumulating paid sick often requires the accumulation of working days, potentially reducing the level of 
paid sick days that temporary agency workers enjoy in some contexts (IDEA Consult, 2015).  
Pension benefits are not an exception to this pattern. Temporary agency workers have similar access 
compared to open end contracted employees, yet due to the nature of temporary employment, in some 
contexts temporary agency workers can struggle to accumulate the same level of pension benefits as 
received by those hired under permanent contracts (IDEA Consult, 2015). Once again, the issue here is 
not the level of benefits per se that temporary agency workers are entitled to – but rather the manner in 
which EU Member States determine the level of benefits. 
Analogous to the former examples of social benefits, temporary agency workers also have similar access 
to maternity leave as open contracted employees. Poland seems to be an exception here: access to 
maternity leave is denied in that country if the employee’s contract expires before the third month of 
pregnancy is reached (IDEA Consult, 2015). Otherwise, maternity leave for temporary agency workers 
appears to meet standards set by the benchmark of the standard permanent contract. Maternity leave 
provisions, as well as the other social protections discussed, are summarised in Table 9 . 
Table 9. Comparison of access to social protection 
  
Open-ended 
contracts 
TAW Fixed-term contracts Self-employment 
Unemployment benefits 1 1 1 0.4 
Sick benefits 1 1 0.98 0.53 
Healthcare 1 1 1 0.86 
Maternity leave 1 0.98 0.98 0.6 
Pension 1 1 0.97 0.7 
Note: Score calculated on national comparisons with open-ended contracts: 1 means the same provisions and 0 
means no provision. ‘TAW’ stands for temporary agency work. 
Source: IDEA Consult (2015). 
 
Generally speaking, this section reports that temporary agency workers to a large extent have similar 
access to social protection as those holding open-ended contracts. This indicates that important 
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prerequisites for ensuring equal access to social protection are in place. Yet, issues in receiving social 
protection remain, largely for benefits that are contingent on the number of days worked. This seems to 
be the primary challenge in assuring social protection in the temporary agency work sector. 
Table 10 offers a brief summary of working and employment conditions for temporary agency workers 
including the right to representation. It summarises coverage at the EU level and what is left to Member 
State regulations.  
Table 10. EU legislation on specific working and employment conditions for temporary agency workers 
General 
Categories  
Specific Topics EU Regulation 
Basic 
employment 
and working 
conditions* 
Working time, overtime, 
break, rest period, night 
work, holidays and public 
holidays 
2008/104/EC: Principle of equal treatment but 
derogations are possible by collective agreements at 
the national level 
Pay 
Social 
protection 
Access to health care 
Rights provided at national level 
Access to unemployment 
benefits 
Access to sick benefits 
Pensions benefits 
Dismissal 
Health and 
safety 
Specific provisions for 
health 
Directive 91/383/EEC 
Specific provisions for 
safety 
Access to 
employment, 
collective 
facilities and 
training 
Access to employment 
2008/104/EC: “informed of any vacant posts” and 
“ensure that no clauses prohibiting conclusion of a 
contract of employment or employment relationship 
between the user undertaking and the temporary 
agency worker” 
Collective facilities 
2008/104/EC: Given access to amenities or collective 
facilities (canteen, transport services, etc.) unless 
difference of treatment for objectives reasons 
Access to vocational 
training 
2008/104/EC: No specific rights but take suitable 
measures to improve (1) access to training, and even in 
the period between assignments; (2) access to training 
for user undertakings’ workers. Bi-partite training funds 
have been created in many countries (see p. 66).  
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Representation 
/Social dialogue 
Access to representative 
bodies 
The possible rights to have access to representative 
bodies is regulated at national level. 2008/104/EC: 1) 
Temporary agency workers must be taken into account 
for the purpose of calculating the threshold above 
which bodies representing workers are to be formed; 2) 
Temporary agency workers can also be taken into 
account for user undertaking threshold; 3) User 
undertakings must provide suitable information on the 
use of temporary agency workers to bodies 
representatives 
*As defined by Directive 2008/104/EC. 
Source: IDEA Consult (2015). 
4.1.3 Summary of and comparison of social protection  
Access to social protection is an important concern in the online talent platform economy, and this debate 
is part of a much larger discussion on access to social protection for non-traditional workers. In general, 
the social security systems currently in place were designed with traditional, dependent and full-time 
employment for a single employer in mind. These systems no longer fit the reality of the world of work of 
today, which is characterised by a growing number of non-traditional workers. This causes issues with 
regard to statutory and effective access to social protection. In the case of online talent platform labour 
suppliers, uncertainty about their status – which is the main factor determining access to benefits in many 
countries – further complicates this issue.  
Labour suppliers for the online talent platform economy are usually categorised as self-employed, and 
their social protection is contingent on that of the self-employed in a given Member State. Other frequent 
cases include those who use online talent platforms as a source of supplemental income alongside 
unemployment benefits, student allowances or even full-time employment. Perhaps the most worrying 
case would be those who earn their income exclusively from online talent platforms, while receiving 
virtually no social protection due to living in a Member State with a less supportive welfare regime. This 
would be particularly troubling in the case that an online talent platform’s business model operates 
similarly to a traditional employment relationship – a case in which ‘bogus self-employment’ is occurring 
with real world consequences for labour suppliers. Such situations have led to a plethora of lawsuits 
against various online talent platforms in a number of EU Member States, many of which are still pending 
(Codagnone et al., 2016). In a few cases, governments and intermediaries have stepped in to try to fill the 
gaps in social protection. Overall, however, it is difficult to make generalisations about social protection 
for labour suppliers of online talent platforms. Access to social protection is different from platform to 
platform, government to government and case by case.  
The status is clearer for temporary agency workers, who are entitled to the same rights as other 
employees under the principle of equal treatment in Directive 2008/104/EC. In practice, however, it may 
be more difficult for temporary agency workers to meet the requirements for access to social protection, 
notably the total days worked in a given time frame. This is a particular concern for those aspects of social 
protection that are contingent on days worked, e.g. accumulating paid sick days, pensions and 
unemployment benefits. Depending on the Member State and particular social protection in question, 
this can be more or less of an issue. 
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4.2 Role of social partners 
The second section of the chapter studies the role of social partners in relation to online talent platforms 
and temporary work agencies. The section approaches the role of social partners from the perspective of 
organisation, representation and collective bargaining. Note that although this section is dedicated to the 
social partners, one must not overlook that social partners play a role in all domains covered in this report. 
We return to this point in the sections below. 
4.2.1 Online talent platforms 
Social partners have increasingly engaged with online talent platforms and their labour suppliers. While 
the level of engagement differs across the Member States, many social partners have interacted with 
labour suppliers (on an individual level and with grassroots organisations), online talent platforms, new 
types of intermediaries, government representatives and other stakeholders. These interactions cover a 
range of issues, including the legal framework, employment and working conditions, and access to training 
and social protection.29 Furthermore, social partners have undertaken several initiatives, from 
information campaigns and research projects, to negotiations on behalf of labour suppliers.  
The involvement of social partners in the online talent platform economy has been encouraged by the 
European Parliament. In its report on the European agenda for the collaborative economy, the European 
Parliament (2017c) calls upon the social partners, together with the EU Member States and other relevant 
stakeholders, to “assess, in a proactive way the need to modernise existing legislation, including social 
security systems, so as to stay abreast of technological developments while ensuring workers’ protection”. 
The current literature on the role of social partners in the online talent platform economy is very limited. 
Some examples have been discussed more broadly (e.g. the Fair Crowd Work initiative launched by IG 
Metall), but overall little is known about the connection between the actors in the online talent platform 
economy, social partners, and industrial relations and social dialogue. Kilhoffer et al. (2017) report that 
social partners appear to be in an observational stage, waiting for the online talent platform economy to 
develop, and for clarification on certain key questions before taking concerted action or coming out with 
a position paper. This observation holds particularly for the social partners operating in the EU Member 
States. At the EU level, social partners have been more vocal about their stance. Still, there are noteworthy 
developments within the EU Member States as well, which are elaborated below and in Appendix A. 
When it comes to the role of social partners in the online talent platform economy, it is important to bear 
in mind the inherent differences between the actors in the online talent platform economy and those that 
are typically associated with industrial relations. Once again, this brings the discussion back to the status 
of the labour suppliers as well as the platforms.  
                                                          
29 Note that despite the wide diversity in the focus and initiatives undertaken by social partners in the online talent 
platform economy, it is clear that social partners tend to prioritise a number of issues over others. For example, in 
the context of physical activities that are carried out offline, for example delivery services, much attention is devoted 
to issues such as safety, the provision of equipment and remuneration. Other issues that social partners usually take 
up in more traditional settings, for example representation in the works council of the company, what information 
is shared with workers or the government and other issues have not yet been explored in the context of the online 
talent platform economy to the best of our knowledge. 
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In a traditional industrial relations context, trade unions and employer representatives engage in bipartite 
or tripartite social dialogue (including government representatives). When superimposing this setting on 
the online talent platform economy, several issues emerge (Kilhoffer et al., 2017). First, labour suppliers 
are not always employees and may therefore not be represented. Some labour suppliers may even prefer 
not to be represented, even when they have an employee status, e.g. out of fear of repercussions by the 
platform. Similarly, labour suppliers who choose to work as self-employed in the online talent platform 
economy may not see a need for representation by a union. For self-employed who would be interested 
in representation, there are only few options available (there are unions for self-employed, but not many). 
An umbrella organisation representing the self-employed does not exist. Furthermore, in many cases the 
status of the labour suppliers remains unclear, which complicates the question of representation. Another 
point is that online talent platform labour suppliers may be rather difficult to unite, due to high turnover 
rates and the fact that the population of labour suppliers is dispersed (Scheiber, 2017). This is a challenge 
for unions as well as for labour suppliers attempting to organise themselves. 
Second, online talent platforms are generally not employers. Although recent court cases have shown that 
the opposite might be true (e.g. Uber in the UK) and examples of platforms that offer employee contracts 
do exist (e.g. Book A Tiger), these are the exceptions rather than the rule. In fact, most platforms stipulate 
explicitly in their terms and conditions that the platform is merely an intermediary between demand and 
supply of labour (e.g. Temper). Furthermore, while the representatives of labour suppliers tend to target 
multiple platforms at once, far less collaboration seems to exist between platforms. One counterexample 
is the Deutscher Crowdsourcing Verband, which has reached agreement with eight platforms to abide by 
the principles described in a Code of Conduct. The platforms united in the Verband also collaborated with 
IG Metall in the establishment of an Ombudman’s Office that serves as a dispute settlement mechanism. 
This example is also an interesting case of self-regulation in the online talent platform economy. 
Besides these two issues, it is clear that the involvement of the government in the online talent platform 
differs from its involvement in other sectors, with a much stronger role for the local level. New forms of 
organisation and representation are emerging, but it remains an open question what their role will be. As 
a result, one can conclude that there is no framework governing social dialogue in the online talent 
platform economy, and the existing framework makes for a poor fit (Kilhoffer et al., 2017). Regardless, 
social partners, online talent platforms and labour suppliers have engaged one another. One example is 
the case of Meploy, a Danish platform enabling small units of work called “ploys”, where the platform 
owner has made explicit that the platform aims to account for the concerns of trade unions (Svansø, 
2016). Furthermore, labour suppliers have organised themselves for nearly as long as online talent 
platforms have operated. Using blogs, Facebook, WhatsApp groups and other ‘soft’ tools of organisation, 
labour suppliers have taken first steps towards formal unionisation (Aloisi, 2015).  
In order for labour suppliers’ organisation to be meaningful, their numbers must reach a critical mass. This 
has occurred, for example, with Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), whose users created the forum and tool 
Turkopticon to reduce information disparities and negative consequences of that particular work 
environment. The largest pool of online talent platform labour suppliers, however, are active on personal 
transportation platforms or on local food delivery platforms, which were some of the first platforms to 
spread to Europe. De Groen et al. (2016), for example, estimated that two-thirds of the European labour 
suppliers for the online talent platform economy were Uber drivers. Perhaps because of the nature of the 
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work performed through these platforms, where labour suppliers can easily spot and speak with one 
another, worker organisation and social partner activity has been especially pronounced here. 
At the same time, social partners have engaged these labour suppliers, but sometimes with hesitation. 
This is partially due to the desire for clarity from national governments and the EU on the legal status of 
online talent platforms and their labour suppliers (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2017). IG Metall, Europe’s 
largest industrial union, has begun cooperating with the founders of Turkopticon to better provide for 
labour suppliers on AMT. Drivers for online talent platforms have partnered with GMB, a general British 
trade union, on court cases related to holiday pay and the minimum wage (Osborne, 2016), the California 
App-Based Drivers Association (CADA),30 the Independent Drivers Guild of New York (Scheiber, 2017) and 
others. The Independent Workers Union of Great Britain has been exceptionally active in advocating on 
behalf of online talent platform labour suppliers, having successfully brought test cases to court on behalf 
of labour suppliers from Deliveroo, UberEats and City Spring.31 Foodora couriers in Austria created a 
Betriebsrat [employee organisation] with the assistance of ‘vida’ – an Austrian union for service and transit 
workers (Der Standard, 2017). In this light, the option to establish works councils for online talent 
platforms could also be explored. 
Two partnership initiatives with social partners are noteworthy in terms of the social partner’s influence. 
IG Metall has begun allowing the self-employed to join, with an explicit emphasis on platform labour 
suppliers (Kilhoffer et al., 2017). Moreover, IG Metall has started an organisation called Fair Crowd Work, 
which seeks to connect labour suppliers with appropriate unions. Fair Crowd Work’s selection of unions 
for labour suppliers of online talent platform appears in Appendix A. Fair Crowd Work also maintains a list 
of online talent platforms with reviews based on terms of service and worker reviews.32 Unionen, a 
Swedish trade union helped fund research initiatives into labour questions related to the platform 
economy and advocates the role of social dialogue and collective bargaining in the context of online talent 
platforms (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2017). More details for both are presented in the boxes below.  
                                                          
30 See CADA’s official Facebook page. It appears that Seattle also has a very active App-Based Drivers Association 
(SADA), and that both CADA and SADA are affiliated with the Teamsters. 
31 www.iwgb.org.uk/. Freedland and Kountouris (2017) discuss one of these legal cases concerning Uber in the UK. 
32 See http://faircrowd.work/platform-reviews/. 
ACCESS TO SOCIAL PROTECTION FOR ONLINE TALENT PLATFORM LABOUR SUPPLIERS AND TEMPORARY AGENCY WORKERS | 63 
 
 
 
  With financial support  
from the European Union 
 
Box 9. IG Metall’s role as social partner for online talent platform workers 
IG Metall has made a concerted effort to include crowd workers in their organisation and to coordinate 
social partners and stakeholders across various nations and sectors. One specific measure is the 
creation of a Crowdsourcing Code of Conduct, which lays out “Guidelines for profitable and fair 
cooperation between crowdsourcing companies, clients, and crowd workers” (Silberman, 2016). The 
Crowdsourcing Code was created in cooperation with numerous stakeholders, aiming to clarify 
principles for acceptable work and the status of labour suppliers.  
Social protection has been a key concern. IG Metall performed a survey of crowd workers and found 
that health insurance and pensions were the most important considerations for them regarding their 
work benefits. Furthermore, around one-third had no pension plan. However, about one-half of 
respondents indicated that they worked less than 10 hours monthly for platforms. Only 5% indicated 
they worked on a platform for more than 20 hours per week, and fewer than 10% are union members. 
This seems to support the notion that relatively few labour suppliers to online talent platforms rely on 
platform work for their primary income and social protection. 
IG Metall was also a key participating organisation in drafting the Frankfurt Declaration on Platform-
Based Work – a document laying out guidelines and principles for reasonable platform-based work. 
The document clarifies IG Metall’s stance on social protections (Frankfurt Paper on Platform Based 
Work, 2016, p. 7). 
Regardless of their employment classification, platform labour suppliers should have access to social 
security protections – public and/or private, as nationally appropriate – including unemployment 
insurance, disability insurance, health insurance, pension, maternity protection and compensation in 
the event of work-related illness or injury. Contributions to relevant accounts should be shared – as 
appropriate by national context – between workers, platforms, clients and the state, and should be 
pro-rated, portable and, if nationally appropriate, mandatory. 
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Despite the efforts to organise labour suppliers who are active in the online talent platform economy, the 
lack of a partner with which to negotiate on the platforms’ side has been a cause for concern for unions. 
In Belgium, this has led unions to start up negotiations with SMart, an intermediary that was already 
collaborating with Deliveroo and served as an employer for the bulk of its bikers (Kilhoffer and Lenaerts, 
2017). Although the unions were highly critical of SMart’s practices, at least in SMart they found a 
counterpart with whom to negotiate working conditions and wages, as Deliveroo was reluctant to engage 
with them. When the unions and SMart were negotiating a collective agreement for the bikers, Deliveroo 
terminated its collaboration with SMart. This triggered a huge public debate in Belgium and prompted 
action by several government departments, the labour and social affairs inspectorates, unions and other 
stakeholders. 
 
4.2.2 Temporary work agencies 
European regulations give a large role to social dialogue and involvement of social partners in concluding 
agreements, and this is no exception in the temporary agency work sector. Although Directive 
2008/104/EC provides the core legal framework for the temporary agency sector, it allows collective 
agreements to deviate in certain points from this regulation. This holds true in particular for Article 5 of 
the Directive (addressing the principle of equal treatment), which explicitly allows exceptions from the 
equal treatment obligations by collective agreement (derogation). Several EU Member States have 
already used this option (e.g. Sweden, Germany and the UK). For a more detailed discussion, see European 
Commission (2014b). Collective agreements have been concluded by social partners, for example by 
providing additional provisions to employees in the temporary agency work sector and ensuring 
compensation in the case of illness or accident (IDEA Consult, 2015). Social partners have also been active 
in pointing out instances in which temporary agency workers are potentially subject to unfair practices. 
They have also taken action to represent temporary agency workers in their ranks, and additionally to 
Box 10. Unionen's role as social partner for online talent platform workers 
Sweden’s largest union, Unionen, has shown initiative in handling issues related to online talent 
platforms. In particular, the focus seems to be on finding a way to integrate labour in the online talent 
platform economy with the Nordic model of industrial relations. Fredrik Söderqvist of Unionen, who 
has also served as an expert on the Swedish government’s digitalisation commission, said: “We want 
to create a distinctly Nordic variation of the platform economy and make it easier for employers to be 
good employers” (Wallin, 2017). 
Unionen has issued a number of position papers emphasising the need for technological development 
and innovation, while expressing concerns for protection of labour rights, health and safety, taxation, 
and social security (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2017). In cooperation with other actors, Unionen has 
funded a number of research projects aiming to better understand online platforms and how they 
might best be integrated into the Swedish labour market and beyond.  
Of particular interest to this study, Unionen has suggested that social partners’ organisation, 
authorisation and regulation of online talent platforms could be modelled on the basis of those found 
in the Swedish temporary agency work sector (Unionen/Söderqvist, 2016). 
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prevent the use of temporary agency work to harm broader interests (e.g. utilising temporary workers to 
replace striking workers). 
Collective bargaining can take place in the temporary agency work sector in one of four ways: 1) 
negotiations at the national inter-sectoral level, 2) collective bargaining within the temporary agency work 
sector itself, 3) bargaining within temporary work agency firms and 4) collective bargaining in sectors in 
which user firms are based (Eurofound, 2008). Depending on national and sectoral context, these broad 
bargaining frameworks are more or less prevalent. 
In the temporary agency work sector, there are 12 EU Member States in which employer organisations 
conduct collective bargaining with trade unions (Eurofound, 2016), as illustrated in Table 11 below. Most 
other European nations have trade associations in which collective bargaining may take place, but there 
is no mandate to do so. More generally, temporary agency workers are free to join any union relevant to 
the sector or occupation in which they are placed (Ibid.). The density of temporary agency workers in 
unions varies substantially from country to country. 
Table 11. Collective bargaining practises of employer organisations in the temporary agency sector 
Type Organisations by country 
Involved in collective bargaining at multi-
employer and sector/branch level 
Austria: FVGD 
Belgium: Federgon 
Denmark: Dansk Erhverv/VB, DI 
Germany: BAP, iGZ 
Finland: HPL, PALTA 
France: Prism’emploi 
Italy: Assolavoro, Assonime 
Luxembourg: FEDIL 
Netherlands: ABU, NBBU 
Spain: ASEMPLEO 
Sweden: Bemmaningsföretagen, Medieföretagen, BI 
Involved in collective bargaining but no 
agreements signed 
Portugal: APESPE, APCC 
Not involved in collective bargaining Austria: Österreichs Personaldienstleister 
Bulgaria: BG Staffing 
Croatia: CPEA 
Czech Republic: APPS 
Estonia: EPREL 
Greece: ENIDEA 
Hungary: SZTMSZ 
Ireland: NRF 
Lithuania: LIIA 
Latvia: LPDAA 
Poland: Polish Forum HR, SAZ, OKAP 
Romania: ARAMT 
Source: Eurofound, 2016, p. 19-20. 
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Looking to one particular example, Germany has long held collective bargaining as an important facet in 
labour policy. Consistent with the equal-pay principle, the German trade union IG Metall joined with iGZ 
and BAP, both groups interested in the temporary agency work sector, and achieved the first collective 
agreement of its kind in Germany in 2012, granting industry-specific premiums to temporary agency 
workers, depending on the field of work to which workers are assigned, attempting to close the pay gap 
between temporary agency workers and other forms of work within the same industry (IDEA Consult, 
2015). France and Italy are also somewhat in the vanguard here, with their social partners having already 
attended to various provisions for temporary agency workers, namely pension funds, maternity leave, 
health care and sick benefits, and also introduced a central system facilitating the register of working days 
for temporary agency workers (IDEA Consult, 2015).  
The following table provides an overview of existing social funds for temporary agency workers (Table 12). 
Note that training funds are not listed in this table, but are discussed in Chapter 5. 
Table 12. Bipartite Social Funds 
Country Name Type of fund Provisions 
Austria SWF Sozial- und 
Weiterbildungsfond 
Social and further 
training fund 
Unemployment benefits for unemployed 
temporary workers 
Belgium SFU-FSI (Fonds Social 
pour les Intérimaires) 
Social fund Additional social benefits: end of year 
bonus 
France FASTT (Fond d'action 
social du travail 
temporaire) 
Social fund Access to housing, credit, childcare, 
schooling, health insurance, mobility 
support 
REUNICA Welfare and 
pension fund 
Additional provision for illness / 
accidents (complementary) 
Italy Ebitemp (ente bilaterale 
nazionale per il lavoro 
temporaneo  
Social fund Inclusion, health, health and safety, 
access to credit, childcare 
Fontemp Pension fund Complementary pension benefits 
Netherlands SFU (Stichting Fonds 
Uitzendbranche) 
Social fund 
(Umbrella 
Organisation for 
STOOF, SNCU and 
SAF) 
Access to housing, childcare, holidays, 
credit 
STIPP Pension fund Complementary pension benefits 
STAF (Stichting Arbo 
Flexbranche) 
Health and safety 
fund 
Improve health and safety at work 
Sources: Eurofound, 2016, p. 22; Boston Consulting Group and Ciett, 2011, p. 70; Voss et al., 2013. 
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4.2.3 Summary and comparison of the role of social partners  
Social partners are increasingly concerned about the online talent platform economy, as is reflected in 
recent initiatives, study groups and various assessments. At the same time, there is large heterogeneity 
in responses and involvement of social partners across the EU Member States, and most of this evidence 
to date is anecdotal. Some social partners, notably IG Metall, have taken the initiative to include labour 
suppliers for online talent platforms. Other social partners have assisted labour suppliers in creating their 
own organisations and carrying out certain initiatives, such as lawsuits against online talent platforms. 
Most social partners, however, seem to be biding their time and waiting for clarity on a number of fronts, 
even while attempting to influence the debate by voicing their concerns and producing position papers 
(Nordic Council of Ministers, 2017). In particular, pending court cases about the status of self-employment 
vis-à-vis labour on online talent platforms may affect the allocation of social protection. Meanwhile, large 
and established social partners such as IG Metall and Unionen, as well as smaller ones, have been involved 
in numerous initiatives concerning social protection for labour suppliers of online talent platforms.  
The more established temporary agency work sector is more clearly committed in this regard, and in 
general has more comprehensive access to social protection, as well as a longer history of engagement 
with social partners. Temporary work agencies are represented in employer organisations, while 
temporary agency workers are represented in employee organisations. Temporary agency workers’ 
access to representation is determined at the national level, which means that variation in effective 
representation is present across the EU Member States. For example, as of April 2017, temporary agency 
workers in Germany are entitled to equal pay after 9 months of employment in the same company unless 
a collective agreement specifies otherwise, provided that the collective agreement guarantees equal pay 
after 15 months. In the UK, full equal treatment of temporary agency workers only applies after 12 weeks, 
unless these workers sign a ‘payment between assignments’ contract, which makes them employees of 
the agency instead of agency workers, so that the equal pay principle would not apply to them anymore. 
Accordingly, Hudson-Sharpe and Runge (2017) find that social partner involvement in the temporary 
agency work sector is more effective in Germany than in the UK. At the European level generally, it is clear 
that social partners have quite actively engaged in issues relevant to temporary work agencies. 
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5. Access to training of online talent platform labour suppliers and 
temporary agency workers 
 
 
KEY MESSAGES 
 
 With few exceptions, online training platforms do not offer training to their labour suppliers. 
 In some cases, online training platforms offer minimal training for labour suppliers, such as 
safety guidelines. 
 A few platforms have partnered with other organisations to provide training. 
 In principle, temporary work agencies offer training on a par with that of full-time, open-ended 
contracts. 
 In practice, training in temporary work agencies is unevenly implemented and access to 
training depends on national regulations, labour market traditions and sectoral conditions. 
 Several countries have special funding mechanisms for training temporary agency workers, 
while more frequently they receive training in the framework of broader worker categories 
(e.g. workers having fixed-term contracts).  
 In comparison with temporary agencies, online talent platforms generally provide far fewer 
opportunities for training. 
 
 
Training is an increasingly relevant consideration for workers at all stages of their careers. Work and the 
way it is performed has always undergone transitions, but the process has accelerated in recent years due 
to various forces, including digitalisation and automation, in combination with aging of the population 
and globalisation and environmental change (Beblavý et al., 2016). These dynamics affect which jobs and 
skills are relevant in the labour market. As skills needs are changing, skills gaps are widening (Quintini, 
2018). Technological change has caused skills restructuring (i.e. occupations are transforming, rather than 
being abolished; see Quintini, 2017). Workers need to adapt their skills to accommodate the rise of new 
occupations and tasks, and new forms of employment. Furthermore, skills are becoming obsolete in a 
very short cycle, which implies that continuous training is key for future employability.  
Against this background, ensuring continued access to high-quality training and providing lifelong learning 
opportunities for all workers have become higher policy priorities for a variety of stakeholders, from the 
European institutions to employers (EPSC, 2016). Yet, a lot of work is ahead. Quintini (2018) shows that 
low-skilled adults are less likely to participate in training than others, and so do workers in jobs that are 
at high risk of automation. Quintini (2018) identified a number of good practices in countries that aim to 
address these concerns. These include the implementation of training policies targeting the low-skilled, 
measures to help SMEs overcome obstacles to providing training, tailored policies for new forms of work, 
and others. 
In the context of this study, training is broadly defined. This broad approach is necessary to account for 
the highly heterogeneous landscape of online talent platforms. The remainder of this section examines 
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access to training with respect to online talent platform labour suppliers and temporary agency workers. 
We highlight specific initiatives to encourage participation in training and skills enhancement. 
 
5.1 Online talent platforms 
Access to training is a subject that has not been discussed much in the literature on online talent 
platforms, nor has it received much attention in the policy debate. One reason for this observation could 
be the still limited size of the online talent platform economy. Another reason could be that other issues 
are deemed more pressing and have therefore attracted more attention (e.g. legal or regulatory concerns, 
taxation or access to social protection). A final point is the unclear status of online talent platform labour 
suppliers, whether self-employed or something else. When considered self-employed, labour suppliers 
should normally be responsible for their own training. In other cases, the responsibility may be less clear.  
Against this background, a first glance of the literature reveals some anecdotal evidence on access to 
training and specific initiatives taken by online talent platforms. In a recent publication (IGAS, 2016) of the 
French Inspection générale des affaires sociales, an administrative service created in 1967, two specific 
examples are mentioned: Frizbiz and Heetch. Heetch partnered with the National Training Institute for 
Security and the Learning and Training Centre in Transport and Logistics, in order to facilitate training 
opportunities. Among the recommendations presented in the same IGAS publication is to authorise and 
urge online talent platforms to finance vocational training programmes. Another consideration was voiced 
by a platform owner, who suggested tentative plans to facilitate pairing labour suppliers on the job, so 
that one can learn from the other.33  
 
In addition, there are some platforms providing digital services that offer training to labour suppliers on 
how to manage and better utilise the platform when searching for work. A platform called Happy Helper, 
                                                          
33 This information was provided in an interview with the platform owner. 
Box 11. Frizbiz and access to training 
Frizbiz is a website that puts members (called ‘jobbers’) in touch with private individuals to fulfil certain 
local tasks, such as babysitting and household repairs. Besides being an online talent platform pioneer 
in France, Frizbiz also enables some workers to benefit from training programmes in cooperation with 
Leroy Merlin, a home improvement and gardening retailer, with headquarters in France.  
These training programmes are free, launched on a voluntary basis and provided by two channels. On 
the one hand, online sessions (webinars) are organised on different topics and in which jobbers may 
take part. Most of the time, these consist of a PowerPoint presentation and end with a Q&A session. 
On the other hand, the gardening and retailer company sets up in-person training sessions to teach 
skills in odd jobs. Moreover, Leroy Merlin also provides advice in completing DIY tasks. 
Source: Analysis from Frizbiz (2016), Buyse (2017). 
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for example, trains its labour suppliers to utilise their app and website.34 This, however, seems to be more 
about guidelines for effective website/app usage than what is traditionally understood as training. 
ListMinut, as well, offers one-hour information sessions to educate labour suppliers on effectively 
attracting tasks via the platform. Most detailed guides for better utilising online talent platforms seem to 
be community created. The website Reddit, for example, contains communities called subreddits for 
labour suppliers of various platforms (Graham, 2016). Among the material on these subreddits are 
detailed guides for new users with tips to maximise profits.35 Indeed, what seems to distinguish the most 
successful digital workers are those who can skilfully manipulate the platform – quickly finding the most 
profitable tasks, building up their rating scores and in some cases re-outsourcing the tasks at even lower 
prices (Graham, 2016). Manipulating platforms in this manner is probably not in the interest of the 
platform, however, so such training is likely only found via online communities. 
In the case of skilled digital services, such as design and programming, both free and paid e-learning 
opportunities abound, from YouTube tutorials, CodeAcademy or free online courses from MIT and 
Harvard. Free online communities such as Stack Overflow provide ample opportunities to learn about 
programming tasks, ask specific questions and receive detailed feedback. No surveyed examples, 
however, seem to indicate that online talent platforms are particularly concerned with providing such 
opportunities – leaving the labour suppliers to procure training themselves. 
A Danish platform called Happy Helper trains its labour suppliers, called Helpers, on how to clean, use its 
website and application, and interact with customers.36 The training takes place in a Happy Helper office 
prior to beginning service. Of all surveyed research in this paper, it appears that Happy Helper is the only 
platform to directly offer its workers training in-person. Professionalism seems to be a major selling point 
in Happy Helper’s business model, with the firm emphasising that its Helpers are qualified and thoroughly 
instructed in how to clean.37  
SMart, a cooperative discussed earlier, previously offered a range of training for both digital and non-
digital labour suppliers, within and outside the online talent platform economy. For example, delivery 
people for Deliveroo could opt to become employees of SMart, obtaining benefits including training in 
exchange for 6.5% of their salary. Prior to beginning work as a SMart employee, couriers needed to 
complete a safety course. SMart is also notable for offering a variety of advisory and training services to 
its employees (SMart, 2017), who represent various types of freelancers, artists and others who are 
traditionally self-employed.38 
With the exception of a few anecdotal cases, training seems to be very minimal or absent in the online 
talent platform economy. One potential explanation is that providing training can lead to labour suppliers 
being reclassified as workers or employees, which platforms typically want to avoid. Another issue is that 
online talent platforms tend to operate on the self-employment model, which means that they facilitate 
transactions between customers and labour suppliers who already have the requisite skillsets for a given 
                                                          
34 A representative for Happy Helper clarified this point via an informal online conversation. 
35 See for example www.reddit.com/r/mturk/comments/1z4sma/new_to_mturk_heres_what_you_should_know/. 
36 A customer service representative from Happy Helper clarified what the training entails in a brief, informal online 
interview. 
37 FAQ can be accessed at https://happyhelper.dk/pages/faq. Few details on training are available. 
38 The partnership between SMart and Deliveroo has come to an end (see Kilhoffer and Lenaerts, 2017). 
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service. Training may then not be a primary consideration for online talent platforms when either i) there 
is a sufficient supply of skilled labour suppliers who do not need additional training, or ii) the services 
offered are not particularly skill-intensive. To elaborate on the second condition, the primary requisite 
hard skills for food delivery (riding a bike safely) and domestic cleaning (cleaning and sanitising 
households) are often picked up naturally prior to reaching working age. In such cases, minimal training, 
or even providing guidelines to working professionally and safely, seem to suffice for online talent 
platforms. Alternatively, the self-employed can access training resources in a variety of ways, either 
relying on their own resources or through organisations that provide such services.  
In summary, it appears that online talent platforms currently do not view providing access to training for 
labour suppliers as a priority. This may be due to the fact that many platforms are still relatively young 
and immature, which may lead them to underestimate its importance or focus on other priorities instead. 
Nevertheless, the world of work is rapidly changing and skills quickly become obsolete. Thus, to remain 
competitive, online talent platforms would have to attract labour suppliers with relevant skills.  
 
5.2 Temporary work agencies  
Training opportunities for temporary agency workers have been considered an important benefit. Given 
the nature of temporary agency work and the goals of many temporary agency workers to develop skills 
and attain a permanent contract, training can be particularly useful. Overall, it appears that temporary 
agency workers in Europe benefit from many opportunities for training. Some have raised concerns, 
however, about the discrepancy between the theoretical access to training and its practical application.39 
To begin, various initiatives have increased the availability of training opportunities to workers in the 
temporary agency work sector. For example, the European Social Partners in the temporary agency work 
sector carried out a joint project on “More training opportunities for more agency workers” which 
resulted in a joint declaration called “Training for Temporary Agency Workers: Joint actions developed by 
sectoral social partners play a key role in facilitating skills upgrading”, published in 2009 (Eurociett/UNI 
Europa, 2009). 
Indeed, social partners have been quite active in advocating the provision of training opportunities in all 
sectors of the labour market, including those specifically for temporary agency workers. Table 13 shows 
countries for which training initiatives have been launched by social partners for temporary agency 
workers versus other types of workers.  
Temporary work agencies have also been noted for offering dual learning schemes and apprenticeship 
contracts. Such schemes often combine formal training with on-the-job training at the user firm. The 
temporary agency work sector offers apprenticeship schemes and contracts in Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK (Voss et al., 2013). 
                                                          
39 For example, the 4th European Working Conditions Survey (2005) suggests that temporary contracts in the form 
of fixed-term and temporary agency work are associated with limited access to training. The 5th edition finds 
employees with a temporary agency contract receive training 26% of the time, versus 38% for employees working 
full-time. The 6th edition (2015) also finds that temporary agency workers receive less training than workers under 
other types of contracts. 
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Table 13. Presence of vocational training initiatives by social partners for workers 
  
Open-ended 
contracts 
TAW  
Fixed-term 
contracts  
Self-
employment 
Initiatives 
developed by SP 
AT, BG, FI, PT, SE, 
UK, IT, NL, NO, 
BE, CH, DE, FR 
AT, BG, FI, PT, 
SE, UK, FR, IT, 
NL, NO, BE, CH, 
DE 
AT, BG, FI, PT, SE, 
UK, IT, NL, NO, BE , 
CH 
AT, BG, FI, PT, 
SE, UK 
No initiative 
developed by SP 
EL, LV, RO, ES, LU 
EL, LV, RO, ES, 
LU 
EL, LV, RO, ES, LU 
FR, EL, IT, LV, NL, 
RO, ES, NO, LU 
Depends on 
sectors and 
occupations 
    FR, DE   
Initiatives 
developed by SP 
0.7 0.7 0.67 0.4 
Note: Number shown is the average of national scores, with 1 being the maximum score. This score is calculated as 
follows: 1 stands for “initiatives developed by social partners”, 0.5 stands for “initiatives developed in some sectors 
only” and 0 for “no initiative developed”. SP refers to social partners. 
Source: IDEA Consult (2015), based on a survey conducted among the Eurociett and UNI Europa members.  
Nevertheless, the heterogeneity of the temporary agency work sector means that access to training is not 
consistent across sectors, EU Member States and user firms. Empirical findings have shown that fixed-
term and temporary agency workers are less likely to receive training than those on a permanent contract. 
For example, three studies specific to the Netherlands conclude temporary agency workers receive less 
training: Van Velzen (2004), CNV (2007) and Houwing (2010). The European Working Conditions Survey 
(2005; 2015) is also illuminating in this regard. 
Germany seems to offer the most empirical evidence on training opportunities in the temporary agency 
work sector. A 2010 survey of 346 German temporary work agencies concluded that temporary agency 
workers receive little additional training beyond an initial orientation period. The most frequently 
mentioned training tools included manuals or instructions from supervisors or colleagues, on-site 
employee meetings and legally required health and safety protocols (Lehmann, 2010). Longer periods of 
work were not found to correspond with more training opportunities, except in the case of academics.40  
Regardless of the definition applied, the question of whether and to what extent temporary agency 
workers have access to training opportunities can only be answered in context. This means comparing the 
availability of training to other forms of employment, using open-ended contracts as a benchmark. Table 
14 from IDEA Consult (2015, p. 76) summarises how temporary agency workers’ access to training 
compares with access under open-ended contracts, fixed-term contracts and self-employment. This 
                                                          
40 It is, however, important to note that these studies are not perfectly comparable. The IDEA Consult (2015) paper 
identifies vocational training as “training whose main objective is preparing people for work with a basis in manual 
or practical activities, traditionally non-academic and entirely related to a specific trade, occupation or vocation”. 
The Lehmann et al. (2010) study uses the term Weiterbildung, which approximately means “advanced training” 
intended to supplement existing qualifications at a higher level. Berufsausbildung or simply Ausbildung is a more 
accurate equivalent for vocational training.   
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comparison represents availability in theory – that is to say, access to training as mandated by the law or 
collective agreements. 
Table 14. Comparative view of temporary agency workers access to training 
  
Open-
ended 
contracts 
TAW 
Fixed-term 
contracts 
Self-employment 
Similar to open-
ended contracts 
Benchmark 
AT, BE, BG, FI, FR, 
DE, EL, IT, NL, RO, 
SI, ES, SE, CH, NO, 
UK, LU, PT 
AT, BE, BG, FI, FR, 
DE, EL, IT, RO, SI, 
ES, SE, CH, NO, UK, 
PL, LU, PT 
AT, FI, DE, EL, PL, 
PT, SI, SE 
Less access LV, PL LV, NL 
BE, BG, FR, LV, SE, 
CH 
No access NA NA IT, NL, RO 
Index of access to 
vocational training 
1 0.95 0.95 0.65 
Note: The score is calculated on the basis of the national comparisons with open-ended contracts: 1 stands for 
‘identical provisions/conditions’, 0.5 stands for ‘different and less advantageous provisions/conditions’ and 0 for ‘no 
provision’. 
Source: IDEA Consult (2015) based on a survey conducted among Eurociett and UNI Europa members. 
 
As shown in Table 14, temporary agency workers’ access to training is similar to that of employees on 
open-ended contracts across the surveyed states, with the exceptions of Latvia and Poland. A study from 
2012 (Bellmann et al., 2013) calculated the further training quota for different contractual arrangements 
in Germany for 2006 and 2012. It shows that part-time employees and employees with fixed-term 
contracts received more training than temporary agency workers. The latter were also confronted with a 
dramatic increase in further training between 2006 and 2012 (‘training’ includes both formal and informal 
‘vocational training’).  
Table 15. Further training quota for different contractual arrangements in Germany (%) 
Source: Bellmann et al. (2013), p. 22. 
In a representative survey conducted in Germany in 2013, 90% of temporary work agencies stated that 
training was always, or at least always for certain workers, provided in connection with current or future 
assignments. This indicates that the agencies are predominantly interested in economic usability, rather 
than the personal development of the agency workers (Baumgarten et al., 2015). 
 Total 
Standard 
contracts 
Fixed-term 
contracts  
Part-time TAW 
  2006 2012 2006 2012 2006 2012 2006 2012 2006 2012 
Female 56,5 58,4 65,6 68,2 41,7 47,4 48,3 49 36,5 22,3 
Male 58,9 59,3 60,6 61,9 46,6 48,8 47,7 44,8 46 29,8 
Total 57,8 58,9 62,2 64 44,1 48,1 48,2 48,5 43,2 27,1 
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While many of the training opportunities for temporary agency workers seem to be a result of 
opportunities for more general categories of workers, such as those on fixed-term contracts, some 
initiatives are also in place specifically for temporary agency workers. A number of EU countries have 
established bipartite funds to facilitate training for temporary agency workers, as indicated in Table 16 
below (Voss et al., 2013). These bipartite funds are jointly run by representatives from trade unions and 
temporary work agencies. Some of the bipartite social funds mentioned in section 4.2.2 also provide 
support for temporary agency workers in terms of supporting/enabling workers’ access to training, 
whereas some other funds were exclusively set-up for training initiatives. 
Table 16. Training Initiatives for temporary agency workers (training funds) 
Country Name Type of fund Provisions 
Austria SWF Sozial- und 
Weiterbildungsfond 
Social and further 
training fund 
Provides funding for further qualification 
of temporary workers 
Belgium Fonds de 
Formation pour les 
Intérimaires (FFI) 
Training fund Facilitates training for agency 
workers in corporation with other 
sectoral funds. 
France FAF-TT (Fonds 
d’assurance 
formation du 
travail temporaire) 
Training fund Financing training for temporary 
agency workers 
FPE-TT (Fonds 
Professionnel pour 
l’Emploi du Travail 
Temporaire)  
Training fund Support for agencies to train and 
develop unemployed workers 
FSPI (Securitization 
of Interims Fund) 
Training fund Financing training and support 
measures for temporary agency 
workers 
Italy FORMATEMP   Training fund Supports qualification and skills 
development of agency workers 
Luxembourg Fonds de formation 
Sectoriel pour 
l'Intérim (fsi) 
Training fund  Training, safety training  
Netherlands STOOF (Stichting 
Opleiding & 
Ontwikkeling 
Flexbranche) 
Training fund Intermediary between ESF and 
temporary work agencies 
Spain SINDETT 
Foundation 
(2004-2009) 
Training fund Organisation and management of 
training courses, analytical work 
Note: The Spanish fund is no longer active. 
Sources: Voss et al. (2013), Peeters et al. (2009) and Eurofound (2017). 
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5.3 Summary and comparison of access to training 
In summary, only a few anecdotal examples point towards online talent platforms offering training. 
Felstinerf (2011) states simply that labour suppliers for online talent platforms do not receive the benefit 
of training from platforms because they are considered self-employed or freelancers. In that case, these 
individuals would be responsible for their own training needs.  
Some online talent platforms, platforms active in France for example, have created partnerships with 
other organisations, thereby facilitating training for their labour suppliers. There is also some evidence of 
online talent platforms that are considering offering training in the future, but efforts appear to be (very) 
limited at the present time. In this regard, a number of online talent platforms provide safety guidelines 
and working guidelines, aimed at standardising services as much as possible and minimising harm and 
liability. However, this would hardly fit in the spirit of training for the purpose of skills development. For 
example, it is a far stretch to consider the requirement of bicycle couriers to view a video instructing them 
to wear a helmet and obey traffic laws as “training”.41 
The only apparent example of training for purely online labour, such as freelance design or ‘clickwork’, 
involve tips to effectively use the platform itself. In this sense especially, taking on the costs of training 
does not seem commensurate with the online talent platform model. In fact, the European Sharing 
Economy Coalition (EURO-SHE), launched by the EESC, advocates embedding ‘sharing economy principles’ 
into curricula including vocational training programmes.42 In other words, existing vocational programmes 
                                                          
41 For example, Foodora bicycle couriers must watch a 10-minute video and complete a 19-question test as a part of 
their online application. The video briefly covers safety issues, professional standards and how to effectively pack 
and hand over food deliveries. 
42 See https://www.euro-freelancers.eu/european-sharing-economy-coalition/ 
Box 12. French training of temporary agency workers 
In France, training for temporary agency workers is considered a priority, and temporary agency 
workers are covered by two collective agreements related to training.  
The first is the FAF-TT (Fonds d’assurance formation du travail temporaire) [Temporary Work Training 
Insurance Fund] from 1983, which is a bipartite body whose main purpose is to finance training for 
temporary agency workers. The second is the FPE-TT (Fonds Professionnel pour l’Emploi du Travail 
Temporaire) [Professional Fund for Employment of Temporary Work]. This fund is a bipartite body that 
provides support and resources to temporary employment agencies to develop and training for 
unemployed workers. 
Temporary work agencies are responsible for contributing 2.15% of the gross payroll to training, 
whereas standard companies are required to contribute 1.5%. This contribution mostly funds the FAF-
TT and FPE-TT. Moreover, firms are required to provide safety training for temporary agency workers 
if the work they do presents particular risks. 
Source: Voss et al. (2013). 
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may adapt to the online talent platform economy, rather than online talent platforms adopting vocational 
training programmes. This may be taking place in the case of Frizbiz, with their partnership initiatives to 
provide training. 
Online talent platforms presently do not perceive providing access to training as a priority. There are 
several potential reason for this, including the immature state of platforms. In addition, in the case of 
high-skill freelance work, training could be lengthy and expensive, and online talent platforms may 
conclude that the supply of skilled labour suppliers is adequate without providing training. In the case of 
relatively low-skill work such as delivery or domestic cleaning, safety guidelines or a very brief course 
could be seen as sufficient to reduce accidents and liability. Most surveyed examples seem to focus on 
safety as well as providing more uniform services in a minimalistic fashion. With only one exception, the 
few anecdotal examples of training are the result of partnerships, rather than being provided by the online 
talent platforms themselves.  
Actors within the temporary agency work sector, including social partners, have engaged in a number of 
efforts to ensure that temporary agency workers have access to training. Bipartite groups active in several 
EU Member States exist to ensure that temporary agency workers have ongoing access to training 
opportunities. Going by the letter of the law, temporary agency workers have, on average, very close to 
the same level of access to training as those working on open-ended contracts.  
In practice, however, it appears that there are some discrepancies. Some studies have found that 
temporary agency workers have fewer training opportunities than those with a standard employment 
contract. This may be particularly true in certain EU Member States and sectors. Of course, the amount 
of training that is required or is appropriate varies from sector to sector. In any case, some survey results 
of temporary work agencies and temporary agency workers indicate that providing training is not always 
a priority for temporary agency work.  
From this research, one point does seem quite clear: it appears that work through the temporary agency 
work sector affords significantly more training opportunities than the online talent platform economy. 
Much of the relevant literature compares access to vocational training for people of different employment 
statuses, including temporary agency workers, workers on an indefinite contract, self-employed, etc. In 
all such literature surveyed for this writing, the self-employed enjoy the least access to training. Given 
that nearly all workers in the online talent platform economy are self-employed, they have accordingly 
limited access to training. 
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6. Labour market transitions and labour market participation in relation to 
online talent platforms and temporary work agencies 
 
 
KEY MESSAGES 
 
 Online talent platforms have the potential to facilitate labour market transitions by offering 
supplemental income and work experience. 
 Online talent platforms can encourage labour market participation by offering flexible work 
options, but mostly appear to increase the activity of those who are already in the labour 
market. 
 Online talent platforms can both increase or decrease undeclared work, but tend to formalise 
labour. 
 Temporary work agencies offer flexible working arrangements and opportunities for labour 
market entrants, facilitating labour market transitions and labour market participation. 
 Temporary work agencies offer employers legal and flexible options for labour, which may 
serve to reduce undeclared and informal work. 
 Labour through temporary work agencies and online talent platforms has fewer barriers to 
entry than other types of work. 
 For both online talent platforms and temporary work agencies, however, there is ambiguous 
and fragmented empirical evidence on the effects on labour market transitions, labour market 
participation, undeclared and informal work. In case of temporary agency work, some studies 
point to the possible existence of a stepping-stone effect, but this usually refers to single 
countries and/or particular groups of workers. There is even less evidence of those effects in 
the context of the platform economy.  
 In general, the transition from atypical into regular employment proves to be more difficult in 
a dualised labour market.  
 
 
Online talent platforms and temporary work agencies offer new, flexible opportunities for labour market 
participation and have the potential to facilitate labour market transitions. Both may also have an impact 
on the prevalence of undeclared or informal work. Against this background, temporary work agencies and 
online talent platforms are often presented as intermediaries that provide opportunities for those who 
find it difficult to enter into the regular labour market (e.g. in traditional full-time work arrangements), or 
those who prefer to work on a more flexible basis. Others have pointed to the risk that new forms of work 
like online talent platform work may crowd-out other forms of work, which are more regulated and offer 
better protection to the involved workers. 
In this chapter, the literature on the potential labour market impact, both positive and negative effects, 
for online talent platforms and temporary work agencies is reviewed. From this review it is clear that the 
empirical evidence on labour market effects is scarce, especially for online talent platforms. Although the 
labour market impact of online talent platforms is described in a number of studies on a theoretical level, 
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there is scant robust evidence to support their claims. Also for temporary work agencies, the evidence is 
limited and mixed. With this in mind, Chapter 1 describes the potential impact and presents available 
research, but refrains from drawing strong conclusions. 
 
6.1 Labour market transitions 
The first section of the chapter is dedicated to a range of labour market transitions, as it examines how 
online talent platforms and temporary work agencies may encourage transitions. The section also reflects 
on the potential of online talent platforms and temporary work agencies to serve as a stepping stone.  
6.1.1 Online talent platforms 
Online talent platforms may contribute in facilitating different types of labour market transitions, such as 
transitions from education to work, temporary to fixed work, part-time to full-time work, unemployment 
to employment, self-employed to employee, and others. Due to the flexible nature of the work offered 
on online talent platforms and the high level of autonomy that this work entails, online talent platforms 
may encourage labour market transitions and serve as a stepping stone (Eurofound, 2015). Participation 
in the online talent platform economy has few barriers, compared with the traditional labour market. 
While some online talent platforms have a vetting process for potential labour suppliers in place (e.g. 
check of government-issued identification cards), vetting is generally minimal or absent.  
In a report prepared by Eurofound (2015), the potential stepping-stone function of online talent platforms 
is suggested; i.e. positive first experiences between labour suppliers and clients leading to a more stable 
employment. However, the same Eurofound report casts doubt on this function, as online talent platforms 
often do not communicate the name of the client to the labour supplier, and attempt to prohibit bypassing 
the platform for future transactions (Eurofound, 2015). Nonetheless, it is likely, especially for work that is 
carried out locally and may involve ongoing services and trust (e.g. gardening, babysitting, or domestic 
cleaning), that online talent platforms are used to establish contact between client and labour supplier, 
after which any remaining transactions are arranged ‘offline’. In addition, other studies find that online 
talent platforms can be particularly interesting for individuals with entrepreneurial aspirations; in some 
cases, online talent platforms have helped fund start-ups by providing an additional source of revenue for 
labour suppliers (Botsman and Rogers, 2015).  
From this discussion, it is clear that a differentiation between categories of labour suppliers can be helpful 
to better understand what labour market transitions are possible. A Wall Street Journal article (2015) puts 
forward four groups of online talent platform labour suppliers: i) those who value the flexibility and 
autonomy (e.g. students, stay at home parents, retirees), and those for whom standard work is unsuitable; 
ii) the unemployed who cannot secure normal employment; iii) those who work full-time on one or 
multiple online talent platforms; and iv) fully-employed individuals who seek to supplement their income. 
Taking these four types as examples, a number of labour market transitions are possible. First, those who 
are unemployed or studying can engage in part- or full-time work, transitioning into employment. Second, 
labour suppliers can use the experience or skills they develop or the money they earn as a stepping stone 
towards a different type of employment they perceive as more suitable – e.g. self-employed to employed, 
or self-employed (via an online talent platform) to a different variety of self-employed. Particularly in the 
case of freelance professionals, portfolio building has been suggested as an important motivation for work 
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via online talent platforms (Maselli and Fabo, 2015). Another example is ListMinut, where labour suppliers 
are often individuals who would like to work as self-employed, but have no knowledge of how to access 
potential clients (especially when they want to contact individuals) or how to market themselves. Finally, 
those who are fully-employed in a traditional setting can transition into self-employment if they perceive 
better opportunities in the online talent platform economy.  
Anecdotal examples of each of these cases are found in the literature, but to date it does not appear that 
any serious effort to quantify the probability for labour market transitions has been published. Especially 
for workers outside the EU, evidence on labour market transitions is limited. Moreover, the advent of the 
online talent platform economy corresponds with increasingly fluid employment statuses (Huws, 2016), 
which makes identifying concrete transitions more difficult. For example, Huws et al. (2016) found that 
labour suppliers frequently identify with a number of potential statuses at one and the same time, 
claiming to be some combination of self-employed, unemployed and/or employed. 
While the possibility for the online talent platform economy to facilitate transitions from unemployment 
into work has been discussed, no surveyed evidence suggests that online talent platform work facilitates 
transitions to open-ended contracts – at least not directly. Part of this is due to the nature of online talent 
platforms; these platforms typically do not consider themselves employers and, hence, do not hire labour 
suppliers. Some platforms do have employees, for example to work on the marketing strategy or technical 
development and maintenance of the platform’s website or app. There are a few online talent platforms 
that provide employee arrangements for labour suppliers, but this is not the norm. Another consideration 
is that online talent platforms typically generate profits by taking a percentage of the transaction between 
labour supplier and customer. In the event that a labour supplier finds an open-ended contract, this source 
of revenue would be lost. 
A further point relates to the non-transferability of ratings, which ‘raises the price’ for labour suppliers of 
online talent platforms to transition to other platforms (Frenken and Schor, 2017). For example, consider 
the terms of service for topcoder, an online talent platform for designers, developers and data scientists. 
The terms and conditions for using this platform state that the labour suppliers must not disclose any 
information related to the platform, including their personal rating, “to any third party for the purpose of 
pursuing employment opportunities without the written consent of topcoder” (De Stefano, 2016). Labour 
suppliers further have to “agree to promptly notify topcoder” in the event that they are “contacted by a 
third-party regarding employment opportunities” (Ibid.). De Stefano (2016) notes that this appears to act 
as an exclusivity clause, which may be questionable under competition law. The issue of non-transferable 
ratings has also been discussed at the policy level. For example, a European Parliament (2017a) press 
release advocated that “workers should also be able to transfer and accumulate users’ electronic ratings 
and reviews, which constitute their ‘digital market value’”. To the best of our knowledge, there are no 
concrete proposals to resolve this issue. Moreover, online talent platforms tend to not consider it relevant 
or desirable.43 Another point is that ratings on one activity are not necessarily informative for another, 
depending on the tasks and skills involved. 
                                                          
43 One possible exception is a collaboration between TaskRabbit and Ebay, where one can connect one’s account on 
the different platforms to each other. Technically speaking, however, Ebay is not a labour platform. 
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As a final consideration, it is possible that the online talent platform economy will induce labour market 
transitions by harming competing industries. Fang et al. (2015), for example, find that Airbnb may reduce 
employment in the ‘low end’ of the hotel industry. Farranado and Fradkin (2015) also show that Airbnb 
attracts customers away from conventional suppliers. While Airbnb is not an online talent platform as per 
our definition, it is still illustrative. In the case that online talent platforms represent a serious challenge 
to an existing industry, it is possible that employees lose their jobs or are forced into other forms of 
employment they consider less desirable.  
6.1.2 Temporary work agencies 
Temporary agency work can support attachment to the labour market and enable the acquisition of work 
experience and skills so that the chance of employment or reemployment in dynamically changing labour 
markets is enhanced, ultimately also paving the way to stable employment. Taking into account the 
empirical research available, we distinguish between two major types of transitions that can in principle 
be supported by temporary work agencies: i) the transition from non-employment to employment, and 
ii) the transition from temporary agency work to direct and permanent employment (see the discussion 
e.g. in Voss et al. (2013) and IDEA Consult (2015)).  
Looking at the first issue, temporary agency work can provide an entry point into employment from 
outside the labour market, for example from unemployment, inactivity or education, as temporary agency 
work may lower barriers towards employment that may have to do with a lack of professional expertise, 
or with skills that are unknown or not easily identifiable by employers. A flexible type of employment like 
temporary agency work reduces the hiring risks experienced by employers and is more easily handled by 
employers relative to hiring directly via a fixed-term or permanent contract, even if they would provide 
for a probationary period at the beginning. Hence, access to the labour market might be stimulated for 
labour-market outsiders. This might be particularly important for groups such as the (long-term) 
unemployed, labour market (re)entrants, low-skilled or migrants (see, among others, Eichhorst et al., 
2013).  
Available evidence on this type of transition shows at a descriptive level that unemployed people and 
labour market (re)entrants frequently enter the labour market via temporary agency work in many 
European countries (see the figures presented by Voss et al. (2013) and IDEA Consult (2015)). But this 
does not yet constitute a significant bridging effect, as the unemployed can enter the labour market 
through different channels aside from temporary agency work. Yet, empirical work on the transition from 
non-employment to employment via temporary work agencies shows that this type of employment can 
in fact bring people into work, raise their employment levels and shorten phases of unemployment or 
inactivity, leading to higher employment also in the medium run, thereby identifying a limited 
contribution of temporary agency work compared to other routes (Kvasnicka, 2009; Lehmer and Ziegler, 
2010; de Graaf-Zijl et al., 2011; Hveem, 2013; Houseman, 2014).  
The second transition that could be influenced by the availability of temporary agency work is the 
transition from temporary agency work to regular, direct employment. Temporary agency work allows for 
the screening (or auditing) of workers, and it provides work experience and some skill acquisition so that 
employers might find it easier to hire them directly after an initial period of employment as agency 
workers (Autor and Houseman, 2010). This argument, the stepping-stone function of temporary agency 
work, has been addressed by empirical research trying to identify if passing through a phase in temporary 
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agency work increases the chances of getting a permanent job with the same or a different employer 
compared to most similar workers not passing through temporary agency work (see Houseman (2014) for 
a recent survey). As with the first transition – from non-employment to employment - discussed above, 
there is some descriptive evidence that some temporary agency workers enter into permanent jobs (Voss 
et al., 2013; IDEA Consult, 2015).  
However, the evidence identifying the contribution of agency work to the probability of entering regular 
employment is more mixed. It can be summarised as follows (see also the reviews by Voss et al., 2013 and 
Houseman, 2014). No general stepping stone effect could be found in comparison with fixed-term workers 
in Italy (Ichino et al., 2008), Spain (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008; García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 2005) 
and France (Givord and Wilner, 2015). Also, for Sweden no such effect could be found (Hveem, 2013). 
Andfor Germany, Kvasnicka (2009) did not find evidence to support for the stepping-stone hypothesis. 
According to this latter analysis, temporary agency workers do not seem to benefit from improved 
chances of employment outside the temporary agency work sector over a four-year period; but nor does 
this study find that these individuals exhibit a greater risk of future unemployment. Thus, temporary 
agencies can be understood as a mechanism to help to bring unemployed people into this particular type 
of work without necessarily easing the transition into other jobs. However, these general observations 
tend to hide some heterogeneity. The situation seems to be more favourable for some groups such as 
migrants in certain countries, in particular Sweden and Denmark, in situations with low unemployment 
(Jahn and Rosholm, 2013) or high-skilled workers in Spain (García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 2005). In the 
Italian case, Ichino et al. (2008) find that the probability of transition from temporary agency work is 
heterogeneous across regions, and with respect to observable characteristics such as age, education and 
economic sector. More positive results are found for service sector workers and for younger people.  
One major issue here is that once certain groups have entered the labour market as agency workers they 
continue to work in the secondary, highly flexible segment of the labour market that exhibits lower pay 
(Jahn and Pozzoli, 2013), lower productivity, employment stability and job satisfaction compared to the 
primary segment, and temporary agency work, on average, does not perform particularly well compared 
to other types of non-traditional work (Houseman, 2014; European Parliament, 2017b; Storrie, 2017). This 
observation does not apply to all countries or regions, as national experiences and practices are diverse 
and heterogeneous, but is relevant in others (in Latin America for example). 
Based on the available evidence from Europe (Houseman, 2014), the overall evidence can be described 
as mixed at best. On average, there is no clear stepping-stone effect of temporary agency work as regards 
the transition to permanent jobs. The effectiveness of the stepping-stone aspect of temporary agency 
work seems to depend on certain institutional, occupational and individual characteristics. Hence, 
temporary agency work seems to be more effective in bringing certain groups in the labour force into 
employment – i.e. to cross the barrier of entry into paid employment - but it does not clearly help them 
in making the transition from temporary agency work to permanent employment.  
Therefore, temporary agency work can be considered a rather effective entry point into the labour 
market, but on average it does not facilitate access to permanent positions. The latter effect can be 
observed under favourable conditions and for some categories of workers only. As a consequence, the 
stepping-stone function towards employment outside temporary agency work is not to be taken for 
granted, although temporary agency work can help end unemployment or inactivity, thereby raising 
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employment levels of vulnerable groups. In a dynamically changing labour market with continuous need 
for adjustment and reskilling, this can be seen as a major contribution of temporary agency work.   
One main reason for the peculiar role of temporary agency work lies outside this sector, however. The 
liberalisation of temporary employment – i.e. fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work – is often 
seen as a policy response to increase employment and lower unemployment without questioning the 
relatively strong protection of open-ended contracts by way of dismissal protection. This leads to a certain 
dualisation of labour markets where transitions between different segments of employment are limited. 
This phenomenon also applies to the role of temporary agency work in many European countries (see e.g. 
Eichhorst and Marx, 2012). Hence, easing entry into the labour market by allowing flexible types of work 
such as fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work comes at the price of a dualised labour market, 
if other segments of employment, in particular open-ended contracts, remain more regulated.  
6.1.3 Summary and comparison of labour market transitions 
Both online talent platforms and temporary work agencies have the potential to facilitate labour market 
transitions. Unfortunately, most evidence about labour market transitions is anecdotal and little empirical 
evidence is available; this applies to both the online talent platforms and temporary work agencies. 
Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn and important differences are worth noting.  
Overall, it appears that online talent platforms have a few additional barriers to labour market transitions 
that are not present in the case of temporary agency work. For example, a lack of rating mobility and the 
prevention of communication between the client and labour supplier outside the platform serve to reduce 
the ability of labour suppliers to transition to other forms of employment. However, it is quite easy to set 
up an account on a different online talent platform and proceed to work there. Additionally, the transition 
from unemployment into full-time employment seems somewhat incompatible with the online talent 
platform economy in many instances. Generally speaking, online talent platform work is unable to provide 
enough income to substitute for a traditional job. Hence, most labour suppliers merely supplement their 
income through the online talent platform economy.  
This limitation is not present for temporary work agencies, where full-time contracts (both temporary and 
permanent) are possible and common. Nevertheless, as the online talent platform economy continues its 
growth, it is possible that increased opportunities for full-time equivalent work will materialise.  
 
6.2 Undeclared and informal work 
The second section of the chapter deals with how the online talent platform economy and the temporary 
agency work sector might contribute to help fight undeclared and informal work. 
6.2.1 Online talent platforms 
A potential advantage of the online talent platform economy is that it may contribute to the fight against 
undeclared work and the formalisation of previously informal work. Activities that were carried out in the 
grey economy and avoided tax compliance, such as cleaning or delivery services, may now be organised 
in the formal economy (Huws, 2016; Huws et al., 2016; Maselli et al., 2016). Online talent platforms can 
play an active role in this regard, by closely cooperating with tax authorities and other public bodies (e.g. 
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by disclosing information on income earned by labour suppliers working on the platform – but also by 
reporting their own income).  
Efforts to formalise work that is often carried out in the grey economy precede online talent platforms, 
exemplified by the Belgian voucher system for cleaning and other household services (Gerald et al., 2014). 
In fact, many temporary work agencies also offer services based on the Belgian voucher system, even if 
under a separate legal framework. Note that the existence of such systems may affect the use or 
popularity of online talent platforms offering similar services. Besides Belgium, Finland, France, Germany 
and Italy additionally have schemes for household and personal services including cleaning, childcare and 
home repair (European Commission, 2015). Perhaps the most important formalising factor with online 
talent platforms is their digital nature, which inherently creates a record of activities and transactions. 
Indeed, Kearney et al. (2013) argue that tax compliance is higher in countries with a higher penetration of 
electronic payments. From this observation, it follows that shifting work from untraceable cash payments 
to electronic payments through online talent platforms may increase tax revenues. For further details on 
taxation, we refer to Chapter 1. 
A Belgian platform ListMinut specialises in providing low- and medium-skilled local services, based on a 
business model best known in the American platform TaskRabbit. ListMinut was inspired by the 
TaskRabbit model, but adapted to the Belgian legal framework. Part of the novelty of platforms like these 
is the possibility to formalise and make professions out of tasks that were once largely informal or 
occasional, such as pet-sitting or babysitting (De Groen et al., 2016). With that said, more formal than 
before does not mean objectively formal. Creating digital records of transactions for discrete tasks is a 
step towards formalisation, but that is not to say that a new formal labour market is the observed 
outcome. As was also discussed in Chapter 1, cooperation in sharing data with tax authorities is an 
additional prerequisite.  
Moreover, online talent platforms may have limitations in this regard. For example, if a platform charges 
a commission on a service rendered, it may be worthwhile for labour suppliers and customers to find 
another one using an online talent platform, then exchange contact information and continue on a private 
cash basis. This is a particularly strong possibility for online talent platforms that offer local services, and 
online talent platforms have a strong incentive to avoid such an occurrence (Goudin, 2016). For certain 
tasks like gardening, household cleaning or babysitting, where a continuous period of service is often 
desirable and trustworthiness may be a factor, this tendency may be stronger. For tasks that do not 
necessarily lend themselves to regular intervals, such as assistance in moving or occasional repairs, it may 
be less pronounced.  
Using online talent platforms to make contact and then discontinuing their use may not be such an issue 
for services rendered remotely such as design or IT. In these instances, online talent platforms usually 
provide a measure of security against non-payment,44 so labour suppliers would be less inclined to engage 
with customers on an individual basis. Where market failures including non-payment are possible, self-
regulation measures such as rating schemes and certain guarantees offered by online talent platforms 
may be a desirable alternative to transactions with no intermediation. As an example, Fair Crowd Work 
                                                          
44 For Drahokoupil and Fabo (2016), an important consideration of platforms is that they aim to prevent market 
failures such as incomplete information about the labour supplier or cheating.  
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interviewed labour suppliers about several online talent platforms, finding that non-payment was only a 
marginal issue for most platforms. Even for Amazon Mechanical Turk, which is widely criticised for poor 
terms of service (e.g. Aloisi, 2015), and which Fair Crowd Work rates poorly, the conclusion is that non-
payment was not a frequently occurring issue for most workers surveyed, although most of these workers 
had at least one experience with non-payment for work performed (Fair Crowd Work, 2017). Online talent 
platforms have a strong incentive to prevent non-payment, as it would drive labour suppliers to competing 
platforms. 
One caveat to note may be the tendency for online talent platforms to take work in the opposite direction, 
from the formal to the informal. While not an online talent platform, Airbnb is still a relevant example 
because of studies on its effects on the labour market (for example, on employment in the tourism sector). 
These effects could have parallels with online talent platforms. For example, Guttentag (2013) discusses 
the emergence of an informal tourism and accommodation sector driven by the popularity of Airbnb. In 
the case of personal transport as well, the online talent platform economy heralded a shift away from the 
largely formal (and even oligopolistic) taxi sector (Jenk, 2015). This highlights examples of where a formal 
industry has long been established, but stringent requirements in the traditional marketplace combined 
with advances in the online talent platform economy shifted industries towards less formal alternatives. 
Poor opportunities in the formal labour market, real or perceived, may also lead some individuals to focus 
their efforts on securing less formal work within the online talent platform economy. 
In summary, online talent platforms have an impact on undeclared and informal work, but depending on 
incentives and specific circumstances of the industry in question, the direction can be towards or away 
from formalisation. In a number of cases, online talent platforms have been pressured to comply with 
national and local ordinances by collecting taxes and sharing data (Miller, 2015). This may lead one to 
conclude that online talent platforms are a force towards formalisation, but a more nuanced assessment 
is needed. Depending on the specific type of labour in question, a careful evaluation of the incentives of 
labour suppliers, clients and platforms must be made. In cases where substantial barriers to work persist 
(e.g. acquiring a taxi license), the online talent platform economy may be ‘disruptive’ and shift labour 
suppliers away from the formal or traditional labour market. In cases where online talent platforms offer 
a larger or more consistent base of clients and prevent ‘cheating’, the trend is more likely to be towards 
formalisation. On the whole, however, most literature highlights the tendency of online talent platforms 
to formalise labour. 
6.2.2 Temporary work agencies 
There is very little evidence on the relationship between temporary agency work and the size of the 
informal sector. Using the OECD indicators of the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) 
and data on the size of the undeclared economy, Williams and Renooy (2014) show a simple bivariate 
correlation between the regulation of temporary agency work and temporary contracts and the size of 
the undeclared economy. The informal sector is smaller in countries where fixed-term contracts and 
temporary agency work is regulated less heavily. This correlation also holds when using the Private 
Employment Services Regulatory Efficiency Index and its different components developed by the Boston 
Consulting Group BCG and Ciett (2011). This analysis is based on a very small sample and does not take 
into account any intervening factors, and hence can only be considered a preliminary hint. Ciett (2011) 
reported a negative bivariate correlation between the temporary agency work penetration rate and the 
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size of the informal sector. Furthermore, descriptive evidence presented for Italy suggests that informal 
work declined after the liberalisation of temporary agency work (Ciett, 2011). In addition, Williams and 
Renooy (2014) show that countries with better developed social protection and active labour market 
policies exhibit smaller shares of undeclared work in their economies. An Italian study found that 
temporary work agencies offer labour market entrants, in particular foreign workers, an opportunity to 
exit the informal labour market and receive a first stint in formal employment (Altieri et al., 2009). 
Hence, it seems fair to say that countries where temporary work agencies are better established and 
easier to access, given “efficient” regulation, tend to have a smaller undeclared work sector (IDEA Consult, 
2105). Although the relationship between the ease of using temporary work agencies and the size of the 
undeclared economy is not proposed to be causal; it can be argued that this mechanism highlights the 
potential for the temporary agency work sector to formalise certain types of work. The proposed 
mechanism is that more efficiently regulated private employment services ensure that firms have ready 
access to temporary labour without being tempted to resort to undeclared work. So Williams and Renooy 
(2014) suggest the possibility that “these regulatory conditions foster a private employment service 
industry that is developed and can contribute to better functioning labour markets where the need to 
turn to undeclared work is less necessary because firms can easily resort to TWAs to fulfil their needs”.  
Efforts to establish regulatory frameworks for European temporary work agencies, as detailed in chapter 
3, were partially due to concerns about undeclared work. Partnership agreements were reached in many 
countries to address undeclared work, and this affected sectors including transport, temporary agency 
work and others (ILO, 2009). While the temporary agency work sector in Europe has become a part of the 
formal labour market landscape, a share of temporary agency work and subcontracted work in other 
locations remains informal (Cazes and Laiglesia, 2014).  
Social partners have worked with governments and temporary work agencies to reduce undeclared work. 
This is evidenced by an influential series of joint declarations (Eurofound, 2009). A 2008 Memorandum of 
Understanding signed by Ciett Corporate Members and UNI Global Union posits that temporary work 
agencies can contribute to preventing undeclared work (Ciett and UNI, 2008).  
6.2.3 Summary and Comparison of Undeclared and Informal Work 
Online talent platforms may have the potential to reduce instances of informal labour, but the mechanics, 
incentives and other considerations are not uniform and require further consideration. Formalisation is 
most likely due to two factors: i) digitalisation of transactions, which are inherent in nearly all models of 
online talent platforms, and ii) cooperation of online talent platforms with tax and other authorities, which 
is not necessarily a given. The trend towards formalisation is, therefore, unlikely to be uniform across all 
areas of the online talent platform economy. In some cases, for example the hospitality industry, it may 
even encourage a trend towards informalisation or at least deregulation. Christoph Juen, CEO of the Swiss 
Hotel Association, has said that “the emergence of online platforms such as Airbnb creates a chance to 
reduce regulation in the entire hotel and tourism industry” (Deloitte, 2015). 
Given that temporary work agencies have generally been formalised institutions for decades, and that 
they provide flexible labour options for employers, it is likely that they are a force for formalisation of 
labour. Nevertheless, there is little robust evidence to support this argument. The effect on formalisation 
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of labour is likely to be most relevant for labour market entrants, people of foreign nationality and others 
who can experience difficulty in finding employment in the traditional labour market. 
 
6.3 Labour market participation 
This third section of chapter 6 builds on the previous sections and explores to what extent online talent 
platforms and temporary work agencies may contribute to labour market participation.  
6.3.1 Online talent platforms 
A number of studies have acknowledged the potential of the online talent platform economy to encourage 
labour market participation (Eurofound, 2015). As was also indicated above, the flexibility and autonomy 
of the work in the online talent platform economy may provide additional opportunities for individuals 
who struggle to enter the labour market (e.g. retirees, stay-at-home parents, those with disabilities, 
people living in rural areas and others who find it difficult to work at conventional times and places (e.g. 
WSJ, 2015; Dettling, 2016; Huws et al., 2016; Sundararajan, 2016). Other studies have indicated that 
online talent platforms may particularly encourage labour market participation of young labour market 
entrants and others with a more limited work experience, as it allows them to gain experience with fewer 
barriers to start work than the formal labour market (European Parliament, 2016). As such, the online 
talent platform economy bears the potential to make labour markets more inclusive. 
Online talent platforms have been noted for increasing opportunities in the labour market in two ways: i) 
creating the opportunity for flexible work and ii) creating demand for new forms of labour (De Groen et 
al., 2016). The typical fixed work schedule is not possible for a variety of different people, and even fixed 
hours for a part-time job can create problems due to the lack of flexibility. As such, online talent platforms 
that operate as intermediaries, where clients pick labour suppliers and labour suppliers pick clients, 
provide value for people with limited ability to hold traditional forms of employment. In terms of demand 
for new forms of labour, examples such as pet-sitting are illustrative. Labour market entrants may lack 
the experience and skills that employers look for even in entry-level positions, but, in recent years, online 
talent platforms have enabled individuals to make a profession out of various odd jobs. In these ways, 
unemployed or inactive people of working age have more opportunities to participate in the labour 
market as a result of online talent platforms (De Groen et al., 2016). 
Additionally, online talent platforms have the potential to increase labour market participation for other 
marginalised groups. For example, Agrawal et al. (2013) suggest that online labour markets break down 
geographical barriers and increase women’s participation. This follows the more general trend that 
advances in telecommunications increase labour market opportunities for women, especially those who 
require more flexible work. For example, Dettling (2011) concludes that the internet facilitates (re)entry 
into the labour force, particularly for highly skilled women and those with children. As discussed in chapter 
2, numerous surveys have found evidence that labour suppliers for online talent platforms are more likely 
than the general population to come from racial or ethnic minorities.45 
                                                          
45 One of the arguments that Uber often puts forward relates to this issue. Uber tends to highlight the ethnic diversity 
of its drivers operating in Paris, emphasising how it facilitates access to the labour market for those with a migrant 
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At the same time, it is possible that minorities tend to perform the less desirable work in the online talent 
platform economy (Roberts, 2016). For example, “relatively low-status” workers tend to work for low 
wages in commercial content moderation – a type of low-skill work common on online talent platforms 
that involves screening digital content that may be offensive, disturbing or otherwise harm an online 
brand (Ibid.). Graham (2016) also argues that low-paid and low-skill online work has the potential to 
disproportionately harm vulnerable individuals, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. In 
some cases, blatant discrimination occurs on online talent platforms with explicit requests for no bids 
from certain nations, notably those in South Asia (Ibid.)  
Nevertheless, most evidence seems to indicate that the majority of labour suppliers for online talent 
platforms are merely seeking to complement their regular source of income. This would then suggest that 
the online talent platform economy mostly increases labour market participation of those who are already 
employed. Huws et al. (2016) reach this conclusion based on a large survey of ‘crowd workers’ in the UK, 
Sweden, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. It also fits the basic assumption of much of the literature 
on the overall platform economy, which emphasises its role to mobilise underutilised assets, including 
time (e.g. Botsman and Rogers, 2015; Frenken et al., 2015). As a final note, Huws et al. (2016) find that 
participants tend to be younger and fairly gender balanced, which may mean that opportunities for labour 
market participation are more relevant for younger people, but comparable for women and men. 
6.3.2 Temporary work agencies 
Labour market participation might be positively affected by the availability of temporary agency work as 
an additional form of flexible employment that is characterised by lower employment protection and 
lower hiring costs, compared to permanent or fixed-term direct employment (Eichhorst et al., 2013, IDEA 
Consult, 2015). Hence, temporary employment might be particularly relevant in more regulated labour 
markets (Cahuc et al., 2013; Houseman, 2014). Temporary agency work can ease the access of socio-
economic groups that are not easily hired into regular employment, i.e. driving the first type of transitions 
discussed above. Hence, unemployment might be lower in countries where temporary agency work is 
liberalised.   
In addition, total employment can also be higher in a labour market with temporary agency work relative 
to a situation without temporary work agencies as temporary agency work can provide a buffering 
function in the labour market by offering a distinct type of flexible employment, thereby reducing the 
pressure on adaptation with the core labour force by way of costlier hirings and firings of workers on 
permanent contracts and using working time flexibility (overtime, working time accounts). If temporary 
agency work is available, firms can buffer temporary demand peaks and slumps by hiring and dismissing 
temporary agency workers. If under such conditions firms have to rely less on working time flexibility or 
direct hirings, temporary agency work could be associated with higher medium-term levels of 
employment, albeit at the price of higher employment volatility and increased heterogeneity of jobs. 
Furthermore, temporary agency work can have a positive effect on productivity, competitiveness and 
                                                          
background. This point is relevant, but overlooks the fact that a similar diversity can be found in the taxi industry. 
Although transportation-oriented platforms are not the focus of this study, this example is nonetheless illustrative 
of the importance of the argument. 
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profitability of firms due to a better adjustment of staffing to business activity, thereby stimulating further 
employment growth.  
Along these lines, Jahn and Weber (2012) show that in Germany the deregulation of temporary agency 
work contributed to the rise in total employment, but some crowding out of regular employment could 
be observed.  
One prominent case here is also the use of temporary agency work in the German manufacturing sector 
during the 2008-09 crisis (Baumgarten and Kvasnicka, 2016). Export-oriented manufacturing has been one 
of the major users of temporary agency work in Germany since the early 2000s. Despite the prominent 
debate about working time accounts and, in particular, short-time work, as mechanisms used to stabilise 
core staff in German manufacturing in a situation of a massive demand slump, an equally important role 
was played by redundancies in the temporary agency sector. Baumgarten and Kvasnicka (2016) show that 
heavy users of temporary agency work could cope more easily with the crisis, i.e. stabilise their core labour 
force and profitability, and did not rely on short-time work that intensively. Hence, there are differences 
in firm strategies when it came to coping with the crisis. All in all, about the same number of permanent 
jobs that was saved by short-time work and working-time flexibility through accounts was destroyed, at 
least temporarily, by terminating temporary agency work contracts (Eichhorst et al., 2010). However, 
while this involved a major effort in labour market adaptation on the part of agency workers who become 
unemployed, this strategy facilitated a quick recovery of manufacturing, and thereby contributed to stable 
and later on even slightly increasing employment in German manufacturing after 2009-10. This also led 
to a recovery of the temporary agency sector. All in all, this mechanism might lead to a higher level of 
total employment in the medium to long run.   
This also shows that temporary agency work can contribute to higher levels of employment, particularly 
in more regulated labour markets, but at the cost of a certain segmentation of employment and some 
limited crowding out of regular jobs.  
6.3.3 Summary and comparison of labour market participation 
Both the online talent platform economy and temporary agency work sector seem to encourage labour 
market participation, albeit in different ways. The online talent platform economy is noteworthy for its 
highly flexible forms of labour. For example, anyone with a computer, internet connection and a bank 
account can earn money with ‘click work’. This is especially relevant for women with children, the elderly, 
the disabled and others who may struggle to meet the demands associated with traditional employment.  
Temporary agency work is likely to increase labour market participation for a different category of people, 
namely young people (and particularly young men) who might struggle to successfully find employment 
in the traditional labour market. The sectoral consideration is also important here. Yet, these two groups 
of people – those participating in the online talent platform economy and temporary agency work sector 
– likely share a certain portion of barriers to traditional employment. This would indicate that both 
temporary agency work and online talent platform work have the potential to be helpful options to raise 
labour market participation. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
As the world of work is rapidly changing, new non-traditional forms of work have emerged that provide 
flexible forms of work and opportunities for labour market participation, but have also raised challenges 
on the definitions of employment relationships and the classification of labour suppliers. This study had 
focused on online talent platforms and the new forms of work they have created. For the purpose of this 
study, online talent platforms are defined as “digital work platforms that provide online peer-to-peer 
intermediation through which users can get temporary access to other users’ services and the payment is 
made through the platform”. While their role has been contested, most online talent platforms maintain 
that they serve as intermediaries between labour demand and supply, in a triangular work relationship. 
Taking their role as labour market intermediaries as a starting point, a comparison between online talent 
platforms and other types of intermediaries can reveal new insights into their labour market effects, but 
it can also provide evidence on whether online talent platforms are taking up the role of intermediaries. 
Are the relationships between the platform, client and labour supplier similar to those between the 
intermediary, client and worker in other cases? Considering the flexible nature of work in the online talent 
platform economy, temporary work agencies make for a particularly interesting basis of comparison. 
Temporary work agencies are specialised in short-term, flexible work and have operated in Europe for 
decades. Unlike work in the online talent platform economy, temporary agency work is heavily regulated.  
Temporary work agencies further make for an interesting comparison because the boundaries between 
these agencies and online talent platforms are blurring. Hybrid models that combine features of both have 
started to emerge. Furthermore, while many online talent platforms claim to be intermediaries, court 
cases have shown that some platforms function instead as employers. A few online talent platforms have 
explicitly taken up this position, for example by offering employment contracts to labour suppliers. In 
those cases, there may not be a triangular relationship, or at least the responsibilities may be shifting. In 
other cases, platforms view themselves as tech companies or start-ups.  
With this in mind, the objective of the study was to compare online talent platforms and temporary work 
agencies regarding their scope and the nature of work. To this end, the study covered issues such as size 
and structure, access to social protection and training, labour market impact and the applicable 
(regulatory) framework. In that way, the study also attempted to find out how comparable online talent 
platforms and temporary work agencies are in these dimensions. Whereas there are clear parallels 
between the two, this study also revealed significant differences – not in the least in relation to the 
regulatory framework, access to social protection and access to training. In addition, it seems that 
temporary work agencies often offer a different type of work, with different work relationships and 
remuneration.    
This comparison between online talent platforms and temporary work agencies is hampered by two main 
issues. First, there is a lack of robust, reliable data on online talent platforms and such data are generally 
difficult to collect, but the body of research is growing and this study hopes to contribute to the literature. 
Also for temporary work agencies, data availability is quite limited. To overcome this challenge, this study 
draws on literature from a range of sources. More generally, it implies that further analysis and monitoring 
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of the online talent platform economy is needed. In this light, platforms have also been called upon to 
exercise greater transparency in their operations. Moreover, the use of web data and big data can be 
helpful in this regard, as the transactions in the online talent platform economy are digital. 
Secondly, the lack of a common definition or conceptualisation of the online talent platform economy is 
another complication. This has raised questions on the definition of online (talent) platforms, but also on 
the roles of the actors that take part in the online talent platform economy: Are platforms intermediaries 
or employers (and, in both cases, what does this mean; should the existing definitions of these concept 
be revised)? Are labour suppliers employees or self-employed? Or do they have yet another status (and 
again, what does this mean in terms of the definitions and conceptualisations in place)? These questions 
are considered in the study.  
 
Structure and size of online talent platform economy and temporary agency work sector 
Given that online talent platforms have entered the labour market relatively recently, they represent only 
a small share of total employment in the EU (i.e. 0.05% of the European workforce according to recent 
estimates). Yet, the online talent platform economy is growing at a fast pace and has already had a 
disruptive impact on the sectors in which the platforms are most prevalent (transportation and 
accommodation most notably). Around 17% of Europeans are found to engage in the online talent 
platform economy as consumers or as labour suppliers according to a 2016 Eurobarometer survey. In 
terms of its structure, the online talent platform economy is typified by a plethora of platforms, which 
differ in terms of sector, activities, business model, target audience and other features. While the online 
talent platform economy was already quite diverse from the onset, its heterogeneity has only increased 
with its proliferation. 
Most labour suppliers work on online talent platforms to earn a supplementary income, on top of income 
gained through other activities. Many of them are active on multiple platforms at the same time. Young 
men of ethnic minority background and living in urban areas tend to be overrepresented among the 
labour suppliers. There are several reasons why labour suppliers work through online talent platforms, 
from higher levels of flexibility and autonomy to opportunities to try out activities before becoming self-
employed. Both push and pull factors appear to be at play. 
Temporary agency work was on the rise until 2008, but its growth has levelled off more recently (after the 
crisis). In addition, the developments in temporary agency work are connected to the economic cycle, 
meaning that the sector reports the largest growth in times of economic upturn and vice versa. Roughly 
2.5% of the labour force in Europe works through a temporary work agency, but this percentage differs 
substantially across the EU Member States. In some Member States, temporary agency work covers a 
significant share of employment; in others the share is much smaller.  
Despite the similarities, it seems that temporary work agencies and online talent platforms are attracting 
different types of labour suppliers and clients. For example, while temporary work agencies typically have 
companies as clients, there is more diversity in the online talent platform in this regard. In fact, peer-to-
peer transactions are still predominant (although companies have started to use platforms as well – which 
is likely linked to the rise of hybrid forms that fall between online talent platforms and temporary work 
agencies). Temporary agency workers typically have an employment contract, and many are young. 
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Further clarity on the online talent platform economy is needed to support evidence-based policy-making. 
To this end, a continued monitoring of online talent platforms is required to enhance the understanding. 
Monitoring efforts should be broad in scope, covering different aspects about the platforms themselves, 
the nature of the work, and the labour suppliers and clients. All these variables are subject to continuous 
change and should therefore be monitored accordingly. Data collection has so far mostly resulted in 
providing only a snapshot of the online talent platform economy far. Although surveys managed to 
capture the profile of online talent platform labour suppliers, data on their motivations remain scarce. To 
this end, more transparency would be helpful. Similarly, further research into temporary work agencies 
and how they are adjusting to the changing world of work is needed, especially given that more flexible 
forms of work are expected to gain in importance. For these data collection exercises, there is a role for 
statistical offices, international organisations, governments and social partners. 
 
Regulatory frameworks governing online talent platforms and temporary work agencies 
With regard to the applicable (regulatory) framework, there are significant differences between the online 
talent platform economy and the temporary agency work sector. Whereas there is no specific regulatory 
framework in place for work in the online talent platform economy, temporary agency work is regulated 
on a global level by ILO Convention 181, and on the EU-level primarily by Directive 2008/104/EC, and it is 
further governed by national regulations. This Directive, together with the Directive on Health and Safety 
in Fixed-Term and Temporary Employment (91/383/EC) and a number of ILO Conventions, of which ILO 
Convention 181 is the most important one, have been key in shaping temporary agency work. Together, 
they ensure that temporary agency workers have similar rights as employees with indefinite contracts.  
For online talent platforms, the situation is radically different. Without a specific framework in place, the 
existing regulatory frameworks on taxation, competition, consumer protection, labour and others should 
apply (not only general legislative framework, also sector-specific regulations). As the existing framework 
may not fit very well with the specificities of online talent platforms, a range of grey areas remains, most 
notably in the application of laws on consumer protection, health and safety and labour. Governments 
have started to take measures in response to the online talent platform economy, but these are mostly 
reactive and focused on a specific issue or case. 
As part of this debate, the need for an EU-level regulatory approach has also been discussed, but a 
consensus has not yet been reached. Some have argued in favour of an EU-wide approach, arguing that 
many online talent platforms operate across borders and that many of the challenges faced are the same. 
Others have stressed that online talent platforms largely affect national competences, so that national 
policy-makers should be free to decide how to approach them. The European Commission has so far 
maintained that what is needed is not new regulation, but rather clarifications on what regulation is 
applicable. At the level of the EU Member States, this process is still ongoing. Furthermore, governments 
have focused their efforts on different issues, most notably taxation. Other domains have been 
overlooked.  
There have been a few attempts at self-regulation, but these are in their infancy. Similarly, no licensing of 
online talent platforms exists (although some policy options would go in that direction). So far, little is 
known about how the same platform adjusts to different national regulatory frameworks. This is an 
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interesting area for further research, and it is one that can shed light on suitable approaches to deal with 
specific challenges.  
Whereas Directive 2008/104/EC has played a role in setting European-wide minimum standards in the 
temporary agency work sector, the challenge to do the same in the online talent platform economy may 
be even larger. In addition, as it is likely that work on online talent platforms and other non-traditional 
forms of work will continue their growth, policy-makers will have to reach a balance between, on the one 
hand, supporting innovation and ensuring that the benefits of these new forms of work can be reaped, 
and on the other hand, addressing the risks that they entail. The challenge, therefore, is to develop 
appropriate regulation. While governments have started to respond to the online talent platform 
economy, many policies are still in the early stages of implementation and their impact is, therefore, still 
to be assessed. 
 
Access to social protection and the role of social partners for online talent platforms and temporary 
work agencies 
Access to social protection is one of the main concerns that has been debated in the context of the online 
talent platform economy. More generally, the social security schemes that are currently in place, and their 
corresponding regulatory framework, are not adapted to the changing world of work. Challenges not only 
relate to statutory access to social protection but also effective access; and transitions from one status to 
another or combinations of different statuses are often difficult to manage.  
Access to social protection is generally linked to the employment status of an individual. While universal 
benefits exist, it is typically the employment status that determines what rights and what obligations a 
person has in this domain. The status of labour suppliers working in the online talent platform economy, 
however, is still to be clarified. As a result, labour suppliers risk falling in between different systems, being 
unaware of their rights and obligations. Furthermore, as was also shown in this report, the authorities or 
actors responsible for the social security scheme may also not know how to deal with the labour suppliers. 
Given the increasing heterogeneity in work relationships in the online talent platform economy, the status 
of labour suppliers may even become more difficult to pinpoint. This call for further clarity, which has 
been echoed by social partners, will be one of the main challenges to tackle. To this end, an exchange of 
information between governments, platforms, labour suppliers and other actors is needed. Although 
there have been some attempts to bring together information, these should be expanded and 
strengthened. 
As labour suppliers from online talent platforms tend to be classified as self-employed, more so than as 
workers or employees, their access to social protection is likely to correspond to that of self-employed. 
Self-employed typically pay less social security contributions, but this has consequences for their rights. 
In response to the unclear labour status, proposals for a third status have been put forward (e.g. a status 
in between employee and self-employed, which would treat a worker as an employee in terms of social 
security but as self-employed in other areas). These proposals, however, have not been taken up so far, 
one of the reasons being that most countries already have a complicated regulatory framework and are 
reluctant to add another layer of complexity.  
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The situation with regard to access to social protection is rather different for temporary agency workers. 
These workers have a clear employment status and an employment contract, and their access to social 
protection is generally on a par with that of employees with indefinite contracts. For them, statutory 
access is typically not a concern, but effective access may be. Depending on how the system is set up, 
temporary agency workers may find it difficult to meet the requirements or minimum thresholds in order 
to be able to draw benefits (even though theoretically they do have access to them – e.g. meeting a 
minimum number of working hours or days over a certain period). Although this could be resolved by 
making it easier to meet the thresholds or abolishing them altogether, this move would have financial 
implications. 
The European Pillar of Social Rights calls for social protection for all, regardless of labour market status 
(although it is not legally binding). This is an ambitious goal indeed, and a lot of work is still ahead in order 
to achieve it. The potential solutions that policy-makers can and will explore, will be determined by the 
national context and preferences. While in some countries the social security scheme already 
accommodates different types of workers and access can be ensured by adapting the parameters of the 
scheme, other countries may see a need to expand the scheme as such. Different solutions have been put 
forward to address these issues, ranging from making social security universal to individual accounts 
(portable benefits), yet few of these proposals have already been implemented. Besides governments, 
social partners and some platforms have also taken up the issue.  
In the debate on online talent platforms, social partners play a major role. As representatives of both 
employers and workers, they have voiced their concerns about unfair competition and called for a level 
playing field for businesses as well as workers. This call has been echoed by policy-makers and other 
stakeholders and is further supported by a growing base of research. Social partners have also taken a 
leading role in the temporary agency work sector, and the lessons they have learned in that sector can be 
helpful in dealing with online talent platforms as well. Whereas organisation and representation are clear 
concepts in the temporary agency work sector, these are less clear for online talent platforms: labour 
suppliers may not be employees, platforms may not be employers, the role of the government is unclear 
and different types of grassroots organisations and new forms of intermediaries are popping up. The 
traditional social dialogue structures do not fit well with this setting. For labour suppliers, the right to 
organise may also be distorted by anti-cartel laws. This is an issue that governments should address. 
One final point relates to the enforcement of rights. Although online talent platform labour suppliers, but 
also temporary agency workers, have the right to have access to social protection as well as organisation 
and representation, in practice this right may not always be honoured. It is necessary to find ways to 
enforce these rights, without going to court (in the case of online talent platforms particularly). Whereas 
attempts at self-regulation by platforms have been documented, they are still rare. Court cases can help 
clarify the status or rights of labour suppliers in relation to a specific case or platform (e.g. the Uber case 
in the UK, which found that Uber drivers should be treated as workers), but the conclusions of these court 
cases may not be applicable beyond the specific circumstances (i.e. cannot be generalised). Nevertheless, 
the outcomes of some high-profile cases have been highly anticipated and are being used to inform policy-
making. 
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Skills development and access to training for labour suppliers in the online talent platform economy 
and temporary agency workers 
Skills enhancement and access to training is one of the domains in which there is a substantial difference 
between online talent platforms and temporary work agencies. Whereas skills enhancement and training 
opportunities are nearly non-existent in the online talent platform economy, temporary work agencies – 
under the impetus of social partners – pay significant attention to this issue. In the case of temporary 
work agencies, however, it is once again important to distinguish between the theoretical and effective 
level.  
In the rapidly changing world of work, training is key for workers at all skill levels. Everyone must engage 
in lifelong learning, to ensure that their skills remain up-to-date (which might require both up- and 
reskilling). Education alone will no longer be sufficient, but would have to be combined with on-the-job 
training and other forms of learning. The growing importance of continued training can be explained by 
the rapid technological advancements and the extension of working lives in Europe. Together with other 
economic, societal and environmental changes, they greatly affect what skills are needed in the labour 
market. In this regard, transversal skills have received much attention recently, as they support the 
development of other skills. Efforts to enhance skills should, therefore, cover different types of skills. The 
fundamental role of training and education has also been underscored in the 2017 declaration of the G20 
on “Shaping an interconnected world”. In the conclusions of the 2017 Berlin meeting of the L20, which is 
composed of elected representatives of trade unions of G20 countries, there was a call to agree on the 
conditions for fair globalisation, in which digitalisation should be taken into account. The L20 further stress 
the importance of good working conditions, secure jobs and access to social protection in this context. 
Yet, when it comes to access to training, the online talent platform economy is lagging behind. With few 
exceptions, online talent platforms do not offer training to their labour suppliers. This is due to several 
reasons. First of all, online talent platforms consider themselves intermediaries and, therefore, argue that 
access to training is the responsibility of the labour suppliers (e.g. when they are self-employed) or client. 
Furthermore, when platforms offer training, their relationship towards the labour suppliers may be seen 
as a traditional employment relationship in which they function as employer. Online talent platforms 
generally try to avoid giving this impression.  
There are some examples of online talent platforms that do offer access to training or are planning to do 
so. Examples range from basic training covering safety regulations or use of the platform, over training 
provided by other labour suppliers working through the platform, to platforms that have partnered with 
other organisations to provide training. In addition, the surveyed hybrid forms that have features of 
temporary work agencies and online talent platforms tend to provide access to training. 
In comparison with online talent platforms, temporary work agencies provide far more opportunities for 
skills enhancement and training. The establishment of bipartite funds is an important development in this 
regard. A number of countries have special funding mechanisms for training temporary agency workers. 
In other countries, these workers receive training under a broader framework. Temporary agency workers 
generally have the same access to training as workers with full-time, open-ended contracts in most 
countries. In practice, however, there appear to be certain cases where access to training for temporary 
agency workers is not as comprehensive as for other workers. This could, therefore, be an area for future 
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improvement. This is particularly true given that many temporary agency workers are motivated by the 
desire to further their professional training and acquire a first working experience. 
More generally, this raises questions on the access to training of non-traditional workers, including the 
self-employed. Self-employed workers bear responsibility for their own training and need to find a way to 
finance it (and are likely to be without income when participating in the training). For online talent 
platform labour suppliers, access to training becomes even more complicated as many work on multiple 
platforms at the same time, often combining very different tasks. These issues support a partnership 
model, in which skills enhancement and training opportunities are provided at a more centralised level. A 
model involving other platforms and (training) organisations seems promising. In this regard, social 
partners also have a role to play. 
 
Labour market participation, labour market transitions and impact on undeclared and informal work of 
online talent platforms and temporary work agencies  
In the debate on online talent platform work, the potential advantages that are often cited include their 
potential to encourage labour market transitions and labour market participation and to address informal 
and undeclared work. The main arguments in support of these claims are that online talent platforms 
offer new, flexible forms of work that may provide opportunities for those who find it difficult to work in 
a more traditional setting or who simply prefer this type of work. In that way, online talent platforms can 
lower the barriers to entry in the labour market. Online talent platforms can support labour market 
transitions by offering additional income or experience. They provide a way for people to try out a work 
activity before settling on it. While there are numerous anecdotal examples, hardly any hard evidence 
exists to support these claims. 
Similar advantages have been attributed to temporary agency work, for similar reasons. Nonetheless, also 
in this case, the empirical evidence is fragmented and mostly focused on the national context. Temporary 
work agencies may facilitate access to the labour market for labour market outsiders, such as (long-term) 
unemployed, labour market (re)entrants, the low-skilled and migrants. For transitions into permanent 
employment, there is also some evidence, but this is more mixed (e.g. applies only to some categories of 
workers). Temporary work agencies may serve to reduce undeclared and informal work, but there is a 
lack of reliable empirical evidence. For online talent platforms the research is more mixed, although a 
tendency to formalise informal labour is found. Transparency of transactions in the online talent platform 
economy is a factor contributing to this formalisation. 
In general, however, there is very little empirical evidence on the labour market effects of online talent 
platforms. This is due to the lack of data overall, but also to fact that online talent platforms are relatively 
new actors in the labour market. It is still too early to detect definitive labour market effects (going beyond 
the individual case level; there is currently no robust evidence on a larger scale). Furthermore, only a very 
small share of the population is engaged in the online talent platform economy as a labour supplier. Also 
for potential negative labour market effects, for example whether online talent platform work is crowding 
out existing more regulated occupations, the available evidence is very limited. Especially for labour 
market effects, continued monitoring and data collection are needed before any conclusions can be 
drawn. 
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Glossary of key terms and concepts 
Access to social protection - Access to health care and income security, particularly in cases of old age, 
unemployment, sickness, invalidity, work injury, maternity or loss of a main income earner. In this study, 
access to social protection is considered in a broad manner, capturing different types of risks that a person 
may be faced with.  
Source: Definition put forward by the International Labour Organisation (ILO).  
Access to training - Conditions, circumstances or requirements (such as qualifications, education level, 
competences or work experience) governing admittance to and participation in training programmes. 
In this study, this definition is used to support research on the extent to which online talent platforms 
labour supplier and temporary agency workers are able to participate in training (regardless of whether it 
concerns off-the-job or on-the-job training programmes). The study will consider both training organised 
by the employer and/or intermediary as by external organisations (public and private). 
Source: Own elaboration based on the definition of ‘access to education and training’ provided in 
Cedefop “Terminology of European education and training policy. Α selection of 130 key terms” 
(2014 edition).  
Decent work – Opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the 
workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social 
integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organise and participate in the decisions that 
affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men. 
Source: Definition put forward by the International Labour Organisation (ILO).  
Industrial relations – Collective relationships between workers, employers and their respective 
representatives, including the tripartite dimension where public authorities at different levels are 
involved.  
Source: Definition put forward by the European Commission (2014).  
Labour market intermediaries – Entities or institutions that interpose themselves between workers and 
firms to facilitate, inform, or regulate how workers are matched to firms, how work is accomplished, 
and how conflicts are resolved.  
Source: Autor (2009).  
Labour market transitions – Moves in labour market status between employment, unemployment and 
inactivity over time. As part of the study, different types of transitions are considered: not only so-called 
labour market transitions from unemployment and inactivity (e.g. education) into employment and vice 
versa, but also transitions between different types of employment status or contracts. Examples of the 
latter are transitions from employment into self-employment and vice versa, transitions from closed- to 
open-ended contracts (temporary to fixed work) and vice versa, part-time to full-time work and vice versa, 
and others. In this study, the term ‘transitions’ is used to capture all these dynamics. 
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Source: Own elaboration based on the definition put forward by Eurostat (used in the EU-Labour 
Force Survey). 
Social protection – Support systems including pension insurance covering old age, survivorship, and 
invalidity; sickness insurance covering leave for sickness, maternity/parental, or injury; and 
unemployment insurance.  
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurofound (2011). 
Online talent platform - Digital work platforms that provide online peer-to-peer intermediation through 
which users can get temporary access to other users’ services and the payment is made through the 
platform. The key point is that online talent platforms are used to provide access to flexible work 
opportunities, for specific tasks or assignments and a set period of time. Payments to the labour suppliers 
are processed through the platforms, which are work-based. Well-known examples of online talent 
platforms are TaskRabbit and Upwork. Online talent platforms are not to be confused with online job 
boards or professional social networking sites. 
Source: Own elaboration based on European Commission (2026) and REC (2016), and our own 
previous work. 
Online talent platform labour supplier – A natural person who provides labour through an online talent 
platform. The term ‘labour supplier’ is used throughout this study as it is neutral. The term is not meant 
to provide any indication on the precise nature of the labour relationship (i.e. no prejudgment on whether 
those who offer labour through an online talent platform or employees or self-employed). In this study, 
only natural persons providing labour are considered whereas legal persons are excluded.  
Source: Own elaboration based on European Commission (2026) and REC (2016), and our own 
previous work. 
Temporary agency worker - A worker with a contract of employment or an employment relationship 
with a temporary work agency with a view to being assigned to a user undertaking to work temporarily 
under its supervision and direction. Within this definition, the concept ‘worker’ refers to any person who, 
in the Member State concerned, is protected as a worker under national employment law. ‘Undertaking’ 
means any natural or legal person for whom and under the supervision and direction of whom a 
temporary agency worker works temporarily. ‘Assignment’ means the period during which the temporary 
agency worker is placed at the user undertaking to work temporarily under its supervision and direction.  
Source: Definition included in Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary agency work. 
Temporary work agency - Any natural or legal person who, in compliance with national law, concludes 
contracts of employment or employment relationships with temporary agency workers in order to 
assign them to user undertakings to work there temporarily under their supervision and direction. 
Source: Definition included in Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary agency work. 
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Appendix 
A. Unions and worker organisations for labour suppliers, by country 
Appendix A presents an overview of workers’ organisations and unions for labour suppliers working in the 
online talent platform economy. This overview is not comprehensive, but rather aims to point to diverse 
organisations, formal and less formal, that have taken an interest in the organisation and representation 
of labour suppliers. It further outlines the different types of initiatives launched by these organisations. In 
general, social partners have been active in the domain of digitalisation and new forms of work, in some 
cases extending their focus to online talent platforms. They have published analyses and reports, engaged 
in the public debate, and initiated dialogues with policy-makers, platforms and labour suppliers, among 
other initiatives. Some unions have changed their statutes to allow online talent platform labour suppliers 
to become members. Unions have also engaged in discussions with new types of intermediaries, and there 
are examples of unions negotiating on behalf of platform labour suppliers (though only a handful of such 
examples exist). At the European level, social partners have also taken a stance on the issue of online 
talent platforms and the communications and proposals from the European Commission and Parliament. 
When it comes to the examples below, there is one caveat that needs to be accounted for in light of the 
present study’s scope. Considering that labour suppliers working ‘offline’ are the easiest to identify and 
organise, most initiatives have focused on these individuals (e.g. Deliveroo bikers or Uber drivers – mostly 
individuals performing low-skilled tasks that are carried out locally; far fewer initiatives have focused on 
those performing high-skilled tasks, and those working online) (Kilhoffer et al., 2017). 
 
Austria  
Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB) (the Austrian federation of trade unions): The ÖGB supports 
the interest of labour suppliers and is actively collaborating with union inside and outside of Austria 
around this topic. For example, the ÖGB launched a project called danube@work, which involves social 
partners in Austria, Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania, aiming to raise awareness of the challenges of 
digitalisation of work and to find common solutions. The project consists of events and case studies, in 
addition to the establishment of a network and information exchange.  
Arbeitkammer (Chamber of Labour): Though not a union, the Chamber of Labour has been active in 
Austria. It did pioneering work on researching the profile and working conditions of labour suppliers 
working on online talent platforms in the country. This study later fed into the ongoing debate. 
 
France 
Syndicat des chauffeurs privés VTC: In France, there has been a lot of activity around Uber (e.g. strikes 
and demonstrations, of both taxi drivers and Uber drivers). Drivers of the union Syndicat des chauffeurs 
privés VTC staged demonstrations in response to Uber dropping the minimum fare rate from €5 to €4.25 
and Uber’s move to increase the commission it charges drivers from 20% to 25%. Following driver strikes 
in Paris, Thibaud Simphal, Uber’s general manager for Western Europe, stated his willingness to enter into 
negotiations with drivers. The French government appointed Jacques Rapoport, a former senior executive 
of the French national rail company, to moderate. As a result of the negotiations, Uber proposed a €21 
per hour minimum gross revenue for drivers working at least 40 hours per week. It also proposed to set 
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aside €2 million for financially distressed drivers. Following the negotiations, Rapoport submitted his 
recommendations to the French government, advising that the government set a legal minimum wage 
only if Uber failed to implement its promised changes. 
Germany 
Ver.di: This union has a long experience in supporting and representing the interests of self-employed 
persons, especially journalists. Now, it is also focused on couriers working in the online talent platform 
economy. Ver.di offers counselling to its self-employed, but they are members on the basis of being self-
employed rather than as platform workers. 
 
IG Metall: The largest union of those working in the metal industry in Germany, and opened up its statutes 
to self-employed members in January 2016, with a focus on online talent platform labour suppliers. IG 
Metall has been a frontrunner in the organisation and representation of labour suppliers, both in Germany 
and beyond. IG Metall is working with both the labour suppliers who work offline and online. IG Metall 
has also engaged with platforms and large German firms using online talent platforms. In 2016, IG Metall 
launched Fair Crowd Work (in collaboration with Austrian and Swedish trade unions). Fair Crowd Work 
gathers information about platforms and workers’ legal rights, and contains a rating system based on the 
platforms’ terms and conditions and worker reviews for online platforms.  
 
Sweden 
Unionen: Large Swedish union that has been very active in the debate on online talent platforms over the 
last years. Unionen has developed a plan to certify platforms for fair and sustainable working conditions.  
 
United Kingdom 
Couriers and Logistics Branch of the Independent Workers of Great Britain: is defending the rights of 
workers in the British courier and logistics industry, including self-employed workers for major courier 
companies and food delivery companies such as Deliveroo and UberEats. 
 
IWW Leeds (Industrial Workers of the World): is raising funds to support 7 Deliveroo couriers who were 
punished or fired for organising for better pay and more favourable contracts. 
 
GMB Union (Britain’s general union): took up Uber case for Uber drivers. 
 
United States 
Teamsters 117 in Seattle (transportation platforms): Actively engaged in defending the rights of drivers 
working for Uber, Lyft and others. 
 
Freelancers union (not a union in the legal sense, rather a mutual): offers unique services for freelancers, 
including insurance and training, and worked with the City Council of New York to pass the landmark 
“Freelance Isn’t Free” Act, defending the rights of freelancers to ensure they get paid.  
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B. Additional case studies 
This section presents a number of additional case examples that have not been included in the body of 
the text, but may nevertheless be informative for the reader. 
 
 
Box 13. Heetch and access to training 
Heetch is a personal transportation platform that enables drivers to pick up users and drop them 
where they want. The user gives as much money as they want to the driver. In the terms of usage, a 
Heetch driver cannot have a turnover higher than €6,000. If a driver’s revenue surpasses this amount, 
the platform sends an email telling them to consider making a profession of their driving. 
Heetch provides some help to drivers by connecting them with different training programmes. 
Moreover, the platform also negotiates partnerships with training centres. The Institut National de 
Formation à la Sécurité (INFS) [National Training Institute for Security], which handles licensing for VTC 
(Voiture de transport avec chauffeur [transportation car with chauffeur]), offers reduced fees to 
Heetch drivers (€199 instead of €499). The Apprendre et se Former en Transport et Logistique (AFTRAL) 
[Learning and Training Centre in Transport and Logistics] also takes part by organising training sessions. 
Source: Heetch (2017). 
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Box 14. Clickworker 
Clickworker, formerly Humangrid, is a German micro-tasking platform that claims to have 800,000 
registered workers. Clickworker offers a ‘marketplace’ where clients can post small tasks for 
individuals to perform, and the platform also offers ‘full-service’ by breaking down tasks into smaller 
pieces and reassembling the resulting crowd work into a coherent project.  
Clickworker’s business model is based on charging clients 40% of labour costs for the self-service 
marketplace, as well as charging higher amounts for the ‘full-service’ solutions requiring the 
breakdown and reassembly of tasks. Examples of tasks offered through Clickworker include SEO-text 
creation, web research, tagging, processing product data and conducting surveys. Client firms include 
large corporations such as Deutsche Telekom, T-Mobile and Honda. 
According to Fair Crowd Work’s terms of service criteria, most of Clickworker’s provisions are 
acceptable. Workers are neither prohibited from contacting other workers, nor from directly 
contacting clients. In most cases, workers are also allotted three days to revise work that is rejected 
on the basis of “deficiencies in the work product”. The ability to refuse payment can be problematic, 
but worker reviews reveal an informal system of dispute resolution with mostly satisfactory results. 
Additionally, workers must be notified of changes to the terms of service six weeks in advance. 
In comparison to Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), Clickworker has far better terms of service and 
dispute resolution procedures, as appraised by Fair Crowd Work. For example, the AMT’s terms of 
service state: “Because Amazon Mechanical Turk is not involved in the actual transaction between 
Providers and Requesters, Amazon Mechanical Turk will not be involved in resolving any disputes 
between participants related to or arising out of the Services or any transaction” (AMT Participation 
Agreement Section 2, 17 October 2017). Nevertheless, according to dozens of reviews from verified 
workers, both Clickworker and AMT only receive 2.5 out of 5 stars on the basis of payment, 
communication, evaluation system, tasks and technology. 
Sources: https://www.clickworker.com/how-it-works/, http://faircrowd.work/platform/clickworker/, 
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/conditionsofuse 
 
 
